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Abstract
Advances in wireless technologies have enabled distributed mobile devices to connect
with each other to form distributed wireless systems. Due to the absence of infrastructure,
distributed wireless systems require node cooperation in multi-hop routing. However, the
openness and decentralized nature of distributed wireless systems where each node labors
under a resource constraint introduces three challenges: (1) cooperation incentives that effectively encourage nodes to oﬀer services and thwart the intentions of selﬁsh and malicious
nodes, (2) cooperation incentives that are eﬃcient to deploy, use and maintain, and (3) routing to eﬃciently deliver messages with less overhead and lower delay. While most previous
cooperation incentive mechanisms rely on either a reputation system or a price system, neither provides suﬃciently eﬀective cooperation incentives nor eﬃcient resource consumption.
Also, previous routing algorithms are not suﬃciently eﬃcient in terms of routing overhead
or delay.
In this research, we propose mechanisms to improve the trustworthiness, scalability,
and eﬃciency of the distributed wireless systems. Regarding trustworthiness, we study
previous cooperation incentives based on game theory models. We then propose an integrated
system that combines a reputation system and a price system to leverage the advantages
of both methods to provide trustworthy services. Analytical and simulation results show
higher performance for the integrated system compared to the other two systems in terms
of the eﬀectiveness of the cooperation incentives and detection of selﬁsh nodes.

ii

Regarding scalability in a large-scale system, we propose a hierarchical Account-aided
Reputation Management system (ARM) to eﬃciently and eﬀectively provide cooperation
incentives with small overhead. To globally collect all node reputation information to accurately calculate node reputation information and detect abnormal reputation information
with low overhead, ARM builds a hierarchical locality-aware Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
infrastructure for the eﬃcient and integrated operation of both reputation systems and price
systems. Based on the DHT infrastructure, ARM can reduce the reputation management
overhead in reputation and price systems. We also design a distributed reputation manager auditing protocol to detect a malicious reputation manager. The experimental results
show that ARM can detect the uncooperative nodes that gain fraudulent beneﬁts while still
being considered as trustworthy in previous reputation and price systems. Also, it can effectively identify misreported, falsiﬁed, and conspiratorial information, providing accurate
node reputations that truly reﬂect node behaviors.
Regarding an eﬃcient distributed system, we propose a social network and duration
utility-based distributed multi-copy routing protocol for delay tolerant networks based on
the ARM system. The routing protocol fully exploits node movement patterns in the social
network to increase delivery throughput and decrease delivery delay while generating low
overhead. The simulation results show that the proposed routing protocol outperforms the
epidemic routing and spray and wait routing in terms of higher message delivery throughput,
lower message delivery delay, lower message delivery overhead, and higher packet delivery
success rate. The three components proposed in this dissertation research improve the trustworthiness, scalability, and eﬃciency of distributed wireless systems to meet the requirements
of diversiﬁed distributed wireless applications.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Motivation and Background

Background Tremendous advances in wireless technologies enable distributed mobile devices (e.g., cell phones, laptops and smartphones) to connect with each other without a
ﬁxed infrastructure to form distributed wireless systems such as mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) and delay tolerant networks (DTNs). Distributed wireless systems are playing
an increasingly important role in areas such as commerce, emergency services, military, education and entertainment. Compared to a centralized system that is prone to problems such
as congestion, single point of failure, a distributed wireless system can reduce the computation and bandwidth burdens on a centralized system and increase the reliability by taking
advantage of the distributed resources in the autonomous peers. The number of mobile device users has been increasing rapidly. Studies show that the number of wireless Internet
users has tripled world-wide in the last three years, and the number of smartphone users
in the US has increased from 7.4 million in 2003, to 69.2 million in 2006, to 190 million in
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2010 [5], and is expected to reach 300 million by 2013 [1]. The computational capability of
wireless devices is increasingly powerful as well. For example, the dual-core A5 processor in
the iPhone4S runs at 800MHz with a storage capacity up to 64GB [3]. The iPhone4S is also
enabled with a cellular interface (i.e. UMTS/HSDPA/HSUPA and GSM/EDGE) and WiFi
interface (i.e., 802.11b/g/n). Such high-capability devices can support many envisioned distributed wireless system applications, such as data sharing [8], road traﬃc monitoring [84],
emergency assistance services [39], and multimedia data transmission [36].
Due to the absence of infrastructure in distributed wireless systems, the systems require the cooperation of the nodes in the system to collaboratively conduct a task. For
example, MANET requires the cooperation of every node in the path for successful packet
transmission from a source node to a destination node. However, distributed wireless systems are particularly vulnerable to selﬁsh node behaviors due to the individualized nature of
nodes. Each node labors under an energy constraint, and selﬁsh nodes tend not to forward
packets to conserve their own resources for their own. It has been proven that the presence
of only a few selﬁsh nodes can dramatically degrade the throughput of an entire system [68].
What’s worse, identifying and punishing selﬁsh nodes will decrease the throughput of cooperative nodes because of the longer transmission path or even lead to complete network
disconnection [45]. Therefore, rather than simply punishing selﬁsh nodes, detecting selﬁsh
nodes in a packet transmission and further encouraging nodes to be cooperative is critical to
ensuring the proper functionality of distributed networks. Limited resources are also an inherent problem in MANETs. The recent increasing growth of multimedia applications (e.g.,
video transmission) further imposes higher requirements of resource-eﬃciency. As a result,
the openness and decentralized nature of MANETs with limited resources introduces three
challenges: (1) eﬀective cooperation incentives that encourage nodes to oﬀer services and
thwart the intentions of selﬁsh and malicious nodes, (2) eﬃcient cooperation incentives that
are resource-eﬃcient in use and maintenance, and (3) eﬃcient routing to deliver messages
2

with less overhead and lower delay.
Previous Approaches To tackle the challenges for trustworthy node communication, most
previous cooperation incentive mechanisms rely on either a reputation system [49, 74, 76,
82, 78, 69, 83, 14] or a price system [66, 56, 57, 85, 43, 54, 37]. However, neither system
provides suﬃciently eﬀective cooperation incentives nor eﬃcient resource consumption. Insuﬃcient eﬀectiveness means that the mechanisms cannot very accurately evaluate node
reputation or prevent nodes from gaining unfair beneﬁts while still being selﬁsh. The accuracy of reputation evaluation can be adversely aﬀected by false information including
falsiﬁed 1 , conspiratorial
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and misreported information 3 . Insuﬃcient eﬃciency means that

the mechanisms exacerbate the resource-eﬃciency problem in large-scale wireless systems by
consuming already scarce resources.
In most current reputation systems [76, 82, 78, 69, 11, 14, 81, 70, 63], each node
periodically exchanges local reputation information with its neighbors and aggregates it to
yield others’ reputation values (R), which are referenced for forwarder selection in routing.
A node with a reputation below a predeﬁned threshold (TR ) is considered selﬁsh, and otherwise is considered trustworthy. Selﬁsh nodes’ forwarding requests are always rejected by
other nodes. However, such reputation systems have several deﬁciencies. First, reputation
calculation based on local information, possibly including false information, may result in an
insuﬃciently accurate reputation evaluation to truly reﬂect node trustworthiness. Second,
they provide equal treatment to trustworthy nodes with R > TR and to selﬁsh nodes with
R < TR . Thus, they cannot reward trustworthy nodes or punish selﬁsh nodes diﬀerently.
Also, nodes may ﬁrst be cooperative and then later uncooperative while maintaining R ≥ TR
1

Falsiﬁed information is reported by a dishonest node to deliberately increase or decrease others’ reputations.
2
Conspiratorial information is generated by colluders that report high reputations for each other to raise
their own reputations, and report low reputations for others to decrease their reputations.
3
Misreported information means low reputations for cooperative nodes that cannot oﬀer high-quality
transmission service due to adverse network conditions such as background interference.
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to avoid punishment. Thus, solely relying on reputation systems cannot eﬀectively deter misbehavior since clever selﬁsh nodes can manipulate the policies to gain an unfair advantage
while maintaining a trustworthy status. Third, because of node mobility, local reputation
exchanges cannot give a node a reasonable understanding of a new neighbor that moves
into its range. Fourth, they lack eﬃcient mechanisms to collect and propagate reputation
information. Exchanging information periodically, storing redundant reputation values in
nodes, and broadcasting reputation queries consume signiﬁcant resources.
Price systems [66, 56, 57, 85, 37] treat packet forwarding as a service transaction, and
introduce virtual credits (or virtual money, stamps, points) for the transactions. In these
systems, nodes forward packets for others to earn credits for their own packet transmission.
However, the price systems have a number of inherent problems. First, the systems fail to
provide a mechanism to monitor the service quality oﬀered by a node. Second, they lack
an eﬀective method to punish selﬁsh and wealthy nodes (e.g., nodes requiring few services)
that occasionally drop others’ packets. Also, cooperative nodes within a low-traﬃc region
receive few forwarding requests, and thus may not earn suﬃcient credits for their needs and
thus may drop some packets. Third, the circulation of credits in the network requires a fair
amount of computation and storage resources and increases traﬃc overhead. Fourth, the
implementation of credits and virtual banks adds complexity with a high requirement on
transmission security. For example, since credits are stored at the head of a packet that is
transmitted through several nodes, how to prevent the credits from being stolen becomes a
problem.
While directly combining a reputation system and a price system can foster cooperation incentives to a certain extent, it cannot easily resolve problems in the individual systems.
Even worse, it generates doubled system overheads, making the problem of resource-eﬃciency
and scalability even more severe. Thus, a formidable challenge to be addressed in this research involves how to eﬃciently combine and coordinate the two systems to avoid the
4

problems in the individual systems, ensuring they can be exploited to their fullest capacities
in achieving highly eﬀective and eﬃcient cooperation incentives.
Concurrently, even if such a trustworthy distributed system is maintained, the multicopybased routing mechanisms [75, 90, 94, 97] generally used in current distributed wireless systems generate signiﬁcant system overhead, which quickly drains the energy of the mobile
devices and prevents the whole system from eﬀectively conducting distributed tasks. Some
research works in the literature proposed to use probabilistic single-copy routing [87, 47, 9,
27, 17, 71], in which messages are forwarded to mobile nodes that have higher probabilities
of meeting the destination node as measured by the contact frequency utility. Although the
single-copy methods save node resources and produce lower transmission overhead, they are
likely to suﬀer from severe transmission delay if a suboptimal forwarding node (i.e., a node
not in the shortest source-destination path) is chosen.
Goal This research aims to meet the trustworthy, scalable and eﬃcient node communication
requirements of diversiﬁed distributed wireless applications. To accomplish the goal of this
research, we propose, design and implement three mechanisms as described below.

1.2

Methods of Study
This dissertation research introduces novel mechanisms to support a trustworthy,

scalable and eﬃcient distributed system as shown in Figure 1.1.
To ensure the trustworthiness of the distributed system and provide eﬀective cooperation incentives that encourage nodes to oﬀer services and thwart the intentions of selﬁsh
and malicious nodes, we propose an integrated reputation/price system, integrated system in
short, that leverages the advantages of both the reputation and price systems and overcomes
their individual disadvantages, making reciprocity the focal point. The design is based on
our understanding regarding the underlying incentives and deﬁciencies of the reputation and
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Figure 1.1: Motivation and mechanisms
price systems according to the game theory models. Speciﬁcally, the cooperative game theory model is used to explore how to form a rational coalition that can optimize the beneﬁt
of each node. We ﬁnd that in the cooperative game model, each node earns the maximum
beneﬁt only when they form a grand coalition where all nodes in the system are cooperative.
We also use a non-cooperative game model to investigate the best strategy for each node to
maximize its beneﬁt. We ﬁnd that nodes can be uncooperative while still gaining beneﬁts
from both reputation and price systems. We then propose an integrated system that coordinately integrates a reputation system and a price system such that selﬁsh nodes are unable
to gain beneﬁt from the system while being uncooperative. Our analysis of the integrated
system shows that it can provide higher cooperation incentives than the reputation system
and the price system alone, and more eﬀectively detects selﬁsh nodes.
To increase the scalability of the reputation management system as well as provide
cooperation incentives that are resource-eﬃcient in use and maintenance, we design a hierarchical Account-aided Reputation Management system (ARM). ARM selects low-mobility
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and trustworthy nodes as reputation managers (managers in short), builds them into a
locality-aware distributed hash table (DHT) [88] infrastructure, and coordinately integrates
a reputation system and a price system through the infrastructure. DHT is well-known
for high scalability, eﬃciency, and reliability, thus DHT supports scalable and eﬃcient operations in ARM, by marshaling all node reputation and transaction information into one
manager that calculates the reputation and increases/decreases credits in the account of the
node accordingly. ARM can eﬀectively deter selﬁsh behaviors based on the integrated model
studied in the integrated system. In addition, ARM can also eﬀectively avoid reputation
misreporting and collusion in reputation calculation for a large-scale system.
Using ARM as the basis for enabling trustworthy routing, we further investigate
the design of an eﬃcient routing protocol to increase the routing eﬃciency of the distributed wireless system. Noticing that in many DTN applications, such as mobile sensor
networks [75], vehicular networks [39], and networks formed by mobile phone holders, the
movement of mobile devices exhibits certain patterns in a social network because the device
hosts (i.e., human or animals) normally have social movement routines [27]. Some nodes,
such as home neighbors and colleagues, have a high probability of meeting (meet and contact
are interchangeable in this dissertation) and staying close for a long time. This attribute of a
movement pattern is called colocation [27] in a network. Some nodes, such as students on a
campus, meet each other with high frequency but for a short meeting time. This attribute of
the movement pattern is called familiar stranger in a social network [77]. Intuitively, familiar strangers normally have high contact frequency, but cannot guarantee the transmission
of a large number of messages during a contact due to limited contact time. On the other
hand, colocation nodes may have low contact frequency, but they have a long meeting time
during each contact, where a large number of messages can be transmitted. For successful
routing, we propose a routing protocol that can capture both the colocation and familiar
stranger attributes in the social network. We ﬁrst design a new metric, “duration utility”,
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captures both colocation and familiar stranger attributes. Based on the metric, we propose a
multi-copy routing protocol to achieve a tradeoﬀ between routing delay and overhead using
an optimal tree replication algorithm and a Markov chain model. Further, we propose a
buﬀer management mechanism to eﬃciently manage the messages in the buﬀer.

1.3

Research Contributions
The contributions of the dissertation research entail:

• Studying the cooperation incentives in a system without any incentive encouragement,
a reputation system, and a price system for wireless distributed systems to ensure
trustworthy communications (WSNS’08 [101] and ICCCN’09 [103], IEEE Transaction
on Mobile Computing’11 [61]).
– Designing several game theory models to analyze the incentives in current reputation systems, price systems and a system with no cooperation incentive strategy
for cooperation encouragement
– Designing an integrated system to leverage the advantages of both systems and
to overcome their individual disadvantages, making reciprocity the focal point
– Developing a game theory model to analyze the integrated system based on a
cooperative game model and a non-cooperative game model
– Presenting extensive evaluation results to justify the theoretical incentive models
• Proposing a hierarchical Account-aided Reputation Management system (ARM) to eﬃciently and eﬀectively provide cooperation incentives (WiSP’08 [38], Infocom’11 [104]).
– Studying the requirements to create a locality-aware DHT infrastructure in a
MANET and proposing the construction and maintenance algorithms
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– Designing a reputation management protocol relying on the collected global information by DHT
– Designing a distributed reputation manager auditing protocol to detect the malicious reputation manager
– Designing a reputation-adaptive account management protocol to fairly treat
nodes with diﬀerent reputations and also to prevent nodes from gaining fraudulent
beneﬁts
– Presenting extensive evaluation results to evaluate the performance of ARM
• Proposing a Social nEtwork and Duration Utility based distributed Multi-copy routing
protocol (SEDUM) for a delay tolerant network that fully exploits node movement
patterns in social networks to increase routing throughput and decrease routing delay
(ICPP’08 [102], IEEE Transaction on Computers [62]).
– Studying a duration utility based routing protocol that can provide optimal routing performance
– Proposing a multi-copy routing protocol to achieve a tradeoﬀ between routing
delay and overhead based on an optimal tree replication algorithm and a Markov
chain model
– Proposing a buﬀer management mechanism to eﬃciently manage the messages in
the buﬀer
– Presenting extensive experiment results on social network and utility based distributed multi-copy routing protocol
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1.4

Dissertation Organization
In the next chapter, we present an overview of the research areas of reputation sys-

tems and price systems geared towards mobile networks. We also present an overview of the
routing in delay tolerant networks. Chapter 3 illustrates the use of game theory to study
reputation systems and price systems, and analyze their underlying incentives and deﬁciencies. We also propose an integrated system that can achieve high cooperation incentives.
Based on the theoretical results in Chapter 3, we further propose a distributed reputation
management system with high scalability and low overhead in Chapter 4. Based on the
system proposed in Chapter 4 for trustworthy routing, in Chapter 5, we study an eﬃcient
routing protocol/mechanism to increase the eﬃciency of the distributed wireless systems.
In Chapter 6, we present the validation of the integrated model. We also show the simulation results of the ARM reputation management mechanisms and the selected case studies
for eﬃcient routing in DTN. Finally, we give our concluding comments and future work in
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
How to detect and punish selﬁsh nodes in distributed systems has been the subject
of many research projects. Reputation systems and price systems are two main approaches
proposed to encourage cooperation between mobile nodes in distributed wireless systems
such as MANETs. Game theory is also used by many research communities as a mathematical tool to study human behaviors in wireless networks. How to eﬃciently route a message
in delay tolerant networks also receives signiﬁcant attention in the mobile network research
community. In this chapter, we will introduce the related research of selﬁsh node detection
and punishment based on reputation and price systems. We will also present diﬀerent methods that use game theory as mathematical tools for wireless network research. Finally, we
will show diﬀerent routing mechanisms that have been proposed for eﬃcient message routing
in delay tolerant networks. We will indicate the diﬀerences between the current state of the
art and this dissertation research.
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2.1

Reputation and Price Systems

Reputation Systems. A reputation system gathers observations of node behaviors and
calculates node reputation values [14, 49, 50, 74, 76, 82, 69, 78, 83, 107, 67, 16]. The system
detects and punishes low-reputed nodes by isolating them from the MANET. There are two
types of reputation systems: ﬁrst-hand based and second-hand based.
In ﬁrst-hand based reputation systems [14, 49, 50, 74], a node only believes its own
observations about the behavior of other nodes, and the exchange of reputation information between nodes is disallowed. OCEAN [14] is the ﬁrst to argue that the second-hand
reputation information is subject to false accusations and requires maintaining trust relationships with other nodes. Therefore, OCEAN attempted to see how far the system can
perform by using direct ﬁrst-hand observations of other node behavior. Conti et al. [49]
proposed acknowledgment-based schemes, termed TWOACK and S-TWOACK, which are
used for the source routing protocol. The destination node sends an acknowledge message
for every received packet to the source node. In this way, the selﬁsh nodes can be identiﬁed if the acknowledge messages from the destination nodes are not received by the source
nodes. The source nodes maintain a blacklist of their observed selﬁsh nodes and try to avoid
the selﬁsh nodes in the routing path in future routes. Liu et al. [50] proposed to further
improve TWOACK and S-TWOACK by only sending acknowledge packets for a fraction of
received data packets instead of all data packets to reduce the overhead. Dewan et al. [74]
proposed a system in which every node maintains a reputation value of other observed nodes.
Since every node maintains diﬀerent routing paths to other nodes, the nodes choose the next
hop nodes with a suﬃciently high reputation during the packet routing to achieve routing
reliability.
In second-hand reputation systems [76, 82, 69, 78, 83, 107, 67, 16], nodes share observations of node behaviors by periodically exchanging observed information. In Core [76], the
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authors proposed to determine the ﬁnal reputation of a node by combining the subjective
reputation and second-hand reputation. Subjective reputation is the reputation calculated
directly from a subject’s observation. Indirect reputation is the reputation learned from the
neighbors. CONFIDANT [82] aims to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes, thus making
it unattractive to deny cooperation. Trust relationships and routing decisions are based on
experienced, observed, or reported routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes. Marti et
al. [69] introduced two functions watchdog and pathrater to mitigate the eﬀorts of routing
misbehavior. When a node forwards a packet, the nodes’ watchdog veriﬁes that the next node
in the path also forwards the packet. If the next node does not forward the packet, then the
next node is regarded as a misbehaving node. The misbehaving information is propagated
throughout the network. The pathrater uses this knowledge of misbehaving nodes to choose
the network path that is most likely to deliver packets. He et al. [78] proposed to objectively
calculate the reputation of a node based on the packet forwarding ratio of the node associated
with its conﬁdence and credibility value. The propagation of reputation is eﬃciently secured
by a one-way-hash-chain-based authentication scheme. Buchegger et al. [83] proposed to
use a Bayesian approach for the representation and building of reputation as well as for
subsequent decision-making depending on the reputation. They found that by excluding
opinions that deviate substantially from ﬁrst-hand observation and the majority opinion of
second-hand opinions gathered overtime, the robustness of the reputation system remains
intact even with a large number of liars in the network. Zong et al. [107] proposed a trust
computation model based on artiﬁcial neural networks (ANN), which can help trust model
tune its parameters automatically to adapt to various requirements on the trust calculation.
They also proposed a broker-assisting information collection strategy based on the clustering method. With the support of brokers, the clustered sub-communities are managed by a
reputation mechanism in an eﬃcient and scalable manner to help the community members
collect reputation values of others with high quality. Refaei et al. [67] proposed an adaptive
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reputation management system that uses a time-slotted approach to allow the reputation
evaluation function to quickly and accurately capture changes in node behavior for reputation calculation. A Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is also used in reputation
calculation to distinguish between cooperative and misbehaving neighbors. Buchegger et
al. [16] proposed a reputation system that can cope with false disseminated information. In
the system, every node maintains a reputation rating and a trust rating about everyone else
that the node cares about and periodically exchanges the ﬁrst-hand reputation information
with others. They also proposed a modiﬁed Bayesian approach to only accept the secondhand reputation information that is not incompatible with the current reputation rating to
avoid false ratings. Therefore, the trust ratings are updated based on the compatibility of
second-hand reputation information with prior reputation ratings.
Although these proposed reputation systems try to use either linear reputation adjustment mechanisms [14, 49, 50, 74, 76, 82, 69, 78, 83] or non-linear reputation adjustment
mechanisms [107, 67, 16] for reputation calculation, they still use a threshold to distinguish
selﬁsh nodes from cooperative nodes. Thus, clever selﬁsh nodes can wisely maintain their
reputation value just above the threshold by selectively forwarding others’ packets regardless
of the reputation calculation mechanism. Such nodes can take advantage of other cooperative nodes without being detected. Also, these methods cannot reward high-reputed nodes
diﬀerently or punish low-reputed nodes in diﬀerent reputation levels.
Price Systems. In price systems, nodes are paid for oﬀering packet forwarding service
and pay for receiving forwarding service. The payments can be in money, stamps, points or
similar objects of value [56, 57, 66, 43, 54, 85, 37]. Buttyan et al. [56] perhaps is the ﬁrst work
to introduce a virtual currency in MANETs to stimulate a cooperative behavior and prevent
congestion. If a mobile node wants to use a service, then it must pay for it in virtual credits.
Therefore, the mobile nodes are no longer interested in sending useless messages to overload
the network. They are motivated to provide services to other mobile nodes since this is
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the only way to earn virtual credits. Based on the study in [56], Buttyan et al. [57] further
proposed a security module maintaining a counter, called virtual credit counter. The counter
is decreased when the node wants to send a packet as originator and increased when the node
forwards a packet. The value of the counter must remain positive if a node wants to send a
packet as originator. Jakobsson et al. [66] developed a micro-payments model for fostering
collaboration among selﬁsh (rational) participants in multi-hop cellular networks. Instead
of mobile nodes, base stations are responsible for verifying that all packets are accompanied
by a valid payment. An auditing process is further used to detect the cheating behavior of
the mobile nodes. Crocraft et al. [43] considered the issue of how prices can be determined
automatically by the ability of nodes to pay the costs for transmitting traﬃc. They also
illustrated how network resources are allocated to users according to their geographical
positions in the packet routing. Anderegg et al. [54] proposed Ad Hoc-VCG, in which every
node bids to be relay nodes for packet transmission and a source node chooses the second best
bid, which forces selﬁsh nodes to reveal their true forwarding costs. The source node pays the
relay node a premium over its actual cost after the packet is forwarded to encourage selﬁsh
nodes to truly oﬀer forwarding services. A packet is always routed on a path with lowest
accumulated costs. Zhong [85] proposed a cheat-proof, credit-based system for stimulating
cooperation among selﬁsh nodes in MANETs without any tamper-proof hardware at any
node. When a node receives a message, the node keeps a receipt of the message and reports
the receipt to the Credit Clearance Service (CCS) if a fast connection to a CCS is available.
Based on the receipts, CCS can determine the charge and reward to each node involved
in the transmission of a message. Janzadeh et al. [37] proposed a credit-based cooperation
mechanism that does not rely on tamper-proof hardware. In the system, every source node
uses a digital signature only in its ﬁrst transaction with any cooperative intermediate node
that forwards packet(s) for it. Any following transaction with such a node requires only
hash operations instead of digital signature operations both for the source node and the
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intermediate nodes, reducing the computation load of the mobile nodes. They use credits to
provide appropriate incentives and ﬁnes to discourage rational nodes from misbehaving.
Although all of the proposed price systems can encourage nodes to be cooperative,
most systems fail to provide a mechanism to measure measure/monitor the service quality of
a node. Moreover, they fail to punish a selﬁsh and wealthy node that earns many credits by
being cooperative early but dropping packets later. Also, the nodes that need no forwarding
services can always refuse to help others in forwarding packets.
Previous research did not analyze the eﬀectiveness of cooperation incentives in the
individual reputation and price systems. In this dissertation research, we analyze the cooperation incentive strategies in the individual reputation and price systems using game theory
model. Based on the analysis results, we propose an integrated system and a hierarchical
Account-aided Reputation Management system (ARM), which coordinately leverage the advantages of reputation systems and price systems to eﬀectively defer selﬁsh behaviors. In
addition, relying on the collected global information by the DHT, ARM eﬀectively detects
false information and accurately calculates node reputation. With the eﬃcient operation
provided by DHT, ARM can also reduce periodical reputation information exchanges, the
storage and computing burden of each node in the previous reputation systems as well as
eliminates the virtual credit circulation in the network in the previous price systems.

2.2

Game Theory-based Works
Game theory has been used to optimize packet routing in MANETs and the allocation

of resources including channel and power resources in wireless networks. These studies use
either non-cooperative game theory [19, 99, 80, 45, 10, 51, 92, 64, 91] or cooperative game
theory [100, 58, 6, 95, 21].
Non-cooperative Game Theory. Non-cooperative game theory has been used broadly

16

in the research of wireless networks in terms of distributed channel, spectrum and power
resource allocation [19, 99, 80]. Saraydar et al. [19] presented a power control solution for
wireless data in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework. In this context, the
quality of service (QoS) of a wireless node receives is regarded as the utility. The distributed
power control is modeled as a non-cooperative game where users try to maximize their
utility. Han et al. [99] attempted to motivate individual users to adopt a social behavior
and enhance the system performance by sharing the resources. They considered both power
control and adaptive modulation by designing non-cooperative games at both the user level
and the system level. A non-cooperative power control game is designed at the user level to
maximize user’s transmitted power constraint. At the system level, the optimization goal is
to maximize the overall system throughput under the maximal transmitted power constraint.
Etkin et al. [80] studied a spectrum sharing problem in an unlicensed band where multiple
networks, such as 802.11, bluetooth, and walkie-talkies, coexist and interfere with each other.
They provided a uniﬁed framework to study the issues of eﬃciency, fairness and incentive
compatibility in a non-cooperative spectrum sharing situation based on a non-cooperative
game.
Numerous studies have also been proposed to use non-cooperative game theory to
optimize the routing in MANETs [45, 10, 51, 92, 64, 91]. Jaramillo et al. [45] proposed
a distributed and adaptive reputation mechanism for MANETs, which avoids a retaliation
situation after a node has been falsely perceived as selﬁsh so cooperation can be restored
quickly. They also proposed a network model based on non-cooperative games to understand the impact of imperfect measurements on the robustness of some previously proposed
reputation strategies. In the analysis, the schemes punish selﬁsh behavior at the expense
of decreasing the throughput of cooperative users, which may occasionally lead to complete
network disconnection. Altman et al. [10] proposed a framework of non-cooperative game
theory to provide incentives for collaboration in MANETs. The incentives provided in the
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proposed framework are based on a less aggressive Tit-for-Tat punishment mechanism that
can be implemented in a completely distributed manner. They assumed that if the fraction
q’ of packets forwarded by a mobile node is less than the fraction q forwarded by other
mobile nodes, then this will result in a decrease of the forwarding probability of the other
mobile nodes to the value q  . Kameda et al [51] examined the issue that the Nash Equilibrium (NE) action set is not the most proﬁtable action set in a non-cooperative game for
network traﬃc ﬂow control. They found that in communication networks where each user
decides its throughput by itself to optimize its own utility, the system throughput is not
maximized. However, they did not provide a Pareto optimal strategy for optimal system
performance. Srinivasan et al. [92] built a non-cooperative game to determine the Pareto
optimal throughput in the system and the optimal throughput each node can achieve. To
achieve the optimal throughput, they proposed a Pareto optimal strategy called Generous
TIT-For-TAT (GTFT), which is used by the nodes to decide whether to accept or reject a relay request to optimize individual throughput. Felegyhazi et al. [64] proposed a model based
on the game theory and graph theory to investigate the equilibrium conditions of packet
forwarding strategies. They studied a number of interaction strategies and showed that it
is very important to provide incentives for node cooperation. Urpi et al. [91] proposed an
approach to choose interaction strategies based on Bayesian games, where the players are the
nodes in the network. In the Bayesian games, prior to choosing its next action, a node has
an opportunity to analyze the past behaviors of its neighbors and its consideration priorities
on energy consumption and throughput to decide how to react in the next step. Although
the paper presents a formal model to guide the selection of an interaction strategy that can
optimize each individual node’s beneﬁt, it does not consider how much cooperation incentive
the strategy can provide.
Cooperative Game Theory. Cooperative game theory is generally applied for the analysis
of networks and spectrum sharing [100, 58, 44, 6, 95, 89]. Han et al. [100] applied cooper18

ative game theory for resource allocation in orthogonal frequency-division multiple access
systems (OFDMA) to maximize the overall system rate, under the constraints of each user’s
minimal rate requirement and maximal transmitted power. First, they developed a two-user
bargaining algorithm to negotiate the usage of subcarriers and then they grouped the users
into groups of size two as a coalition. Within each coalition, they used a two-user algorithm
to improve the system rate. Cao et al. [58] proposed a local bargaining approach where
users are self-organized into bargaining groups and adapt their spectrum assignment to approximate an optimal spectrum assignment. They also proposed a fairness bargaining with
feed poverty to improve fairness in a spectrum assignment and derived a theoretical lower
bound on the minimum assignment each user can get from bargaining. Such a bound can be
utilized to guide the bargaining process of spectrum assignment. Aram et al. [6] considered
a network in which several service providers oﬀer wireless access service to their respective
customers. They modeled the cooperation using transferable payoﬀ coalitional game theory
to ﬁnd the optimum resource allocation strategies. Saad et al. [95] studied cognitive radio
networks where secondary users occupy the channels of primary users in an attempt to reduce the interference of secondary users on the primary users through collaborations. The
authors modeled the problem as a cooperative game and proposed a distributed algorithm
for coalition formation through simple merge and split rules.
Based on the previous research using game theory, in this dissertation research, we
apply the cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to model the node interaction in
reputation and price systems for cooperation encouragement and seeking strategies that can
thwart the intentions of selﬁsh and malicious nodes.
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2.3

Routing Protocols
One method to deal with message routing in DTNs is to reinforce connectivity on

demand by assigning a number of specialized nodes (e.g., robots and satellites) to ﬁll the
“communication gap” when a disconnection occurs [106, 79]. Zhao et al. [106] proposed a
Message Ferrying (MF) approach for data delivery in sparse networks. MF is a proactive
mobility-assisted approach, which utilizes a set of special mobile nodes called message ferries
to provide communication services for nodes in the network. Message ferries move around
the deployment area and take responsibility for carrying data between nodes. Li et al. [79]
attempted to explore the possibility of changing the host trajectories to facilitate communication. Given an ad hoc network of mobile computers where the trajectory of each node is
approximately known, they developed an algorithm for computing a trajectory for sending a
message from host A to host B by recruiting intermediate hosts to help. However, these approaches, which require approximate knowledge of the network, are not applicable in a highly
dynamic self-organized network. In our dissertation research, we have proposed a routing
mechanism called SEDUM that works well in a highly dynamic self-organized network.
Epidemic routing (i.e., ﬂooding) [94] is a widely-used routing strategy in DTNs. In
this method, a message is ﬂooded from a node to all its neighbor nodes in the system
recursively to transmit a message to a destination node. This method requires that each
node has a large buﬀer for storing messages in transmission. It can achieve a short delay
by locating a shortest routing path at the cost of high network resource consumption. Some
improved approaches are proposed to reduce the overhead of epidemic routing [86, 97, 105,
46, 96]. In [86], nodes remove redundant replicas of a message when the message has been
transmitted by exchanging the “metadata” of delivered messages. The work in [105] uses
a gossip algorithm, in which a message is forwarded to partial neighbors for the message
forwarding. Additional studies [97, 46, 96, 23] further improved the mechanism proposed in
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[105] by using network coding mechanisms to increase the routing reliability and reduce the
routing overhead. Wang et al. [97] proposed to encode a message with erasure coding and
spread them over multiple relays while using a ﬁxed amount of overhead, which is much more
robust to failures of a few relays or some bad choices compared to the mechanisms in [105].
In contrast to simply forwarding the information contained in the packets, Widmer et al. [46]
proposed to let the nodes send out packets with linear combinations of previously received
information based on the network coding methods. By compressing the information based
on the network coding, the amount of messages exchanged in the system is greatly reduced,
leading to much smaller system overhead. Wang et al. [96] proposed to use erasure coding
technology to achieve a desired data delivery ratio with minimum overhead. Nodes determine
whether to transmit or drop messages based on the importance of the messages. Chen et
al. [23] proposed a hybrid routing method that combines erasure coding based routing and
a replication technique to reduce the system overhead. Although all of these methods can
improve the performance of the epidemic routing to a certain extent, the coding mechanisms
still lead to a high resource consumption.
The other widely studied routing proposal for DTNs is single-copy routing, including
direct routing [87] and probabilistic routing [9, 18, 17, 31, 47, 71, 27, 25].
Direct routing lets the source or a moving relay node carry a message all the way to
the destination. Spyropoulos et al. [87] looked into a number of “single-copy” direct routing schemes such as direct transmission, “oracle-based” optimal algorithm, and randomized
routing. They found that all these methods can signiﬁcantly reduce the resource requirements of ﬂooding-based algorithms and maximize the transmission capacity of the system if
they are carefully designed. Although this method can maximize the transmission capacity
of the system, it leads to long transmission delay.
Probabilistic routing uses diﬀerent information to assist message routing. Lindgren
et al. [9] proposed a probabilistic protocol for routing in intermittently connected networks
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that use node encounters frequency and transitivity to enhance performance over previously
existing protocols. Burns et al. [18] proposed a routing protocol that maintains a movement
model of the network participants and uses this information to perform routing of messages
on the network. It estimates the probability of a particular message being delivered by a given
peer, and thus is capable of making informed routing decisions. They further used multiobjective control methods from robotics to generate motions capable of optimizing multiple
network performance metrics simultaneously. Burgess et al. [17] proposed a probabilistic
routing based on prioritizing both the schedule of packets transmitted to other peers and
the schedule of packets to be dropped. These priorities are determined based on the delivery
probability of the packets according to historical data as well as several complementary
mechanisms, including acknowledgments, a head-start for new packets, and lists of previous
intermediaries. These methods reduce the transmission overhead of epidemic routing at the
cost of possible delivery delay due to suboptimal relay node choices. Henri et al. [31] pointed
out that consulting the time period of a node since it encountered the destination node
when making a forwarding decision results in superior performance over ﬂooding. Jain et
al. [47] proposed a forwarding algorithm to minimize the average delay of message delivery
using oracles that know the entire topology of the current network. However, such oracles
are very diﬃcult to implement because of the high mobility and intermittent connections
between nodes. The context-aware adaptive routing (CAR) protocol [71] periodically reﬁnes
the prediction of node mobility in order to identify the cluster where the destination nodes
belong to and select an optimal node as a message carrier to the destination nodes. It also
uses a proactive routing algorithm such as Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV)
routing to publish the predicted delivery utility. Admittedly, CAR works well in a partially
connected network. However, in a very sparse DTN, the update messages are unlikely to
be published in a timely manner. Polo et al. [27] proposed a publish/subscribe system for
DTNs. It relies on the Kalman ﬁlter [40] to predict the routing of nodes based on current
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topology states. Conan et al. [25] presented a routing strategy based on single copy, in
which a node relays a message to a neighbor that is closer in terms of total expected delivery
time to the destination. The strategy uses the estimates of the average inter-contact times
between the nodes in the network as the routing metric and limits the transmission hops
to two. Although the single-copy routing strategy saves node resources and produces lower
transmission overhead, it is likely to suﬀer from severe transmission delays if a suboptimal
forwarding node (i.e., a node not in the shortest path between the source and the destination)
is chosen.
Recently, a few routing protocols have been proposed that explore communities in
social networks in MANETs and DTNs. LABEL [41] exploits clustering algorithms to group
nodes into communities according to their aﬃliation through labels. They found that simply
identifying community can improve message delivery. Li et al. [60] proposed to construct
communities based on the neighboring relationships from node encounter histories in a distributed manner. They also proposed a locally weighted publish/subscribe method for data
collecting, storage, and propagation within and among the communities. Ghosh et al. [35]
proposed a sociological orbit aware location approximation and routing algorithm by extracting the mobility information of the users based on the observation that the movement
of a mobile user exhibits a partially repetitive “orbital” pattern involving a set of “hub”
nodes. Taking advantage of these hub nodes, the messages can be eﬃciently routed to the
destination node compared to the ﬂooding algorithms. Costa et al. [28] proposed a routing
framework for publish-subscribe that exploits predictions based on metrics of social interaction (e.g., patterns of movements among communities) to identify the best information
carriers. Daly et al. [30] proposed to identify some bridge nodes based on their centrality
characteristics. They explore the concept of ego networks [15] for bridge node extraction
where nodes are not required to exchange information about the entire network topology
but only the locally available network information. Hui et al. [42] evaluated the impact of
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community and centrality on packet forwarding, and proposed a hybrid algorithm, BUBBLE, that selects high centrality nodes and community members of destination as relays.
Gao et al. [34] studied multicast in DTNs from the social network perspective and investigated the essential diﬀerence between multicast and unicast in DTNs. They also formulated
relay selections for multicast as a uniﬁed knapsack problem by exploiting node centrality
and social community structures in the networks. Chen et al. [24] proposed a hybrid routing
scheme combining utility and centrality metrics to make forwarding decision. The utility and
centrality metrics are deﬁned with two kinds of contact history, the ages of last encounter
and the cumulative contact durations between the nodes in the network, respectively.
Based on the previous research on routing, in this dissertation research, we propose
a Social nEtwork and utility based DistribUted Multi-copy routing protocol (SEDUM). SEDUM is diﬀerent from the previous research in two aspects. First, rather than relying on
either ﬂooding or single-copy routing, it uses multi-copy for routing based on the optimal
tree replication algorithm to achieve a tradeoﬀ between routing delay and overhead. Second,
SEDUM uses a novel duration utility that can automatically capture the social movement
features without social graph analysis and community detection/construction as in the previous research. Although Li and Chen [60, 24] also used contact durations in routing utilities
calculation, they did not show the rationale of using contact duration utility and the advantage of contact duration utility over contact frequency utility. Meanwhile, their method is
not suitable for a system with dynamically changing network size. Even the network size and
network patterns change dramatically, SEDUM still can achieve a high performance with its
optimal tree replication mechanism and buﬀer management algorithm.
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2.4

Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the research regarding reputation and price systems

for selﬁsh node detection and punishment, game theory modeling, and routing in DTNs. We
have also explained the diﬀerence and relevance between our work and the previous research.
In the next chapter, we will introduce our proposed method to increase the trustworthiness
of the distributed wireless systems.
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Chapter 3
Trustworthiness: Analysis of
Cooperation Incentive Strategies
In this chapter, we propose mechanisms to solve the ﬁrst challenge in distributed
wireless systems. That is, cooperation incentives that eﬀectively encourage nodes to oﬀer
services and thwart the intentions of selﬁsh and malicious nodes. We describe theoretical
studies of the trustworthiness of the reputation and price systems, and analyze their underlying incentives and deﬁciencies for cooperation encouragement. We also present our proposed
integrated system that can provide high incentives to encourage cooperation. We assume
that all nodes in the system are self-interested. That is, they always try to choose actions
that maximize their own beneﬁt. We intend to answer the following questions:
(1) Is it possible to encourage the nodes in a system to be cooperative without any cooperation incentive strategy? (Section 3.2)
(2) How eﬀective are the cooperation incentives provided by existing individual reputation
(Section 3.3) and price systems (Section 3.4)? What are the deﬁciencies of individual
reputation (Section 3.3) and price systems (Section 3.4)?
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(3) How to design a system that can overcome the deﬁciencies of individual reputation
and price systems, and provide higher cooperation incentives? (Section 3.5)
To answer these questions, we build diﬀerent game theory models including cooperative and non-cooperative game models to study the cooperation incentives provided by (i)
a system without any cooperation incentive strategy (defenseless system), (ii) a reputation
system and (iii) a price system. We use both cooperative game and non-cooperative game
to investigate the best strategy for each node to maximize its beneﬁt.
Based on the cooperative game model, we ﬁnd that in all these systems, each node
earns the maximum beneﬁt only when they form a grand coalition, in which all nodes in the
system are cooperative. However, in order to form such a coalition, the cooperative strategy
should be enforced by a third party that can monitor or control the users. However, such an
assumption cannot always be valid especially for the commercial applications in our daily life,
which are controlled by several authorities. Based on the non-cooperative game model, we
ﬁnd that the cooperation incentives provided by both reputation systems and price systems
are limited. The strategies of using a threshold to determine the trustworthiness of a node in
the reputation system and the strategies of rewarding cooperative nodes in the price system
may be manipulated by clever but selﬁsh nodes. Speciﬁcally, the reputation systems treat
nodes with reputation values higher than the threshold equally. Thus, a node can keep its
reputation value just above the threshold to receive the same beneﬁt as nodes with much
higher reputations. This behavior is unaﬀected by the reputation calculation mechanisms
and can exist in all reputation systems with the threshold strategy. The price system lacks an
eﬀective method to detect a selﬁsh and wealthy node that earns many credits by cooperating
initially but becomes non-cooperative (selﬁsh and non-cooperative are interchangeable in this
dissertation) later without receiving a penalty.
Inspired by our observations, we propose an integrated system to leverage the advantages of both reputation and price systems by integrating the misbehavior detection
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mechanism from the reputation system and the cooperation incentive mechanism from the
price system. The integrated system can also overcome their individual disadvantages. The
theoretical analysis shows that the integrated system can provide higher cooperation incentives than the individual reputation and the price systems in terms of higher payoﬀs for
the cooperation strategy and make the cooperative strategy to be the Nash Equilibrium and
Pareto-optimal. The system is also more eﬀective in selﬁsh node detection, which can greatly
reduce the packet dropping rate of the whole system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the basic
game theory models. Section 3.2, Section 3.3, Section 3.4 present the game theory based
analysis for the individual defenseless, reputation, and price systems. Section 3.5 describes
and analyzes the proposed integrated system with the game theory model. Section 3.6
summarizes this chapter. The experimental results are given in Chapter 6.

3.1
3.1.1

Game Theory Models For Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Classiﬁcation of Basic Game Theory Models
Game theory is an area of applied mathematics that models and analyzes a system

in which every individual attempts to ﬁnd the best strategy for success depending on the
choices of others in node interactions. As shown in Figure 3.1, game theory models can
be generally categorized as cooperative games or non-cooperative games. In a cooperative
game, the nodes agree on the strategy and this strategy cannot be altered. In contrast,
nodes in non-cooperative games can change their strategies at any time to maximize their
beneﬁts. Non-cooperative games can be further classiﬁed into one-interaction games and
repeated games. In the former, individuals only interact with each other once. In the latter,
individuals interact with each other multiple times.
Repeated games can be further classiﬁed into ﬁnite repeated games or inﬁnite repeated
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Figure 3.1: Classiﬁcation of game theory models.
games. In ﬁnite repeated games, there are a ﬁnite number of interactions for a pair of players,
while in inﬁnite repeated games there are no restrictions on the number of interactions.
Game theory provides analytical tools to predict the outcome of complex interactions among
rational and self-interested entities who always attempt to reach the best outcome [93].
Table 3.1 shows the parameters used in the analysis.

3.1.2

Non-cooperative Game in MANETs
Regarding nodes in MANETs as rational and self-interested entities, a game theory

model can be built. We use N = {1, 2, ..., n} to denote the set of all mobile nodes (i.e., game
players) in a routing path. In an interaction between a pair of nodes in routing, each node
requests the other node forward a packet, and the other node either forwards the packet
or drops the packet. We use Ai to denote the action set for node i, and Ai = {I, C};
the C (i.e., cooperative) action means the node is willing to help the other node forward a
packet, while the I (i.e., incooperative, non-cooperative) action means it drops the packet.
Action and strategy are interchangeable terms in this dissertation. The action chosen by
node i is denoted by ai , and the actions chosen by other nodes are denoted by an action set
a−i = {a1 , a2 , a3 , ...ai−1 , null, ai+1 , ..., an }. a = (ai , a−i ) = {a1 , a2 , a3 , ...ai−1 , ai , ai+1 , ..., an }
denotes the action set of all nodes on a path for the routing of one packet. If any node is
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Table 3.1: Parameters used in the analysis.
c
mp
ng
p
x
N
U
Ps
TR
I

packet forwarding cost
packet forwarding price
the number of generated packets
packet forwarding beneﬁt
allocated payoﬀ
the set of total mobile nodes
payoﬀ
the probability of an account state
reputation threshold
non-cooperative action

mr
nd
nr
v
A
S
Pd
R
V
C

packet forwarding reward
the number of dropped packets
the number of received packets
characteristic function
action set
a subset of mobile nodes
average packet drop probability
current reputation value
current account value
cooperative action

uncooperative, the packet will be dropped. We use D to denote the Cartesian product of
the action set for a node, use Ui (ai , a−i ) to denote the utility (i.e., payoﬀ, beneﬁt) function
of a node i given the strategies used by other nodes, and use U (a) to denote the sum of the
utilities of all nodes. The game theory model for MANETs given a normal form of game G
is,
G =< N , D, Ui (ai , a−i ) >

(3.1)

Every rational node in the system intends to choose an action that maximizes its utility for
a given action tuple of the other nodes. That is, the best action a∗i ∈ Ai is the best response
of node i to a−i iﬀ for all other ai ∈ Ai , Ui (a∗i , a−i ) ≥ Ui (ai , a−i ).
Deﬁnition 1. A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an action tuple that corresponds
to the mutual best response. Formally, the action tuple a∗ = (a∗1 , a∗2 , a∗3 , ..., a∗n ) is a NE
if Ui (a∗i , a∗−i ) ≥ Ui (ai , a∗−i ) for ∀ai ∈ Ai and ∀i ∈ N [93], where Ai denotes the action
set (cooperative, non-cooperative) for node i. Therefore, a NE is an action set where no
individual rational node can beneﬁt from unilateral deviation.
Deﬁnition 2. An outcome of a game is non-Pareto-optimal if there is another
outcome that would give both players higher payoﬀs, or would give one player the same
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payoﬀ but the other player a higher payoﬀ. An outcome is Pareto-optimal if there are no
other such outcomes [73].
Based on Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, we know that encouraging the cooperation between
nodes is essentially enforcing the cooperation strategy between nodes to become NE and
Pareto-optimal.
Speciﬁcally, for the nodes in the routing path from source node 1 to destination node
n, since the packet forwarding interaction only occurs between two neighboring nodes,

a = (a1 , a2 , ..., an ) = ∪ni=1 (ai−1 , ai ).

(3.2)

To ensure that (C1 , C2 , ...Cn ) is NE, according to Deﬁnition 1, we must guarantee that ∀ i
(i ∈ [1, n]), U (C1 , ..., Ci , ..., Cn ) ≥ U (C1 , ..., ai , ..., Cn ). For the interaction between two neighboring nodes i − 1 and i, if the cooperation strategy (Ci−1 , Ci ) is not NE, then U (Ci−1 , Ci ) ≤
U (ai−1 , Ci ). Based on Equation (3.2), U (C1 , ..., Ci , ..., Cn ) ≤ U (C1 , ..., ai , ..., Cn ), which contradicts our assumptions. To ensure that (C1 , C2 , ...Cn ) is Pareto-optimal, according to
Deﬁnition 2, we must guarantee that U (C1 , ..., Ci , ...Cn ) ≥ U (a1 , ..., ai , an ). For the interaction between two neighboring nodes i − 1 and i, if the cooperation strategy (Ci−1 , Ci )
is not Pareto-optimal, U (Ci−1 , Ci ) ≤ U (ai−1 , ai ). Based on Equation (3.2), we can obtain
U (C1 , ..., Ci , ...Cn ) ≤ U (a1 , ..., ai , an ), which also contradicts our assumptions. Therefore, to
ensure that (C1 , C2 , ...Cn ) is NE and Pareto-optimal, we must ensure that the interaction
strategy between two neighboring nodes in the routing path is NE and Pareto-optimal.
In this dissertation, we consider the cooperation of nodes along one routing path to
forward one packet. For the case in which multiple nodes transmit multiple packets to the
same next hop node, we can separately consider the interactions between the multiple nodes
and the next hop node for diﬀerent packets. Prior to describing the models, we ﬁrst use an
example to explain the non-cooperative game.
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Non-cooperative Game Example. Table 3.2 shows an example of a payoﬀ matrix for a
non-cooperative game with a two-node interaction. If node i is cooperative, node j’s payoﬀ
is 4 when it is cooperative and 6 when it is not cooperative. Hence, node j chooses the
I strategy. If node i is non-cooperative, node j’s payoﬀ is 0 when being cooperative and
1 when being non-cooperative. Thus, node j still chooses the I strategy. As a result, no
matter which strategy node i selects, being non-cooperative produces more utility than being
cooperative for node j, i.e., Uj (I, a−j ) > Uj (C, a−j ). Similarly, no matter which strategy node
j chooses, being non-cooperative generates more utility than being cooperative for node i,
i.e., Ui (I, a−i ) > Ui (C, a−i ). We use Ii and Ci to represent the cases that node i takes for
the I and C actions, respectively. In this game, the action set (Ii , Ij ) dominates other action
sets. We say that (Ii , Ij ), marked with a star in the table, is the NE of this game. From the
payoﬀ matrix, we can see that no individual node can obtain more beneﬁt by unilaterally
deviating from the action set (Ii , Ij ). However, the payoﬀ of the action set (Ii , Ij ) is not
the best outcome of the payoﬀ matrix; the optimal payoﬀ (4, 4) is brought by the action
set (Ci , Cj ). (Ci , Cj ) is the Pareto-optimal of this game. An eﬀective cooperation incentive
system should aim to achieve both the NE and Pareto-optimal outcomes rather than only
the NE outcome.
Table 3.2: An example for non-cooperative games.

Node i

Node j
Cooperative
Cooperative
(4,4)
Non-cooperative (6, 0)

Non-cooperative
(0, 6)
(1, 1)∗

Note: * denotes the Nash Equilibrium strategy set of this game

3.1.3

Cooperative Game in MANETs
Deﬁnition 3. In cooperative games, the characteristic function describes how much
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collective payoﬀ a set of players gain by forming a coalition. The collective Pareto-optimal
payoﬀ is denoted by v(S), where S ⊆ N is a subset of total players. v(i) is the characteristic
function of player i in no coalition with other nodes (i.e., single member coalition) [32].
The single member coalition in the cooperative game is equivalent to the non-cooperative
strategy in the non-cooperative game. v(i) equals the NE payoﬀ of player i in the uncooperative game.
−
Deﬁnition 4. Let xi be the payoﬀ received by player i (i ∈ S). A vector →
x =
n
(x1 , ...xn ) is a rational utility allocation if (1) xi ≥ v(i) and (2)
i=1 xi = v(N ) [32].
Deﬁnition 4 implies that a rational utility allocation should guarantee that a node earns more
payoﬀs by forming a coalition with other nodes (Condition (1)). Also, the total allocated
payoﬀ of all players in a coalition should equal the collective Pareto-optimal payoﬀ of all
players (Condition (2)). Therefore, a node prefers to join a coalition that will bring a greater
payoﬀ than the single member coalition. Also, a node prefers to choose an optimal coalition
from a number of coalition options. In non-rational utility allocation, a node may either
choose not to join a coalition or to leave its current coalition to gain higher payoﬀ from
another coalition.
Deﬁnition 5. A coalition is deemed stable when no other coalitions can yield a
higher payoﬀ for each individual player in the stable coalition.
Cooperative Game Example. We use the same example in Table 3.2 to explain the
cooperative game by analyzing the interactions between the players in the game. We show
whether nodes sometimes have an incentive to form a coalition to optimize their utilities, how
the nodes form a coalition, and whether the utility allocation to each node in the coalition
is reasonable. According to the payoﬀs shown in Table 3.2, in a single member coalition
v(i)=1 and v(j)=1. However, if player i and player j decide to form a coalition and ask a
third party to enforce their strategies (i.e., the (Ci , Cj ) strategy set is formed), the maximum
payoﬀ of the coalition is v(i, j) = 8 > v(i) + v(j) = 2. Also, for the payoﬀ allocation in the
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coalition, xi > v(i) and xj > v(j). That is, forming a cooperative coalition can bring more
beneﬁts to the nodes than forming a single member coalition. The (Ci , Cj ) coalition is stable
since no other coalitions can bring more beneﬁt.
In the following sections, we build the game theory models introduced in this section
for a defenseless MANET, a MANET with a reputation system, a MANET with a price
system, and a MANET with an integrated system. We rely on the models to analyze the
eﬀectiveness of the cooperation incentives in each of the systems.

3.2

Game Theory Model for Defenseless Systems
We assume that a packet is the basic transmission unit between two nodes. When

node i interacts with node j, node i sends a packet to node j and node j sends a packet to node
i. The packet receiver can then choose to forward or drop the packet. If it chooses to forward
the packet, it consumes resources for receiving, processing, and transmitting the packet.
The resource consumption cost of forwarding a packet depends on several factors including
channel condition, ﬁle size, modulation scheme, and transmission inference. As a generic
model, we use c to denote the resource consumption cost for a node to forward a packet,
and use p to denote the beneﬁt gained by a node after its packet is forwarded by another
node. In practice, c and p diﬀers for nodes under diﬀerent conditions and conﬁgurations.
We assume that c and p can be generalized to the same measurement units. The beneﬁt p
includes the units of beneﬁt gained by a node when its packet is successfully forwarded and
the units of resources used for forwarding the packet. Thus, we assume p > c, since it is
not rational for a user to use a device with p ≤ c. We use p and c to represent the utility
values in the game theory models for the cooperation incentive analysis. Then, the payoﬀ
for each node when both nodes are cooperative in an interaction is (p − c). If one node
is non-cooperative in transmitting a packet and the other is cooperative in transmitting a
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packet, the selﬁsh node earns a proﬁt of p while the cooperative node earns a proﬁt of −c.
The reason is that the selﬁsh node’s packet has been forwarded by the cooperative node,
but the selﬁsh node has not forwarded the cooperative node’s packet. If both nodes are
non-cooperative in forwarding packets, the payoﬀ of this action set is (0, 0) because both
nodes gain no beneﬁts and consume no resources.

3.2.1

Non-cooperative Game for Defenseless Systems

One-interaction Game. Based on the cost and beneﬁt of forwarding a packet between a
pair of nodes in an interaction, we build a one-interaction game model as shown in Table 3.3.
The table shows the payoﬀ matrix for each combination of diﬀerent actions taken by node
i and node j. From the table, we see that since p > p − c and −c < 0, independent of the
strategy node j chooses, I is the best strategy for node i. Since p > c, independent of the
strategy node i takes, I is also the best strategy for node j. Therefore, the action set (Ii , Ij )
is the NE in this interaction. However, (Ci , Cj ) is the optimal outcome since it leads to a
payoﬀ of (p − c, p − c), which is much higher than (0, 0). In this payoﬀ matrix, the NE is not
the Pareto-optimal. The nodes do not choose the Pareto-optimal action set because every
node in the system is independent and self-interested, and each node in a pair does not know
which action the opponent will take. If one node chooses C but the other chooses I, the
payoﬀ for the cooperative node will be the lowest. Therefore, the self-interested nodes will
normally choose the safest strategy over the strategy that may lead to the best outcome [73]
in a one-interaction game, at risk of a higher cost.
Repeated Games. Since in a real system the interactions between nodes are repeated, we
also analyze the cooperation incentives in repeated games. Diﬀerent from a one-interaction
game, a player in repeated games learns the action history of other nodes, which helps it to
make subsequent choices.
TIT-For-TAT has been recognized as the most eﬀective interaction strategy thus far
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Table 3.3: Payoﬀ matrix for defenseless systems.

Node i

Node j
Cooperative
Cooperative
(p-c, p-c)
Non-cooperative (p, -c)

Non-cooperative
(-c, p)
(0, 0)∗

Note: * denotes the Nash Equilibrium strategy set of this game

for repeated interaction games [73]. In TIT-For-TAT, given a pair of nodes i and j, node
i is initially cooperative with node j. If node j is also cooperative, node i will continue to
use strategy C. Whenever node j is non-cooperative, node i will immediately become noncooperative. Since (Ci , Cj ) is Pareto-optimal, node i will forgive node j’s non-cooperative
behavior and periodically check whether node j wants to be cooperative again. An iterative
(i.e., repeated) defenseless system (IDS) with TIT-For-TAT can eﬀectively encourage node
cooperation in an inﬁnite game. The fundamental reason is that repeated games can change
the Pareto-optimal strategy in the payoﬀ matrix to NE when nodes interact with each other
for inﬁnite time; based on the interaction history of the opponents, the players can adjust
their action strategy to be the Pareto-optimal to maximize their beneﬁts. For a pair of nodes
i and j in an inﬁnite game, even though node i may lose some beneﬁt by being cooperative
at ﬁrst, when node j is uncooperative, its cooperation will stimulate node j to be cooperative
later when node j ﬁnd being cooperative is more beneﬁcial. Node i will also gain a much
higher payoﬀ for itself. Thus, by punishment (being non-cooperative) and forgiveness (being
cooperative), a node can earn a high payoﬀ in the long term.
However, IDS with TIT-For-TAT cannot encourage node cooperation in a ﬁnite game
when the number of interactions is unknown to both nodes. Essentially, (Ci , Cj ) is Paretooptimal but not NE in IDS, i.e., the strategy I always dominates the strategy C. In a
ﬁnite game, the best strategy for a node is to continue being cooperative and deviate in
the last round from (Ci , Cj ) if it knows when the interaction will end. For a node that
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wishes to use the best strategy but does not know when the opponent will leave, it may
suspect that the opponent will leave in the next round. Thus, the trust relationship between
the interacting nodes will deteriorate. The only resolution to this problem is to make the
(Ci , Cj ) action set both NE and Pareto-optimal. In this situation, each node gains the same
payoﬀ or even higher payoﬀ when its opponent deviates from its current action. Thus, each
node has no incentive to deviate from the current cooperation strategy and is not afraid
of the other node’s deviation at any time during the interaction. One feature of repeated
games is that they can change the Pareto-optimal strategy in a payoﬀ matrix to be NE when
nodes interact with each other for inﬁnitely many times. Since the nodes in a MANET may
randomly leave or join the network, the interaction between two nodes is actually a ﬁnite
game with unknown number of interactions. In this situation, TIT-For-TAT cannot provide
incentives for node cooperation. Therefore, the only method to encourage node cooperation
in a MANET is to make (Ci , Cj ) both NE and Pareto-optimal. In this case, regardless of
whether node j deviates from (Ci , Cj ) or not, the payoﬀ received by node i will not be
reduced, rather it will always be increased by choosing the cooperate strategy. Therefore, in
MANETs, providing incentives for node cooperation essentially involves making (Ci , Cj ) be
both NE and Pareto-optimal in the payoﬀ matrix.
Also, IDS with TIT-For-TAT can only provide the best action strategy for a node to
obtain the best beneﬁt based on the action of other nodes, but cannot monitor, detect or
punish the misbehaving nodes eﬃciently. If node j is always uncooperative, node i can be
non-cooperative or sometimes be cooperative to j. Node j will not be punished.

3.2.2

Cooperative Game for Defenseless Systems
In military applications, the nodes work for the US government, which can serve as the

third party to monitor the nodes. In commercial applications, a telecommunication company
could serve as the third party for monitoring. However, as many individual telecommunica37

tion companies exist, it is diﬃcult to form a rule to monitor the nodes. Suppose the players
can enforce contracts on each other through a third party and form a coalition to maximize
their individual utilities. Take a three-node based coalition as an example. The coalitions
that node i can choose include {i}, {i, j}, {i, k} and {i, j, k}. Since all nodes in the system
are identical, they have the same strategy options as node i. If node i does not form any
coalition with other nodes, the interaction with another node is just the non-cooperative
game. From the two-node interaction matrix shown in Table 3.3, we know that all nodes
will choose the non-cooperative strategy. Therefore, v(i) equals the NE payoﬀ of player i in
the non-cooperative game, that is v(i) = 0 (Deﬁnition 3). Below, we analyze the {i, j} coalition. When player i and player j form a coalition, they choose the Pareto-optimal strategy
(Ci , Cj ) to interact with each other. Thus, the collective payoﬀ of the {i, j} coalition from
their interaction is (2p − 2c). Since player k chooses the NE strategy to interact with each
of them, the collective payoﬀ of the {i, j} coalition from the interaction with k is (−2c).
Therefore, the collective payoﬀ of the {i, j} coalition is v(i, j) = max{2p − 4c, 0}. Similarly,
v(i, k) = max{2p − 4c, 0} and v(i, j, k) = 6(p − c). Therefore, v(i, j, k) = 6(p − c) is the
highest utility the players can achieve when they form a grand coalition, in which all nodes
in the system are cooperative. Since xi = xj = xk = 2(p − c) > v(i) = v(j) = v(k) = 0 and
n
i=1 xi = v(N ), according to Deﬁnition (3), the payoﬀ allocation resulting from the grand
coalition is rational.
Proposition 3.2.1 In the cooperative game, the grand coalition with the (C1 , C2 , ...Cn ) action set is the only stable coalition.
Proof Table 3.3 shows that the (Ci , Cj ) action set leads to the Pareto-optimal payoﬀ and
(Ii , Ij ) leads to the NE payoﬀ. Therefore, in the n-node cooperative game, the action set
(C1 , C2 , ..., Cn ) leads to a Pareto-optimal payoﬀ. According to Deﬁnition 2, the Paretooptimal action set (C1 , C2 , ..., Cn ) has the highest collective payoﬀ. Since no other coalition
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can generate a higher payoﬀ, according to Deﬁnition 4, the (C1 , C2 , ...Cn ) action set is a

stable coalition. Because v(S) < i∈S xiN for all S ⊂ N , where xiN is xi for node i in the
grand coalition. Therefore, the grand coalition is the only stable coalition.
In conclusion, in a defenseless system, if the strategies of the nodes can be enforced by
a third party, cooperative packet forwarding is the best choice for all rational nodes. However,
such assumptions cannot always be valid especially for existing commercial applications that
are controlled by several authorities.

3.3

Game Theory Model for Reputation Systems

One-interaction Game. Most reputation systems, regardless of whether the reputation
value changes linearly or non-linearly, use a reputation threshold to distinguish selﬁsh nodes
from cooperative nodes. If nodes are cooperative in packet forwarding, the reputation values
of these nodes are increased. If nodes are found to be uncooperative, their reputation values
will be reduced. When the reputation value of a node is below threshold TR , it will be
detected as a selﬁsh node.
Based on the packet forwarding beneﬁt, cost, and reputation threshold, we build
a one-interaction game theory model for reputation systems as shown in Table 3.4 along
with Equations (3.3) and (3.4). From Table 3.4, we can see that when the reputation value
of the node is above TR , the non-cooperative action set (Ii , Ij ) with payoﬀ (0, 0) is NE,
but (Ci , Cj ) is Pareto-optimal. When the R of a node is below TR , all other action sets
except the (Ci , Cj ) action set produce (0, 0) payoﬀ. Therefore, only when the reputation
value of the node is below TR does the (Ci , Cj ) become both NE and Pareto-optimal. In this
situation, as no individual rational node can beneﬁt from the unilateral deviation of (Ci , Cj ),
(Ci , Cj ) becomes NE. As it can bring the maximum beneﬁt for each node, (Ci , Cj ) is also
Pareto-optimal. Based on the above analysis, we can surmise the following proposition.
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Table 3.4: Payoﬀ matrix for reputation systems.

Node i

Node j
Cooperative
Cooperative
(p-c, p-c)
Non-cooperative U (Ii , Cj )

U (Ci , Ij ) =

U (Ii , Cj ) =

Non-cooperative
U (Ci , Ij )
(0, 0)

(−c, p) if RI(j) > TR
(0, 0)
if RI(j) ≤ TR

(3.3)

(p, −c) if RI(i) > TR
(0, 0)
if RI(i) ≤ TR

(3.4)

Proposition 3.3.1 Given a pair of nodes i and j in a reputation system, if their reputation
values are larger than the reputation threshold TR , the (Ii , Ij ) strategy is NE and the (Ci , Cj )
strategy is Pareto-optimal. If the reputation value of either node in the pair is less than TR ,
the (Ci , Cj ) strategy is both NE and Pareto-optimal.

Proposition 3.3.2 The cooperation incentive strategy provided by reputation systems will
result in a situation where the node reputation values are near the reputation threshold.
Proof As the payoﬀ matrix in Table 3.4 shows, when the reputation value of a node is above
TR , (Ii , Ij ) is the NE. Therefore, the node has incentive to be non-cooperative. Then, its
reputation value continues to decrease as:

lim R = TR .

+
R→TR

(3.5)

When a node’s reputation value is below TR , (Ci , Cj ) is the NE. Hence, the node will cooperate to increase its reputation value. The value continues to increase as:

lim R = TR .

−
R→TR
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(3.6)

Consequently, the reputation values of nodes converge at TR , meaning the nodes tend to
keep their reputation value near the threshold value.
Proposition 3.3.2 implies that reputation systems cannot provide incentives to encourage nodes to be more cooperative when their reputations are close to and above TR ; it
can only encourage nodes not to misbehave. Therefore, nodes are only motivated to keep
their reputation values close and above the reputation threshold. If a node cleverly manipulates this policy by accepting partial transmission requests to keep its reputation just above
the threshold, the performance of the system is impeded due to the packet drops.
We use R to denote the current reputation value of a node. We assume that in the ﬁrst
nr packets that a node has received, it drops nd packets, and forwards nr -nd packets. We use
ΔR+ to denote the reputation increase rate, the increased reputation value for a cooperation
action, and use ΔR− to denote the reputation decrease rate, the decreased reputation value
for a non-cooperation action.
Proposition 3.3.3 If a selﬁsh node manages to keep its reputation value closely above the
threshold, the upper bound of the packet drop rate Pd is:
ΔR+
Pd ≥
.
ΔR+ + ΔR−

(3.7)

Proof Suppose that in the ﬁrst nr interactions, a selﬁsh node can choose the I strategy for
nd interactions before its reputation value falls below TR . Therefore,

nd · ΔR− − (nr − nd ) · ΔR+ ≥ R − TR ,

⇒ Pd =

R−TR
+ ΔR+
nd
≥ nr +
,
nr
ΔR + ΔR−
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(3.8)

(3.9)

R−TR
nr
nr →∞ ΔR+

⇒ lim Pd ≥ lim
nr →∞

+ ΔR+
+ ΔR−

=

ΔR+
.
ΔR+ + ΔR−

(3.10)

Proposition 3.3.3 implies two points. First, in a MANET with a reputation system, the
packet drop rate of rational nodes is determined by the reputation increase rate for cooperative behavior and the decrease rate for non-cooperative behavior. Second, the packet
drop rate is irrelevant to the threshold value. Therefore, to reduce the packet drop rate, a
reputation system should have a low reputation increase rate and a high reputation decrease
rate.
Propositions 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 show that the reputation system can only provide incentive to encourage nodes to keep their reputation values just above the reputation threshold,
rather than encouraging them to be more cooperative in packet forwarding. Once a node
has an R just above the threshold, it can always be served in the packet transmission. The
reputation system treats all the nodes whose Rs are above the reputation threshold identically, regardless of their diﬀerent cooperative levels. Therefore, a reputation system must
have a complementary method to encourage all nodes to be highly cooperative with each
other and diﬀerentially reward nodes in diﬀerent altruistic levels.
Repeated Games. In a repeated game of reputation systems, for a pair of nodes i and j
the Pareto-optimal action set alternates between (Ci , Cj ) and (Ii , Ij ) because the reputation
values of the nodes ﬂuctuate near TR . Since (Ci , Cj ) cannot always be the NE, the nodes will
not always choose (Ci , Cj ). Therefore, reputation systems cannot always encourage nodes
to be cooperative in repeated games.

3.4

Game Theory Model for Price Systems

One-interaction Game. A price system uses virtual cash such as credits to encourage
node cooperation in the system. If a node does not have enough credits for packet forward42

ing, all of its transmission requests will be rejected. In addition to the transmission cost c
and transmission beneﬁt p, we introduce credit payoﬀs mr and mp for service transactions.
mr denotes the packet forwarding reward in credits for one cooperative forwarding behavior
and mp denotes the packet forwarding price in credits for one forwarding service. In an
interaction between a pair of nodes i and j with the strategy set (Ci , Ij ), node j drops node
i’s packet and node i forwards node j’s packet. Although the selﬁsh node j can save the
transmission cost c by refusing to forward node i’s packet, it still should pay mp for node i’s
forwarding service for its packet. On the other hand, although the cooperative node i loses
packet transmission payoﬀ p as its packet has been dropped by node j, it can still earn payoﬀ mr due to its cooperative behavior for forwarding node j’s packet. Based on the packet
forwarding beneﬁt, cost, price and reward, we build the one-interaction payoﬀ matrix for a
pair of interaction nodes in a price system, as shown in Table 3.5, where

m = mp − mr .

In one interaction, both nodes cooperatively forward each other’s packet. For the (Ci , Cj )
strategy set, since both nodes are cooperative in the packet routing, they both earn the
payoﬀ p and spend c for the packet transmission. Also, since each node should pay mp for
the packet forwarding by the other and earn mr for its own cooperative behavior, the payoﬀ
for (Ci , Cj ) is (p-c-mp -mr , p-c-mp -mr ). Similarly, the payoﬀ for (Ci , Ij ) and (Ii , Cj ) can be
calculated as shown in Equations (3.11) and (3.12). For example, in the (Ci , Ij ) action set,
since node i is cooperative to forward packets but its packet is not forwarded by node j, the
payoﬀ for node i is mr -c. Meanwhile, since the packets of node j are forwarded by node i,
node j should pay for the forwarding. Therefore, the payoﬀ for node j is p-mp . Vi and Vj
denote the account value (i.e., credit amount) of node i and j respectively. When Vi < 0 or
Vj < 0, there is no interaction between the nodes. Therefore, the payoﬀ is (0, 0).
Proposition 3.4.1 Price systems can make (Ci , Cj ) NE iﬀ the transmission cost c, transmission beneﬁt p, packet forwarding price mp , and packet forwarding reward mr satisfy
p > mp & mr > c.
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Table 3.5: Payoﬀ matrix for price systems.

Node i

Node j
Cooperative
Cooperative
(p-c- m, p-c- m)
Non-cooperative U (Ii , Cj )

U (Ci , Ij ) =

U (Ii , Cj ) =

Non-cooperative
U (Ci , Ij )
(0, 0)

(−c + mr , p − mp ) if Vj > 0
(0, 0)
if Vj < 0

(3.11)

(p − mp , −c + mr ) if Vi > 0
(0, 0)
if Vi < 0

(3.12)

Proof To change the (Ci , Cj ) action set to NE, (Ci , Ij ), (Ii , Cj ), and (Ii , Ij ) should not be
NE. That is
⎧
⎪
⎪
p − c − mp + mr > p − mp
⎪
⎪
⎨
p − c − mp + mr > −c + mr
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ −c + mr > 0
⇒ p > mp & mr > c.

(3.13a)

(3.13b)

Proposition 3.4.2 In a price system, the action set (Ci , Cj ) is Pareto-Optimal iﬀ p >
mp & mr > c.
Proof Proposition 3.4.1 shows that iﬀ p > mp & mr > c, the action set (Ci , Cj ) is the NE.
Also, (Ci , Cj ) is the best outcome in the system. Therefore, (Ci , Cj ) is also Pareto-Optimal.
Proposition 3.4.2 indicates that price systems can provide eﬀective cooperation incentives to the nodes.
Proposition 3.4.3 Suppose a selﬁsh node has dropped nd packets and forwarded nr − nd
packets from its received nr packets and that it has enough credits to pay the forwarding
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services for its generated ng packets. If the selﬁsh node manages to keep its credit amount
above zero, the lower bound of its packet drop rate Pd is

Pd ≥

where α =

ng
nr

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨ 1−α·

mp
mr ,

⎪
⎪
⎩ 1−α·

mp
mr

V
= 0,
nr
V
if
lim
= β,
nr →∞,V →∞ nr

if
β
mr ,

+

lim

nr →∞

(3.14)

and V is the account value of the node.

Proof The selﬁsh node has dropped nd packets and forwarded nr − nd packets from its
received nr packets, and it has enough credits to pay the forwarding services for its generated
ng packets. Therefore,

(nr − nd ) · mr + V − ng · mp ≤ 0

⇒ Pd =

nd
nr · mr + V − ng · m p
≥
nr
nr · mr
nr · mr + V − ng · mp
nr →∞
nr · mr

⇒ lim Pd ≥ lim
nr →∞

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨1 − α ·
=

⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩1 − α ·

V
=0
nr →∞ nr

mp
,
mr
mp
mr

(3.15)

(3.16)

(3.17)

if lim

(3.18)

V
+ mβr , if lim
= β.
nr →∞ nr

Price systems detect selﬁsh nodes by checking the node account value. Nodes with
account values no more than zero are regarded as selﬁsh nodes. Proposition 3.4.3 implies
that price systems cannot detect some selﬁsh nodes since they can drop packets while still
keeping their account value above zero. Speciﬁcally, these systems cannot detect selﬁsh
nodes in three cases. First, the price system cannot detect selﬁsh and wealthy nodes. Such
a node has a considerable amount of credits (i.e., large V ), which leads to large β, and
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subsequently a large drop rate Pd according to Equation (3.14). Due to its large V, the
selﬁsh and wealthy node is not easily detected. Second, the price system cannot punish the
selﬁsh nodes in a high-traﬃc region where a node receives more packets than it generates (i.e.,
ng < nr ). This condition leads to small α, which subsequently produces a large packet drop
rate Pd according to Equation (3.14). Since the node consumes much fewer credits, it cannot
be easily detected. On the other hand, the price system is unfair for nodes in a low-traﬃc
region. Such a node may not be able to accumulate enough credits to buy forwarding services
for its own packets although it is a cooperative node. Third, when the packet forwarding
price is much smaller than the forwarding reward (i.e., mp

mr ), Pd becomes very large

according to Equation (3.14). Since a node’s cooperative behavior enables it to buy several
forwarding services, it can easily keep its account value above zero.
Proposition 3.4.4 Given a price system with node packet drop probability q when its V > 0,
its average packet drop probability is:
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨q,
Pd =

where k =

⎪
⎪
⎩

if k ≥ α

k·q
,
k·q+1

(3.19)

if k < α,

mr
.
mp

Proof The process of an account value change can be modeled as a Markov chain as shown
in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. Each cycle denotes the account state of a node with its account
value. An labeled arrow between two states denotes the state transferring probability from
one state to the other. We use s to denote a node’s account state and Ps (s) to denote the
probability that the node is in state s.
Case 1 (k ≥ α): Figure 3.2 shows the Markov chain for the account states of a node
when k ≥ α (i.e., mr · nr ≥ mp · ng ). As shown by the right ﬂowing arrows, when the
node forwards a packet it gains mr -mp =(k − 1)mp credits given ng = nr . As shown by
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…
q

Figure 3.2: The Markov chain of the account states of a node when k ≥ α.
the left ﬂowing arrows, when the node drops a packet it pays mp credits for the forwarding
service. When s = 0, the node has only one action choice – to be cooperative in order to
buy services for its own packets. Therefore, the node jumps from state 0 to state (k − 1)mp
with probability 1. For other states, since mr · nr ≥ mp · ng , i.e., the node has enough credits
to pay its packet forwarding service, it can choose to drop or forward its received packets
with probabilities q and 1 − q, respectively. Since the states in the Markov chain are inﬁnite,
i.e., ns →∞ where ns is the number of all states in the Markov chain, the probability that a
node stays in state 0 is lim Ps (0) = 0. Because a node drops a packet with probability q
ns →∞

only when s = 0, its average packet drop probability is
Pd = (1 − lim Ps (0)) · q = q.

(3.20)

ns →∞

1
(1  k)m p

1

1
(1  2k)m p

…

 2 km p

1
1-q

1

1

 km p

0

km p

…

q

Figure 3.3: The Markov chain of the account states of a node when k < α.
Case 2 (k<α): Figure 3.3 shows the Markov chain of the account states of a node
when k<α (i.e., mr ·nr < mp ·ng ). It shows that states {(−1+k)mp , (−1+2k)mp ,..., −2kmp ,
−kmp , 0, kmp } form a closed cycle. Thus, these states are called absorbing states [55] and
the whole Markov chain can be reduced to the aborting states because a node cannot leave
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the closed cycle once it stays in one of the absorbing states. As the left arrows show, when
a node stays in the state kmp , it moves to state (−1 + k)mp when it loses mp credits by
dropping a packet with probability q, and it moves to state (−1 + 2k)mp when it earns
(k − 1)mp credits by forwarding a packet with probability (1 − q). In other absorbing states,
since their account values are not positive, the node has only one action choice – to be
cooperative to increase its account value. Thus, as the right arrows show, a node forwards
the packets with probability 1 in these states. Based on the global balance equations [55],
we can obtain:

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
Ps ((−1 + k)mp ) = q · Ps (kmp )
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨Ps ((−1 + 2k)mp ) = (1 − q) · Ps (kmp ) + Ps ((−1 + k)mp )
⎪
⎪
⎪
Ps ((−1 + 3k)mp ) = Ps ((−1 + 2k)mp ) = ... = Ps (0) = Ps (kmp )
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩Ps (kmp ) + Ps (0) + ... + Ps ((−1 + 2k)mp ) + Ps ((−1 + k)mp ) = 1
⇒ Ps (kmp ) =

1
q+

1
k

=

k
.
k·q+1

(3.21a)

(3.21b)

Since the node will drop packets only in state kmp as shown in the Markov chain, its packet
drop rate is:
Pd =

k·q
.
k·q+1

(3.22)

Repeated Games. In the price system, according to Proposition 3.4.1, when p>mp & mr >c,
the (Ci , Cj ) strategy is both NE and Pareto-optimal. Therefore, in the repeated cooperation
game with ﬁnitely many interactions, all nodes will choose (Ci , Cj ) stably and continuously.
Therefore, (Ci , Cj ) in the repeated games of price system remains the NE and Pareto-optimal
case.
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3.5

The Design and Game Theory Model for the Integrated Reputation/Price System

One-interaction Game. A system that can eﬀectively encourage the cooperation of the
nodes in a one-interaction system should have two features: (1) strong incentives to encourage the nodes to be cooperative and (2) quick, eﬀective detection of selﬁsh nodes for
punishment. The reputation system uses a reputation threshold to distinguish the selﬁsh
and cooperative nodes. However, it cannot provide strong incentive for cooperation. Though
price systems can provide a strong incentive for node cooperation, they fail to provide an
eﬀective mechanism for detecting misbehaving nodes. We propose an integrated system
that combines the reputation system and the price system. By integrating the misbehavior
detection mechanism from the reputation system and the cooperation incentive mechanism
from the price system, the integrated system can overcome the drawbacks of the individual
systems.
In addition to the strategies of the individual reputation system and the price system, the integrated system oﬀers additional strategies. Node i’s packet forwarding price is
determined from its reputation value by mp =

a
,
(Ri )b

where a and b are constant parameters

and b is used to control the increase/decrease speed of mp based on Ri . Thus, a node with
a higher reputation value may pay less for the packet forwarding service compared to lower
reputation node. The reputation value R and account value V of each node are used to distinguish selﬁsh nodes and cooperative nodes. The node with V < 0 or R < TR is regarded
as a selﬁsh node and its transmission requests will be rejected by other nodes.
Compared to the reputation system, the integrated system can eﬀectively prevent
some selﬁsh nodes from keeping their reputation values just above the threshold value by selectively sending packets because the selﬁsh nodes must pay more credits for packet forwarding, which will quickly deplete their credit account. Also, the system avoids discouraging the
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cooperation of high-reputed nodes, since a higher reputed node can pay less for the packet
forwarding. Compared to the price system, the integrated system can encourage wealthy
nodes to always be cooperative in the packet forwarding because these nodes attempt to
gain a higher reputation for a lower service price. The integrated system can also detect
selﬁsh and wealthy nodes in a high traﬃc region by reputation values, and encourage these
nodes to be cooperative. If a node’s reputation value is below the threshold (R < TR ) its
transmission requests will be rejected by other nodes, regardless of its wealth. Therefore, the
nodes stay cooperative for packet forwarding. Moreover, even in a low traﬃc region where
a node has few chances to earn credits, a highly-reputed node can still have its packets
forwarded because it pays a low price.
Table 3.6: Payoﬀ matrix for the integrated system.

Node i

Node j
Cooperative
Cooperative
U (Ci , Cj )
Non-cooperative U (Ii , Cj )

U (Ci , Cj ) = (p − c + (mr −

U (Ci , Ij ) =

U (Ii , Cj ) =

(−c + mr , p −
(0, 0)

Non-cooperative
U (Ci , Ij )
(0, 0)

mp
mp
), p − c + (mr −
)).
Ri
Rj

mp
)
Rj

(3.23)

if Vj > 0 & RI(j) > TR
if Vj ≤ 0  RI(i) ≤ TR .

(3.24)

p
, −c + mr ) if Vi > 0 & RI(i) > TR
(p − m
Ri
(0, 0)
if Vi ≤ 0  RI(i) ≤ TR .

(3.25)

Proposition 3.5.1 In the integrated system, the action set (Ci , Cj ) is both NE and Paretooptimal if transmission cost c, current reputation value Rj and Ri , and packet forwarding
reward mr satisfy mr > c & p >

mp
Ri

&p>

mp
.
Rj

Proof To change the (Ci , Cj ) strategy to be the NE and Pareto-optimal, the payoﬀ values
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of the integrated system should satisfy:
⎧
⎪
⎪
p − c + mr −
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ p − c + mr −
⎪
p
⎪
p− m
>0
⎪
Ri
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩ p − mp > 0
Rj

mp
Ri

>p−

mp
Ri

mp
Rj

>p−

mp
Rj

⇒ mr > c & p >

mp
mp
&p>
.
Ri
Rj

Equations (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25) represent the payoﬀs of U (Ci , Cj ), U (Ci , Ij ), and U (Ii , Cj ).
When the reputation value of a node is lower than threshold TR , the node is regarded as a selfmp
p
→ p> m
.
ish node and punished. Therefore, node i needs to ensure Ri > TR . That is, p> R
Ri
T
mp
.
As a result, the (Ci , Cj ) strategy is always the NE and Pareto-optimal iﬀ mr >c & p> R
T

Equations (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25) show that a high reputation value leads to a high payoﬀ
for cooperative behavior. Therefore, the integrated system can provide higher incentives than
the price-based system for cooperative behavior, because the payoﬀ earned by a cooperative
behavior in the integrated system is higher than that in the price-based system.
In addition to providing incentive for higher node cooperation, the integrated system
can also eﬀectively detect selﬁsh nodes by monitoring node reputation and account value.
A selﬁsh node is detected when its R < TR or V < 0. A silly selﬁsh node is deﬁned as
the node that drops packets no matter whether its reputation value is below the reputation
threshold TR or not. A clever selﬁsh node is deﬁned as the node that selectively drops part of
the receiving packets but keeps its reputation value above TR . The wealthy and silly selﬁsh
node cannot be detected by the price system in a short time, but can be detected by the
reputation component of the integrated system quickly when its reputation falls below TR .
Similarly, the selﬁsh behaviors of the nodes with small packet forwarding requests cannot
be detected by the price system, but can be detected by the integrated system when its
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reputation falls below TR . A wealthy and clever selﬁsh node can avoid being detected in the
reputation system. However, in the integrated system, the node’s reputation drops quickly,
and then its credits are quickly consumed as it always pays a very high price for packet
forwarding services based on the price policy in the integrated system, leading to detection
upon account starvation.
Repeated Games. In the one-interaction game of the integrated system, the (Ci , Cj ) action
set is both NE and Pareto-optimal iﬀ mr > c & p > c. Thus, for a repeated cooperation
game, each interacting node has no incentive to deviate from the (Ci , Cj ) action set. Even if
some nodes deviate from (Ci , Cj ), the remaining nodes’ payoﬀ will not be reduced because
(Ci , Cj ) is the NE. Unlike IDS, nodes in the integrated system can always safely choose
the cooperation strategy. Hence a MANET with the integrated system can always provide
incentives for the nodes’ cooperation. We deﬁne the relative success rate of a strategy as the
rate of the total payoﬀs of nodes employing the strategy to the total payoﬀs of all nodes in
the system. We also deﬁne round as a sequence of system interactions in which each pair of
nodes have an interaction with each other. We use fC/I [t] to denote the percent of the nodes
using strategy C or I in round t over all nodes.
Proposition 3.5.2 The percent of the nodes adopting the cooperation strategy is

fC [t] =

fC [0] +

fC [0]
.
Ui (Ii ,Cj )+Ui (Ii ,Ij ) (t−1)
fI [0]( Ui (Ci ,Cj )+Ui (Ci ,Ij ) )

(3.27)

Proof According to evolutionary game theory [73] and the property of linearity of expectation [55], we see that the percent of nodes adopting the cooperation strategy scales with the
relative success rate of the cooperation strategy. According to the deﬁnition of the relative
success rate, we obtain:
fC [t − 1] Ui (Ci , Cj ) + Ui (Ci , Ij )
fC [t]
=
·
fI [t]
fI [t − 1] Ui (Ii , Cj ) + Ui (Ii , Ij )
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(3.28)

⇒

Ui (Ci , Cj ) + Ui (Ci , Ij ) t fC [0]
fC [t]
=(
)
.
fI [t]
Ui (Ii , Cj ) + Ui (Ii , Ij ) fI [0]

(3.29)

Since fI [t] = 1 − fC [t], we obtain:

fC [t] =

fC [0]
U (I ,C )+U (I ,I )

fC [0] + fI [0]( Uii(Cii ,Cjj )+Uii (Cii ,Ijj ) )(t)

.

(3.30)

Interestingly, in repeated games, if a selﬁsh node changes to be cooperative in the
next round (t + 1), the packet forwarding price decrease is:
mp
mp
(R(t + 1) − R(t)) · mp
−
=
,
R(t + 1) R(t)
R(t) · R(t + 1)

(3.31)

where R(t) denotes the node’s reputation at time t. That is, whether a node is high-reputed
or low-reputed, the price for its packet forwarding requests always decreases in the next
round if it is cooperative, and the price always increases in the next round if it drops packets.
Therefore, the price policy in the integrated system can encourage both high-reputed and
low-reputed nodes to be cooperative. Also, as Formula (3.31) shows that lower reputed nodes
have more price reduced if they are cooperative in the next round, the lower reputed nodes
receive higher incentives to be cooperative.

3.6

Summary

In this chapter, we analyzed the underlying cooperation incentives of defenseless,
reputation and price systems through game theory. To overcome the observed drawbacks in
each system, we proposed and analyzed an integrated system, which leverages the advantages
of reputation and price systems. Analytical results show the higher performance of the
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integrated system compared to the other two systems in terms of the eﬀectiveness of the
cooperation incentives and selﬁsh node detection. In the next chapter, we propose an eﬃcient
reputation management system that is based on the integrated system proposed in this
chapter.
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Chapter 4
Scalability: A Hierarchical
Account-aided Reputation
Management System (ARM)
In Chapter 3, we theoretically studied the incentives provided by the reputation,
price and integrated systems. Based on the theoretical results illustrated in Chapter 3,
here we propose mechanisms to solve the second challenge in distributed wireless systems.
That is, eﬃcient cooperation incentives that are resource-eﬃcient in use and maintenance.
We propose a hierarchical Account-aided Reputation Management system (ARM) that can
provide eﬃcient cooperation incentives, which are resource-eﬃcient in use and maintenance
in large-scale MANETs.
Existing reputation systems and price systems are neither suﬃciently eﬃcient nor
eﬀective for a large scale MANETs. First, most current reputation systems lack eﬃcient
mechanisms to collect and propagate reputation information for large scale MANETs. Periodical information exchanges, keeping redundant reputations in each node, and broadcasting
to query reputations consume signiﬁcant resources and fail to achieve high scalability. Sec-
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ond, reputation calculations based on partial local information, which may include false
information, may result in an insuﬃciently accurate reputation evaluation to truly reﬂect
node behaviors. Third, solely relying on a reputation system is not eﬀective in thwarting
uncooperative behaviors. Reputation systems provide equal treatment to trustworthy nodes
with reputation values larger than the threshold. Thus, a node can be uncooperative for
some time while maintaining its reputation value larger than the threshold, which leads to
a suboptimal overall system performance.
Meanwhile, price systems also suﬀer a similar problem. First, the circulation of credits
in the network requires a fair amount of computation and storage resources and increases
traﬃc overhead. Second, these systems fail to provide a mechanism to measure the service
quality oﬀered by a node and lack eﬀective methods to punish selﬁsh and wealthy nodes
(e.g., nodes that need few services) that sometimes drop others’ packets. Third, cooperative
nodes located in a low-traﬃc region receive few forwarding requests, and thus may not earn
enough credits for their own requests, while nodes located in a high-traﬃc region have more
chances to earn more credits than they actually need and thus may strategically drop some
messages for their own beneﬁt. Finally, the implementation of credits and virtual banks
brings more complexity with additional requirements on transmission security. For example,
since credits are stored at the head of a packet, which is transmitted through several nodes,
preventing the credits from being stolen becomes a problem.
ARM builds a structure in a MANET to realize the integrated system proposed in
Chapter 3 to provide stronger incentives than individual reputation and price systems. It
selects low-mobility and trustworthy nodes as reputation managers (managers in short),
builds them into a locality-aware distributed hash table (DHT) [88] infrastructure, and coordinately integrates the reputation and price systems through the infrastructure. DHTs are
well-known for high scalability, eﬃciency and reliability, thus support scalable and eﬃcient
operations in ARM. The DHT marshals all reputation and transaction information for a
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node into one manager, which calculates the reputation and increases/decreases credits for
the node accordingly. Therefore, ARM can eﬃciently manage the reputation of nodes in the
system with small overhead. It can also eﬀectively avoid misbehaviors including reputation
misreporting, reputation false accusation, and collusion.
Speciﬁcally, ARM consists of three components:
• A locality-aware DHT infrastructure. We study the requirements for creating such an
infrastructure in a MANET and propose the construction and maintenance algorithms.
The infrastructure eﬃciently collects all reputation and transaction information for a
node for eﬀective reputation and account management. Experimental results show
that including the maintenance overhead for node mobility, ARM still generates much
lower overhead than current reputation and prices systems.
• Reputation management. Relying on the collected global reputation information based
on DHT, ARM eﬀectively detects the false information and accurately calculates node
reputation. Also, with the aid of the DHT, ARM reduces each node’s burden for
periodical information exchange and for storage and computing.
• Reputation-adaptive account management. ARM treats the nodes with diﬀerent reputations accordingly and prevents nodes from gaining fraudulent beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally,
a higher-reputed node pays a lower price while a lower-reputed node pays a higher
price for service. Also, a highly reputed node earns more credits than a lower reputed
node for the same forwarding service. Using the DHT, ARM has no virtual credits
circulating in the network, eliminating the implementation complexity and security
concerns in virtual credits circulation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides an overview
of the ARM system. Section 4.2 introduces the algorithms to build a locality-aware DHT
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Infrastructure. Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 illustrate how ARM manages the reputation
values and prices of the nodes. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. The experimental results
are shown in Chapter 6.

4.1

An Overview of the ARM System

The resource managers constitute a locality-aware DHT, functioning as a backbone
at the center of the MANET for eﬃcient and stable operations of ARM. As shown in Figure 4.1, each normal mobile node has a watchdog [76, 69] to monitor and report the behavior
of its neighbors to managers. The DHT helps marshal all reputation and transaction information of a given node in the system to a speciﬁc manager. The managers have two
functions: reputation management and account management. Each manager calculates the
reputations and increases/decreases the credits in the accounts of the mobile nodes for which
it is responsible. Nodes with reputations either below the threshold or with deﬁcit accounts
are regarded as uncooperative. Managers notify mobile nodes about uncooperative nodes,
which are then put onto their blacklists. The blacklisted nodes’ forwarding requests are then
ignored by others. Like price systems, ARM also requires the source node to pay the relay
nodes for packet forwarding, but it eliminates the need for credit circulation in the network.
Moreover, in ARM, a highly-reputed node pays less credits while a lower-reputed node pays
more credits in a forwarding service transaction, thus eﬀectively providing incentives for
cooperation between nodes.
For example, when node n1 looks for a path for packet transmissions, it broadcasts a
path query message to the packet destination. When nodes n2 and n3 receive the query, they
check whether n1 is on their blacklists (step (1) in Figure 4.1). If so, they ignore n1 ’s query;
otherwise, they respond to n1 . n1 then forwards the packet along a discovered path consisting
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the ARM system.
of cooperative nodes including n2 and n3 . In step (2), the neighbor nodes of communicating
nodes n2 and n3 monitor the data transmission using their watchdog, and report the observed
transmission rate to their closest managers. Relying on the DHT, the managers merge all
reputation reports for n2 and n3 respectively and produce their global reputations. The
DHT overlay supports eﬃcient reputation information collection and querying. In step (3),
ARM adds credits to the accounts of n2 and n3 and decreases the account of n1 . A higher
reputation leads to more earned credits for n2 and n3 , and lower service charges for n1 . In
step (4), if the reputations of n2 and n3 are below a threshold or n1 has a deﬁcit account,
managers inform all nodes in the network to place the uncooperative nodes on their blacklists.
Similar to [98], we assume that the movement of each node is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) in a square area with space length l. The number of smart phones is
increasing daily with each typically having dual-mode: a low-power ad-hoc network interface
(e.g., IEEE 802.11 interface) and a high-power infrastructure network interface (e.g., WLAN
radio interface). Thus, we assume some mobile nodes in the MANET will have dual-mode
interfaces. The network designers can initially deploy a number of peers in the network
that serve as bootstrap manager nodes for DHT construction. The reputation messages exchanged between managers are of small size and delay tolerant compared to data messages.
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Managers can use the low-power interface for data transmission and the high-power interface
for reputation data transmission.
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Figure 4.2: The ARM hierarchical structure.

4.2

Locality-aware DHT Infrastructure
Figure 4.2 illustrates the hierarchical structure of ARM. The higher level is a DHT

network composed of managers (low-mobility and high-trustworthy nodes) and the lower
level is composed of normal mobile nodes. A DHT network can partition ownership of a set
of objects (e.g., ﬁles) among participating nodes and eﬃciently route messages to the unique
owner of any given object. Each object or node is assigned an ID that is the hashed value
of the object (e.g., ﬁle name) or node IP address using a consistent hash function [52]. An
object is stored in a node whose ID equals or immediately succeeds the object’s ID. The
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DHT provides two main functions: Insert(ID,object) and Lookup(ID), to store an
object to a node responsible for the ID and to retrieve the object, respectively. The message
for the two functions is forwarded based on the DHT routing algorithm. The DHT achieves
O(log n) path length per lookup request by using O(log n) neighbors per node, where n is
the number of nodes.
We leverage the Chord DHT network [88] as the ARM infrastructure for scalable and
eﬃcient reputation and account management. For each MANET, there is one DHT. ARM
constructs a locality-aware DHT-based infrastructure where the logical proximity abstraction
derived from ARM matches the physical proximity information. In this way, the packet
routing path in the overlay is consistent with the packet routing path in the physical topology,
which greatly reduces the physical routing distance and overhead. However, managers in
MANETs are mobile while nodes in DHT networks are stable. Also, in a MANET, a node can
only communicate with nodes within its transmission range. The limited transmission range
of the node poses a challenge in building and maintaining a DHT in a mobile environment.
Two questions naturally arise: (1) is it possible to form managers into a locality-aware
DHT infrastructure in a MANET? (2) how is a DHT built and maintained in a mobile
environment?
A Hamiltonian cycle graph is a graph in which a path can go through every vertex
in the graph exactly once and return to the starting vertex [33]. A Chord DHT [88] with
the ring topology is a representative of DHT overlays. A Chord, with the ring topology, is
actually a Hamiltonian cycle because successor neighbor links connect all nodes to a circle.
Therefore, to build a locality-aware DHT, the physical topology should also be a Hamiltonian
cycle.
Proposition 4.2.1 The transmission range of nodes should satisfy r ≥
form a Hamiltonian cycle.
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√2 l
2π

in order to

Proof To guarantee that the nodes in a graph can form a Hamiltonian cycle, the number of
neighbors of each node (i.e., connectivity degree) should satisfy deg(v) ≥

N
2

where v denotes

a vertex [33]. With the assumption of the i.i.d. movement, a node has the least connectivity
degree when it moves to the corner of the square ﬁeld. That is,
πr2
N
=⇒ l ≤
N≥
2
4l
2

√

2π
2
r =⇒ r ≥ √ l,
2
2π

(4.1)

which shows the requirement for forming managers into a Hamiltonian cycle.

4.2.1

Locality-aware DHT Infrastructure Construction
Figure 4.3 shows an example of a physical topology and its corresponding logical

topology in ARM. In a logical topology, the distance between node IDs represents their
logical distance. To build managers into a locality-aware DHT infrastructure, we assign a
sequence of consecutive DHT IDs to the managers along the path connecting all nodes in a
cycle.
In a MANET, each node identiﬁes its neighbors by sending “hello” messages. Thus, a
node can infer the relative physical closeness of its neighbors by the communication latency.
To assign IDs to managers, as shown in Figure 4.3, we ﬁrst choose a trustworthy bootstrap
manager (m0 ) and assign it ID 0. Then, it chooses its physically closest node as its successor,
and assigns it ID 1. The successor ﬁnds its successor and assigns it ID 2. The process is
repeated until the bootstrap node is reached. At this time, a complete cycle is formed and
all managers have been assigned numerically continuous IDs. The last node in the created
path with ID N − 1 must be in the transmission range of m0 , i.e., the successor of m7 is m0 .
Since only the physically close nodes can have sequential IDs, the constructed logical overlay
topology is consistent with the physical topology of managers. Then, each manager builds
a DHT routing table containing log N neighbors based on a DHT neighbor determination
protocol using broadcasting.
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Figure 4.3: Construction of the DHT infrastructure.

4.2.2

Locality-aware DHT Infrastructure Maintenance

Proposition 4.2.2 In ARM, the average time period a pair of neighbor managers stay
within the transmission range of each other (i.e., connection duration) is

r
,
v

where v is

the average relative speed of their movement.
Proof Since the movement of each manager is i.i.d., if manager mi is distance d away from
manager mj , the expected time period needed by mi to move out of the transmission range
of mj is:



0

E(T ) =
2π

1
2π

√

r2 + d2 − 2rdcosθ·
r
d(θ) = .
E(v)
v

(4.2)

Proposition 4.2.2 shows that the stability of the DHT infrastructure is primarily determined
by the moving speed and transmission range of managers. To maintain the DHT structure in
node mobility, managers must maintain connectivity with their neighbors to guarantee that
they are sequentially connected from ID 0 to N − 1. By regarding node movement as node
departures followed by node joins, we can use the original DHT maintenance mechanism to
maintain the ARM DHT infrastructure. However, it leads to a high maintenance overhead
due to node mobility. We propose a lightweight DHT maintenance algorithm to deal with
this mobility.
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Each manager relies on the “hello” messages to check its connectivity with its successor and update the managers in its routing table. When manager mi senses its link to
its predecessor mi−1 is about to break based on the sensed transmission power, it notiﬁes
mi−1 . When manager mi−1 receives the notiﬁcation or senses that its link to its successor
mi is about to break, it ﬁnds an alternative path that ends in mk (k > i − 1) and covers all
managers with IDs ∈ [i − 1, k]. The purpose of this operation is to maintain a complete DHT
circle covering all managers with numerically continuous IDs. Since mi moves in a local area
to ﬁnd the path with low overhead, mi−1 pings manager mi+j (j ≥ 2) sequentially by locally
broadcasting a query message with T T L = j. That is, manager mi+2 is pinged ﬁrst, then
mi+3 is pinged, and so on. Each pinged manager replies to mi−1 with a message containing
the routing path between them. Once the path covers ID∈ [i − 1, k], mi−1 reassigns IDs to
the managers in the detected path in sequence to maintain numerically continuous IDs in
the cycle. If no path is found after half of the managers in the system are pinged, then mi−1
functions as a bootstrap manager for DHT reestablishment. For routing table maintenance,
when a manager notices its routing table neighbor is not within its transmission range, it
broadcasts a query message to ﬁnd a new neighbor in that routing table entry.
As shown in Figure 4.4, when m3 senses that its link to m4 is about to break, it
initializes a path querying process to ﬁnd an alternate path covering all managers with
ID∈ [3, k] starting from itself and ending with mk . m3 ﬁrst pings m5 . If such a path cannot
be found, m3 pings m6 , then m7 , and so on. When an alternative path is discovered, the
managers along the path will be assigned new consecutive IDs for a complete circle. After
ﬁnding a new path that travels through manager mi with ID 5 and mj with ID 4, m3 assigns
mi and mj ID 4 and 5, respectively.
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Figure 4.4: Maintenance of the DHT infrastructure.

4.2.3

DHT-based Information Collection and Querying
The DHT approach supports eﬃcient and scalable information collection and querying

in ARM. Each normal mobile node ni has a virtual id=i, which is the consistent hash of
its IP address. In a DHT, an object is stored in a node whose id equals or immediately
succeeds the object’s id. We call this node the object’s owner manager. Nodes report the
business and reputation information (B + R) of the observed data forwarding behaviors of a
speciﬁc node (ni ) to their nearest managers. Relying on the function Insert(i,B+R), the
managers marshal all information for ni in the system to ni ’s owner manager. The owner
manager calculates ni ’s reputation and increases/decreases the credits in its account. For
example, in Figure 4.3, the information of the observed behavior of n1 and n9 is stored in
m1 , which is responsible for their resource and account management. A node queries for the
reputation of node ni by sending the function Lookup(i) to its physically closest manager.
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The query will be forwarded to the owner manager of node ni relying on the DHT routing
algorithm.

4.3

Reputation Management
In ARM, the reputation managers collect reputation information, calculate the global

reputation, identify misbehaving nodes, and manage node accounts. ARM provides more
accurate node reputation information for two reasons: it uses the global information rather
than local partial information in reputation calculation and the large amount of global information makes it eﬀective in detecting falsiﬁed, conspiratorial, and misreported information
through deviation.
Neighbor Monitoring. ARM uses neighbor monitoring to observe the packet-forwarding
behavior of nodes. Speciﬁcally, each observer uses a watchdog [76, 69] to keep track of the
message forwarding behavior of its neighbors. The observer records the total number of
packets that ni has received from other nodes for forwarding (Dir ), and the total number of
packets that ni has forwarded (Dif ) during each time period T . Assume t0 is the time instance
that an observing node no joined the system. At each time instance t0 + kT (k ∈ [1, 2, 3...]),
Dr

no calculates the observed reputation value of node ni by Rino = Dfi , reports this information
i

to its closest manager, and resets

Dir

and

Dif

to zero. The manager then merges the collected

reputations reported by nodes in its transmission range to the local reputation Rli .
Misreports Avoidance. When a node in a region experiences an adverse network condition, such as background interference due to traﬃc or thermal noise, the node’s neighbors
may also experience adverse network conditions. Thus, even though the nodes are cooperative, they are unable to transmit requested data. As a result, these nodes that mutually
monitor each other report low Rl values for each other. In this case, the low Rl values are
reported from nodes that are clustered together. Also, the interfering regions and the nodes
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in the regions are changing constantly. ARM can easily solve this problem since it reports
all reputations of a node in a region to a single manager. When a manager notices that all
nodes in an area report low Rl s, it temporarily ignores the reports to reduce the uncertainty
of the reported Rl to avoid punishing nodes for failing to forward packets due to adverse
network conditions.
False Accusation Avoidance. Some misbehaving nodes may report a high reputation
for an uncooperative node and a low reputation for a cooperative node. Since all observed
reputations of a node in a region are collected into a manager and most nodes are benign,
falsiﬁed reputations always deviate largely from most reported reputations. Thus, to reduce
the eﬀect of falsiﬁed reports, a manager ﬁlters the Ri s that dramatically deviate from the
average Ri . The deviation of Rino reported by node no about node ni is calculated as:
n

ΔRino = |Rino −

Ri j /|n||,

(4.3)

nj ∈n

where n denotes the group of observers that report Ri to the manager during T , and |n|
denotes the number of nodes in the group. ARM sets a threshold δl for the deviation and
ignores Rino satisfying ΔRino > δl . The manager mo then calculates the local reputation value
of ni in T denoted by Rlmi o :
Rlmi o =

Rino /|ñ|,

(4.4)

no ∈ñ

where ñ denotes n after removing the deviated observed reputations. Then, the manager
reports Rlmi o to ni ’s owner manager using the function Insert(i,Rlmi o ). According to
equation (4.3), the expected value of δ is

E(δ) =

a(Rlh − Rlf )
a · R l h + b · R lf
− R lf =
,
a+b
a+b

(4.5)

where Rlh and Rlf denote the expected values of honest reports and false reports respectively,
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and a and b respectively denote the number of honest reports and the number of false reports
in interval T .
Collusion Avoidance. The nodes in a region may collude to conspiratorially report node
reputations to fraudulently increase their own reputations or decrease others’ reputations.
For example, the nodes in group A and group B are the nodes in the transmission range
of mk . The number of nodes in group B overwhelms group A. If the nodes in group B
collude to report low Ri for ni , then the justiﬁed reports from group A are ignored by mk
according to Equation (4.3). This problem can be resolved with another ﬁltering process at
the owner manager mi that collects all Rlmi o from diﬀerent managers mo . Again, mi computes
the variance of Rlmi o based on Equation (4.6), and ignores Rlmi o with ΔRlmi o > δg . δg can be
determined in the same way as δl :
m

ΔRlmi o = |Rlmi o −

Rli j /|m||,

(4.6)

mj ∈m

where m is the number of managers that report Rli . Therefore, the global reputation of
node ni becomes:
Rlmi o /|m̃|,

Rg i =

(4.7)

mo ∈m̃

where m̃ is the group of m after ﬁltering.
For example, in Figure 4.2, nodes n3 , n4 , and n7 monitor the transmissions of n2 .
Nodes n3 and n7 report the observed reputation of n2 to manager m8 and n4 reports its
observed reputation of n2 to m10 . Then, m8 and m10 merge the reported reputations to a
local reputation value of n2 in its region, denoted by Rlm2 8 and Rlm2 10 , and report the results
to n2 ’s owner manager, m2 . Later, when n2 moves close to n5 , n5 will start monitoring the
transmissions of n2 and reporting the observed reputation of n2 to its nearby manager m4 ,
which subsequently reports Rlm2 4 to manager m2 . Therefore, all local reputations of n2 are
marshaled to m2 , which then calculates the global reputation for n2 . Unlike most existing
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reputation systems where a node calculates its neighbors’ reputation values based on its local
observations and cannot easily retrieve its new neighbor’s previous reputation, ARM globally
collects all Rli of node ni at all times in all regions for global reputation calculation, leading
to a more accurate reﬂection of ni ’s trustworthiness over time. Also, global information (i.e.,
large data samples) makes it easier to detect false information.
When a node is suddenly out of power or suﬀers from channel congestion, it cannot
oﬀer service to others and thus has a low reputation despite not being selﬁsh. It is unfair
to punish such a cooperative node with a low reputation. On the other hand, it is diﬃcult
to identify the real reason for a low reputation. Therefore, ARM takes into account the old
reputation when calculating the new reputation [11]. That is,

Rgnew = αRgold + (1 − α)Rg ,

(4.8)

where Rg is the currently calculated reputation value for period T and α is a weight factor
that is adaptive to the traﬃc load in the system. In a system with high traﬃc, a node is
more likely to be either out of power or congested. Then, α should be set to a larger value.
Therefore, we specify α = D̄/C̄, where D̄ is the average number of packets generated per
second in the monitoring region and C̄ is the expected channel capacity of the monitoring
region.
ARM periodically decreases the reputations of the nodes whose Rg > βT + (1 −
β)Rgmax (β < 1) by:
Rgnew := ϕRgnew (ϕ < 1),

(4.9)

where Rgmax denotes the maximum global reputation, and β and ϕ are weight factors. The
rationale behind this policy is that the reputation of a highly-reputed node will decrease
over time if it does not receive a new rating from others. The low reputation subsequently
increases the service price for message forwarding of the node (Section 4.4). Therefore, the
69

only way a node can enjoy a low price is to cooperate with other nodes, at all times. As with
other reputation systems, ARM also sets a reputation threshold T to determine whether or
not a node is selﬁsh. In traditional reputation systems, smart selﬁsh nodes may keep their
reputation just above T . Thus, they can sometimes drop packets while being regarded as
reputed nodes. These nodes will be detected by the account management function in ARM.
That is, if a node always generates packets rather than forwarding packets for others, it will
eventually run out of credits and be detected as a selﬁsh node.
Distributed Reputation Manager Auditing. Recall that reputation managers should
be highly-reputed nodes with high reputation value. The high reputations of reputation
managers only mean that they are willing to serve in packet forwarding, however, it does
not necessarily mean that they would not misbehave in managing other nodes’ reputations,
e.g., modifying the reputation values of other nodes. A reputation manager may modify a
node’s reputation value and (or) account value in two situations. First, a reputation manager
misreports the reputation of a node to its owner manager in the local reputation calculation.
Second, the owner manager of a node modiﬁes the reputation value and account value of the
node in the global reputation calculation.
In the ﬁrst situation, since the nodes in the transmission range of a reputation manager always change, the local reputation values of a node can be collected by several reputation managers in an interval T . After these managers report the collected reputation
values of a node to its owner manager, the owner manager can detect the misbehaviors
of the malevolent reputation mangers using the collusion avoidance method introduced in
Section 4.3.
In the second situation, as the owner reputation manager calculates the ﬁnal reputation value and manages the account value for a node, if the manager modiﬁes the reputation
value, no other nodes can detect it. To handle this problem, we use redundant reputation
managers for each node. Speciﬁcally, we set c diﬀerent consistent hash functions. When a
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manager reports the local reputation of a node to its owner managers, it uses the c consistent hash functions to generate c virtual ids. Then, it uses Insert(id,B+R) to report the
reputation to the owner managers of the node. When a node inquires the reputation value
of node ni from reputation managers, it also uses the c consistent hash functions on ni ’s
IP address to generate c virtual ids. Then, it executes Lookup(id) to retrieve the values.
The node ﬁrst calculates the average of the c returned values. The reputation managers
whose returned reputation values deviate from the average value for a certain threshold δa
are considered as malevolent managers. Then, the node regards the average value of the
reputation values from the non-malevolent managers as ni ’s global reputation value. The
node also reports the suspicious malevolent manager to other c − 1 managers. The managers
periodically exchange their received misbehavior reports, and dismiss the manager who has
been reported as a malevolent manager after checking the reputation values managed by the
owner manager by executing Lookup(id).
In this case, a highly-reputed node will be selected to join the DHT to replace the
dismissed manager. To select a new reputation manager, the reputation manager with DHT
ID=0 initially selects a node with the highest reputation among the normal nodes it manages. Then, the manager transfers a token, TOKEN(Reputation value (RVt ), Reputation
manager ID (ID0 )), to the reputation manager with DHT ID=1. If the reputation manager
has normal nodes with reputation value (RV) higher than RVt in the TOKEN, it replaces
RVt with RV and replaces ID0 with ID1 in the token and passes the token to its successor
reputation manager. The process continues until the reputation manager with ID=0 in the
token receives the token. Then the reputation manager informs the node with reputation
value RVt to be the reputation manager. From this point, the locality-aware DHT infrastructure maintenance algorithm in Section 4.2.2 is used to maintain the locality of the DHT
infrastructure.
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4.4

Reputation-adaptive Account Management
ARM has an account management function to avoid equal treatment of highly-reputed

nodes in diﬀerent reputation levels to eﬀectively provide cooperation incentives and deter
selﬁsh behaviors. ARM assigns each newly joined node with an initial number of credits
denoted by A(0). The owner managers of nodes maintain their accounts and transparently
increase and decrease the credits in the accounts of forwarding service providers and receivers,
respectively. Thus, as opposed to previous price systems, ARM’s account management
does not require credit circulation in the network, reducing transmission overhead, system
complexity and improving communication security.
In previous price systems [66, 57], the credits a node earns or pays, equals the product
of the unit price and the absolute number of packets forwarded (absolute method in short).
Cooperative nodes in a region with low traﬃc may not earn enough credits for their transmission needs, and nodes in a region with high traﬃc or without many transmission service
needs can be uncooperative without being punished. To deal with these problems, rather
than relying on the absolute number, ARM determines the credits earned by a node based
on the percent of forwarded packets among its received packets. Notice that Rg is exactly
the percentage in ARM; we use it directly for the calculation of earned credits. Speciﬁcally,
node ni ’s owner manager increases its account every period T by

Pe = p r R g i ,

(4.10)

where pr is a constant credit rewarding factor. We call this method the relative method. The
relative method is advantageous because: (1) managers can directly use the latest reported
reputation for account calculation instead of taking extra eﬀort to record packet forwarding
activities between nodes, reducing transmission overhead, and (2) it awards nodes fairly
according to the cooperative degree of node behavior.
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Proposition 4.4.1 For cooperative behavior rewarding, the relative method provides nodes
fairer treatment than the absolute method.
Proof We use ql and qh (qh >ql ) to denote the percent of the time period T used for packet
transmissions in a relay node in low-traﬃc and high-traﬃc regions, respectively. In the
absolute method, we use pa to denote the amount of awarded credits per packet. Suppose
λ is the average packet generation rate of the source, during time period t, the cooperative
relay node gains (qh − ql )tpa · λRg more credits in the high-traﬃc region than in the lowtraﬃc region. Using the relative method, whether the relay node is in a low-traﬃc region or
a high-traﬃc region, it always earns

t
pR .
T r g

To foster the cooperation incentives, ARM connects the forwarding service cost per
packet pc of a node to its reputation, so that higher-reputed nodes receive more credits while
lower-reputed nodes receive fewer credits for oﬀering the same forwarding service. The pc of
ni , denoted by pci , is calculated by:
p ci =

γ
Rgnew
i

,

(4.11)

where γ is a weight.
When an observing node no notices that Npi packets of node ni have been transmitted
by others during period T , it reports this business information Bi to its nearest manager
along with Ri . By the DHT function Insert(i,Bi + Ri ), the manager forwards the
information to ni ’s owner manager mi , which then deducts pci Npi credits from ni ’s account.
Therefore, the account of node ni at time t0 + kT (k ∈ [1, 2, 3...]) is:
t0 +kT

A(t) = A(0) −

(pci (t) · Npi (t) − pr · Rg i ).

(4.12)

t=t0

When the account of node ni is negative, managers notify all nodes to place node ni in their
blacklists.
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Proposition 4.4.2 ARM exponentially increases the credits of a node while it is cooperative
and exponentially decreases the credits of a node while it is uncooperative.
Proof Suppose a node’s Rg stays approximately constant during a time period T when it
sticks to an certain action strategy. We use Rg (t) to denote the reputation of a node at an
arbitrary time instance t = kT (k ∈ [0, 1, . . . , m]) during time period mT . Rg (t + T ) and
Rg (t) correspond to Rgnew and Rgold in the (k + 1)th time period.
From Equation (4.8), we can determine that:

Rg (t + T ) − Rg = α · (Rg (t) − Rg ),

t

⇒ Rg (t) = α T (Rg (0) − Rg ) + Rg .

(4.13)

(4.14)

Based on Formulas (4.11) and (4.12), after time t, a node’s account is:
kT

A = A(0) −

(pc (t) · Np − pr Rg )
t=T
kT +T

(4.15a)



> A(0) −
T
⎧
⎪
⎨ A(0) −
=
⎪
⎩ A(0) −

(pc (t) · Np − pr Rg ) · d(t),

γNp (1−α−k )·T
(Rg −Rg (0))·ln α·α
γNp ·k·T
Rg

(4.15b)

+ pr · T · Rg · k if Rg = Rg (0)

+ p r · T · Rg · k

(4.15c)

if Rg = Rg (0).

Because α−k > 1 and ln α < 0, when Rg < Rg (0), the account exponentially decreases with
k; when Rg > Rg (0), the account exponentially increases with k; and when Rg = Rg (0), the
account decreases linearly with k.
From Proposition 4.4.2, we can deduce that to ensure a selﬁsh node will ﬁnally run
out of the credits if it manipulates its reputation just above the threshold TR = Rg , we must
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ensure:
⎧
⎪
⎨
γ>

4.5

⎪
⎩

(Rg −Rg (0)) ln α·α·(A(0)+T kpr Rg )
(1−α−k )Np T

if Rg = Rg (0)

(A(0)+T pr Rg k)·Rg
T Np k

if Rg = Rg (0).

(4.16)

Summary
In this chapter, we propose a hierarchical Account-aided Reputation Management

system (ARM) to eﬃciently and eﬀectively deter node selﬁsh behaviors and provide cooperation incentives. ARM builds an underlying locality-aware DHT infrastructure to eﬃciently
collect global reputation information in the entire system for node reputation evaluation,
which avoids a periodical message exchange, reduces information redundancy, and more accurately reﬂects a node’s trustworthiness. ARM has functions of reputation management
and account management, the integration of which fosters the cooperation incentives and
non-cooperation deterrence. ARM can detect the uncooperative nodes that gain fraudulent
beneﬁts while still being considered as trustworthy in previous reputation and price systems.
Also, it can eﬀectively identify falsiﬁed, conspiratorial and misreported information so as to
provide accurate node reputations that truly reﬂect node behaviors. Based on the scalability and trustworthy reputation management system as ARM, we present an eﬃcient routing
algorithm for delay tolerant network in next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Eﬃciency: A Social Network and
Utility based Distributed Multi-copy
Routing Protocol (SEDUM)

In Chapter 4, we proposed a hierarchical Account-aided Reputation Management system (ARM) to eﬃciently and eﬀectively deter node selﬁsh behaviors and provide cooperation
incentives. To handle the third challenge in distributed wireless systems, we propose an eﬃcient routing algorithm to deliver messages with less overhead and lower delay. Speciﬁcally,
we propose a Social nEtwork and utility based DistribUted Multi-copy routing protocol (SEDUM) for Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) that fully exploits node movement patterns to
increase routing throughput and decrease routing delay. We assume that based on the ARM
reputation management system, the nodes are cooperative in packet forwarding.
Routing methods speciﬁcally for DTNs have been widely studied in recent years.
One group of routing methods use ﬂooding [75, 90, 94, 97] to enable a message to opportunistically meet its destination node. Despite their high robustness and low transmission
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delay, ﬂooding-based routing methods require high energy, bandwidth, and memory space
that are precious resources in wireless networks. Under high traﬃc loads, these methods
suﬀer from severe resource contention and message dropping, which signiﬁcantly degrade
their eﬃciency. The other group of methods use single-copy routing, such as direct routing [87] and probabilistic (i.e., predicted) routing [47, 9, 27, 17, 71]. In direct routing, a
source node spreads messages to several mobile nodes, which keep messages until they meet
the destination node. In probabilistic routing, the messages are forwarded to mobile nodes
that have higher probabilities of meeting the destination node as measured by the contact
frequency utility. Although the single-copy methods save node resources and produce lower
transmission overhead, they are likely to suﬀer from severe transmission delay if a suboptimal
forwarding node (i.e., a node not in the shortest S-D path) is chosen.
In many DTN applications, such as mobile sensor networks [75], vehicular networks [39],
and networks formed by mobile phone holders, the movements of mobile devices exhibit certain patterns as the devices in these scenarios are the extension of the hosts (i.e., human or
animals), which normally exhibit certain movement routines [27]. Some nodes, such as home
neighbors and colleagues, have a high probability of meeting with each other and staying
close for a long time. This attribute of a movement pattern is called colocation [27] in a
network. Some nodes, such as students on a campus, meet each other with high frequency
but a short meeting time. This attribute of the movement pattern is called familiar stranger
in a social network [77].
The movement pattern of nodes can be leveraged to assist a node in ﬁnding a relay
node with a high probability of successfully sending data to the destination. Intuitively,
familiar strangers normally have high contact frequency, but cannot guarantee the transmission of a large number of messages during a contact due to limited contact time. On the
other hand, colocation nodes may have low contact frequency, but they have a long meeting
time during each contact, in which a large number of messages can be transmitted. A few
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routing protocols have been proposed to explore social communities in social networks for
data routing in DTNs [41, 60, 35, 28, 30, 42, 34, 25, 24] by aggregating contacts among
nodes in the past to a social graph, which may not be applicable to a large network with
dynamically changing network size and node movement pattern.
In this chapter, we provide answers to the following questions:
• Is there a metric that can capture the colocation and familiar stranger features of the
node’s movement to assist the message routing in a DTN?
• How to build a routing algorithm that can leverage the advantages of the single-copy
routing and ﬂooding?
Speciﬁcally, SEDUM consists of three distinguishing components.
• Duration utility based distributed routing. We propose a duration utility, which is the
ratio of total contact duration between two nodes over a time period T . A high duration
utility between two nodes indicates a high message transmission throughput between
them. This utility can fully capture the colocation and familiar stranger attributes
of the node movement pattern in the social network. Forwarding messages to nodes
that have higher duration utilities with destinations enhances routing throughput and
decreases routing delay.
• Eﬃcient multi-copy routing. Rather than relying on either ﬂooding or single-copy
routing, SEDUM uses multi-copy routing to achieve a tradeoﬀ between routing delay
and overhead. It uses the optimal tree replication algorithm to enable a node to quickly
replicate a number of copies to other nodes while moving. We theoretically analyze the
eﬃciency of this replication algorithm and the inﬂuence of the replication delay on the
routing delay. We also build a Markov chain to model the replication process, which
helps discover the minimum message copies necessary to achieve a desired routing
delay.
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• Eﬀective buﬀer management. The buﬀer management mechanism gives longer-lifetime
messages a higher priority to be sent from buﬀers, thus reducing the system’s total
transmission latency. It also gives higher-utility messages higher priority to remain in
buﬀers when there is congested, thus increasing the system’s total throughput. Further,
it quickly deletes the replicas of delivered messages to releases buﬀer congestion.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 theoretically analyzes
why a duration utility is better than a contact utility for enhancing throughput. Section 5.2
explains the SEDUM routing protocol in detail. Section 5.3 provides a theoretical analysis
of SEDUM. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.

5.1

Why Duration Utility Is Better Than Frequency
Utility

5.1.1

Frequency Utility
In DTN routing, the utility of a node is a measure of the contribution of the node to

enhance a routing metric such as throughput or delay [7]. The contact frequency utility is
widely used for probabilistic routing in DTNs. Node ni ’s contact frequency utility to node
nj is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of contacts between ni and nj in a time period. In
frequency utility based routing, a node chooses its neighbor with the highest utility to the
destination as the next hop for high routing successful rate and throughput.

5.1.2

Factors Aﬀecting the Successful Transmission
We consider one message as a basic unit for the transmission between two nodes. If

the link between two contacting nodes breaks before a message is completely transmitted,
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the message transmission fails. In a multi-copy routing protocol, each copy is transmitted
independently. Suppose that each message can have Nc copies and each of the copies can be
successfully transmitted from the source to the destination with probability P(S,D) . Then,
the probability that at least one copy is sent to the destination node (P ) is:

P = 1 − (1 − P(S,D) )Nc .

(5.1)

Equation (5.1) shows that a larger P(S,D) and a larger Nc lead to a higher Ps . However,
a larger Nc generates higher transmission overhead. Later on, we prove that increasing a
large Nc leads to a linear increase in transmission overhead but a negligible delay decrease
(Theorem 5.3.1). Therefore, we aim to increase the value of P(S,D) . P(S,D) =

P(i,j) , where

P(i,j) is the probability of successful transmission between two neighboring nodes ni and nj
in a routing path. A large P(i,j) leads to a large P(S,D) , and ultimately a large Ps . Next, we
will ﬁnd the factors that should be considered in order to increase P(i,j) .
We use α to denote the smallest contact duration between two nodes at one contact.
Speciﬁcally, α =

R
,
2vmax

where R is the transmission range of the mobile nodes and vmax is

the maximum moving speed of a mobile node. We use f to denote the contact frequency
between two nodes. Then, the two nodes have f T contacts during the time interval T . We
use P(i,j) (f T = 1) to denote P(i,j) when f T = 1, and use P(i,j) (f T > 1) to denote P(i,j) when
f T > 1.
Theorem 5.1.1 The probability of a successful message transmission between two neighboring nodes, P(i,j) , during a time interval T is:
⎧
α·w β
⎪
⎪
⎨ P(i,j) (f T = 1) = ( s )
α·w β
⎪
⎪
⎩ P(i,j) (f T > 1) = 1 − 1 − (
)
s
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(5.2)

fT

(β > 0),

where w is the transmission rate of a node, s is the size of a message, and β is a constant
parameter.
Proof Chaintreau et al. [22] indicated that the communication time of one contact between
two persons conforms to a power-law distribution, and given α and β, the distribution of the
contact time period t can be modeled by:

p(t) =

β · αβ
(0 < α < t < ∞, β > 0).
tβ+1

(5.3)

As the amount of transmission traﬃc during time t is W = wt, Equation (5.3) can be
transformed to:
p(W ) =

1 β · αβ
.
w (W
)β+1
w

(5.4)

Note that, for two contacting nodes, only when their communication capacity in the contact
is larger than the message size (W > s), will the message be transmitted successfully.
Therefore, based on Equation (5.4), we obtain:


∞

P(i,j) (f T = 1) = P(i,j) (W > s) =

p(W ) · dW = (

s

P(i,j) (f T > 1) = 1 − 1 − (

α·w β
)
s

α·w β
) ,
s

(5.5)

fT

.

(5.6)

From Formula (5.6), we can see that the success probability for a message is determined by both α · w and f . A large frequency utility cannot ensure a high transmission
success probability if α · w is very small. Also, a small frequency utility does not necessarily
indicate a small transmission success probability if α · w is very large. Therefore, frequency
utility is not the only factor that aﬀects the transmission throughput between two nodes.
The frequency utility works well when the nodes in a network have a medium mobility rate
(i.e., medium or large α), meaning a node can completely forward a message to the des81

tination when they meet. However, when nodes have high mobility rates (i.e., small α),
the communication time during one contact between two nodes is short. Then, it is likely
that the link between two nodes breaks during the message transmission process, leading to
message transmission failures.

5.1.3

Duration Utility
Therefore, the contact frequency utility f cannot guarantee high communication ca-

pacity and throughput of a DTN, and we need to have a new utility that can reﬂect both
α · w and f . Since w of a given pair of nodes is determined, to reﬂect α, we propose a
duration utility between nodes ni and nj as
U(i,j) =



fT


t(i,j) (k) /T,

(5.7)

k=1

where t(i,j) (k) is the encounter duration of the k th encounter.
Theorem 5.1.2 A duration utility can reﬂect the transmission capacity between a pair of
nodes with higher accuracy than a contact frequency utility.
A large duration utility indicates either a large a · w, a large f T , or both. Therefore, the
duration utility can more accurately reﬂect the transmission success probability P than the
contact frequency utility, especially in a DTN with high-mobility nodes and large messages.

5.2

Duration Utility Based Distributed Multi-Copy Routing Protocol
In this section, we present the details of the duration utility based distributed multi-

copy routing in SEDUM.
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Figure 5.1: An example of message routing in SEDUM.

To route a message in SEDUM, a source node quickly spreads a number of message
replicas to a number of nodes that it meets. The message replicas are transmitted simultaneously throughout the entire network until one copy reaches the destination node. Speciﬁcally,
SEDUM can be generally divided into three phases: Replicating phase, Forwarding phase,
and Clearing phase as shown in Figure 5.1.
(1) Replicating phase: Every message originating at a source node is initially replicated
to a number of diﬀerent meeting nodes.
(2) Forwarding phase: Each node in the system maintains a utility table recording its
duration utilities to other nodes. A node always forwards a message to another node
with a higher utility to the destination. This process is repeated until one copy of the
message arrives at the destination node. A node is notiﬁed about the message delivery
in the clearing phase.
(3) Clearing phase: After a message transmission is completed, the destination node notiﬁes the nodes in the system to discard the replicas of the delivered message by sending
a delivered message list. The lists are exchanged between two nodes when they meet.
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Figure 5.2: Community models.

5.2.1

Node Movement Models
The traditional popular node movement models such as the random walk model and

the random way-point model [72] assume that the nodes are i.i.d. in the system and that
each node independently moves with equal frequency to every network location. Numerous
recent studies on human traces (e.g., university campuses and conferences) demonstrate that
these two models rarely hold true in real-life situations where mobile devices are controlled
by humans [87]. In this case, mobile node movement is based on human decisions and social
behaviors.
Chaintreau et al. [22] studied the data transfer opportunities between wireless devices
carried by humans. They observed that the inner-community contact duration of nodes
follows a heavy-tailed distribution over the range from 10 minutes to 1 day and that the intercommunity contact time distribution can be modeled as the power-law distribution. This is
because in daily life, people spend most of their time with others in the same community,
such as colleagues, parents, roommates, and etc. Although the number of persons we may
meet daily is large, most meetings have a very short communication time.
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Therefore, we consider a more realistic mobility model called the community model,
which captures the movement patterns of the human nodes in the social network [22]. The
community model has many communities, such as home, gathering places, and working
places. In the model, every person has his/her movement routine. That is, when a person is
at one place, he/she will go to some places with higher probability or go to other places with
lower probability. For example, if a node is at its home community, it will go to a gathering
place (e.g., mall or park) with a high probability. If a node is at a gathering place, it is very
likely that its next destination is home.
Figure 5.2 shows a Basic community model [59] and a Manhattan community model [48].
In the former, there are no movement path restrictions on nodes. The nodes randomly select
a speed and move to the destination directly. Though the tracks of the nodes’ movements
are stochastic, it is impossible to build enough roads or paths to directly connect every pair
of destinations in real life. Thus, this model is not very suitable to simulate human behavior
in a practical situation. The Manhattan community model [48] uses a grid road topology,
where the mobile nodes move along the grid in horizontal and vertical directions akin to
roads. This model is more realistic because we can only travel on the roads or paths that
connect diﬀerent places in the real world.

5.2.2

Duration Utility Calculation
In this section, we introduce a method for calculating the duration utility, which

considers both contact frequency and duration between two nodes in a time interval T .
Each node ni periodically records the accumulated contact duration with the individual
nodes it has met in a time period T .
Node ni can either directly send a message to nj or send a message to nj though
(i,j) with
nk , i.e., ni → nk → nj . In this case, we say ni has an indirect duration utility U
node nj . The indirect duration utility between ni and nj through nk is calculated using the
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transitive principle:
(i,j) = U
(i,k) ∗ U
(k,j) .
U

(5.8)

Finally, the duration utility U(i,j) equals:
(i,j) , max(U
(i,j) )),
U(i,j) = max(U
k∈N

(5.9)

where N is the set of all nodes in the network. That is, the duration utility between two
nodes is the maximum of their direct utility and indirect utility. Thus, two nodes with a low
contact frequency still have a high duration utility if they have a long meeting time. Even if
two nodes have a low direct duration utility, if both have high duration utilities to a common
node, they can still have a high utility to each other by forwarding messages through the
common node.
Based on Formula (5.9), a node periodically calculates its delivery utility with all other
nodes. A node’s movement pattern may change in a social network due to reasons such as
an oﬃce change, vacations, and etc. So that the duration utility more accurately reﬂects the
current communication capacity, a node periodically updates the expected duration utility
every T by considering both the historical utility and the current utility:

U(i,j)new = γU(i,j) + (1 − γ)U(i,j)old , γ ∈ (0, 1),

(5.10)

where γ is a weight constant and U(i,j)new and U(i,j)old respectively denote the utility of the new
and old time intervals. The system with high dynamic changes in the pattern of movement
can set γ to a large value to give more weight to the newly calculated utility value to reﬂect
the dynamic change of the overall utility value.
Each node has a utility table to store its utilities with other nodes. Figure 5.3 shows
an example of the utility table of node ni in SEDUM. It records the duration utility of ni
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Routingtable
Node

n1
n2
n3
n7
n9

Deliveryutility
Deli
er
tilit
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.1
0.6

Relay

n2
N/A
/A
N/A
N/A

n1

Figure 5.3: An example of the utility table of a node.

with all the nodes that ni has met. The “Relay” in the table indicates whether the duration
utility between ni and nj is a direct utility or an indirect utility. In this column, “N/A”
means direct utility and node “nk ” means the utility is indirectly calculated through nk . For
example, the direct utility of ni and n2 is 0.8, and the indirect utility of ni and n1 is 0.7
calculated through n2 .
In routing, either a source node or a relay node forwards a message to the neighbor
that has the highest duration utility to the destination. As Figure 5.3 shows, the utility of
ni to n2 is 0.8 and the utility of ni to n9 is 0.6 through ni . If node ni is asked to transmit a
message to node n2 , ni holds the message until meeting n2 or meeting a node that has higher
utility than 0.8. If node ni is asked to forward a message to n9 , since the utility between ni
and n9 is an indirect utility through n1 , ni forwards the message to n1 or a node that has a
higher utility than 0.6.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for duration utility calculation, in which every
node ni in the system periodically checks its connectivity. When node nj moves into the
transmission range of ni , ni and nj exchange their utility tables and update their own utility
table accordingly based on Formula (5.9). For example, U(i,j) = 0.4 and U(j,7) = 0.5. Then,
U(i,j) ∗ U(j,7) = 0.2 > U(i,7) = 0.1. Therefore, ni changes the entry of “n7 , 0.1, N/A” in its
utility table to “n7 , 0.2, nj ”. Also, ni records the duration of the meeting with nj . At each
update time period T , ni updates the duration utilities between itself and all other nodes
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according to Formulas (5.9) and (5.10). Since testing whether a utility for a node exists in
a utility table takes constant time by using a hash table and the utility calculation can be
ﬁnished in constant time, the whole duration utility calculation process can be ﬁnished in
constant time.
Theorem 5.2.1 SEDUM has a loop-free route from a source node to a destination node.
Proof Because of the movement patterns of nodes in the network, the duration utility
between each pair of nodes will converge to a stable value that can statistically reﬂect the
communication capacity between the two nodes. Since SEDUM uses unidirectional message
routing, a message is always forwarded to a node with higher delivery utility; thus, a routing
loop will not occur.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for duration utility calculation executed by ni .
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:

//When meeting other nodes;
if meet node nj then
Exchange utilities that has been updated since last time meet with nj
if U(i,j) exists in ni ’s utility table then
for each node nk in updated utilities do
if U(i,j) ∗ U(j,k) > U(i,k) then
Update U(i,k) using Formula (5.9)
end if
end for
end if
Record the contacting time with nj
end if
//Periodically update its utilities;
if currentTime=updateTime then
updateTime+=T
for each meeting node nj in the last time period T do
Calculate U(i,j) using Formula (5.9)
if U(i,j)old exists in its utility table then
Update U(i,j) using Formula (5.10)
end if
end for
end if
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Figure 5.4: Message replication algorithms.

5.2.3

Multi-Copy Routing
SEDUM uses a multi-copy routing method to increase the probability that a message

is successfully delivered to a destination node. Since too many replicas will result in high
node resource consumption, SEDUM aims to minimize the number of replicas of a message
while achieving the desired routing delay. SEDUM can arrive at this minimum number
based on network size, meeting interval, and desired transmission delay. We will introduce
the details of this calculation in Section 5.3.2.
There are two requirements for the replication algorithm: (1) a message should be
replicated quickly and (2) the algorithm can terminate the replication process after exactly
Nc replicas (including the source message) are generated. To meet the requirements, SEDUM
adopts the optimal tree replication algorithm [86]. In this algorithm, if node ni is responsible
for creating x replicas, when it meets node nj , ni sends a copy to nj . Also, it entitles nj to

be responsible for half of its remaining responsibility; that is, it entitles nj to replicate  x−1
2
copies, and itself is responsible for the other  x−1
 replicas. Each replica node conducts the
2
same operation until every node has no more responsibility.
Figure 5.4(a) shows an example of the optimal tree replication algorithm. The number
in a circle represents the number of replicas a node should create. We use epoch to denote the
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time step (Ti ) in which a replica node replicates a message to a non-replica node. Assume
SEDUM allows each message to have Nc = 15 copies for message routing. Then, source
node n1 needs to create an additional x = Nc − 1 = 14 replicas in the network. It entitles
the ﬁrst meeting node n2 to create  (Nc −1)−1
=6 replicas at the ﬁrst epoch T1 and keeps the
2
responsibility to create the remaining  (Nc −1)−1
=7 replicas to itself. At epoch T2 , n1 entitles
2
the second meeting node n4 to create 



entitles its meeting node n3 to create 
the remaining 

(Nc −1)−1
2

2

−1

(Nc −1)−1
2

2

(Nc −1)−1
2

2

−1

= 62 =3 replicas. At the same epoch, n2

−1

=2 replicas, and itself is responsible for

 replicas. Then, in epoch T3 , nodes n1 , n2 , n3 , and n4 entitle

their next meeting nodes with half of their own replication responsibility. The process repeats
until each node completes its replicating task. The algorithm needs only Θ(log2 Nc ) time
steps or 4 steps to replicate 14 copies in this example.
The optimal tree replication algorithm performs better than the source tree replication
algorithm and the binary tree replication algorithm [86]. In the source tree replication
algorithm, only a source node can replicate a message to others. As shown in Figure 5.4(b),
the source node initially tries to create 14 replicas in the network. Since a replica is created
only when the source node meets a new node, it takes Θ(Nc ) epochs to create Nc replicas, or
14 epochs to replicate 14 copies in this example. Figure 5.4(c) shows an example of a binary
routing tree algorithm where each node can only replicate a message to two other nodes. It
requires Θ(log2 Nc ) epochs to replicate Nc copies or 6 steps for 14 copies in this example.
Although both the binary tree replication algorithm and optimal tree replication
algorithm have Θ(log2 Nc ) replication epochs, the former’s replication process is slower than
the latter on average. The reason is that in the optimal tree replication algorithm, the nodes
entitled to replicate messages keep replicating messages until each node has no additional
message needing replication. At this time, Nc replicas are generated in the system. In
contrast, in the binary tree replication algorithm, the nodes that are entitled to replicate
messages stop replicating messages after generating two replicas. Even if the nodes meet
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other nodes that do not have any replicas before the entire replication processes complete,
they cannot replicate messages. For example, in Figure 5.4(a) at epoch 3, 8 nodes are able
to replicate the message to others in the optimal tree replication algorithm, while only four
nodes can replicate messages to others in the source tree replication algorithm as shown in
Figure 5.4(b). Also, as shown Figure 5.4(c), the binary tree replication algorithm cannot
terminate the replication process after Nc replicas are generated in the system.

5.2.4

Buﬀer Management
Because of the intermittent connections between nodes in DTNs, each node uses a

buﬀer to store the messages for transmission. When two nodes meet each other, since the
communication time between two nodes is limited, the order of message transmission aﬀects
the transmission throughput and delay of a DTN. Since the size of a buﬀer is limited, whether
or not to accept an incoming message and which message is selected to drop when the queue
is full also aﬀects the delivery throughput and delay of a DTN. Additionally, SEDUM routes
multiple copies of a message in the network. If one replica is successfully delivered, deletion
of other replicas of the message in time to leave space for undelivered messages is also
important. Therefore, we must have an eﬀective buﬀer management mechanism to address
these problems to increase the network throughput and reduce transmission delay.
Figure 5.5 shows the structure of a message header. The total size of the message
header is 24 bytes. Source, 4 bytes, indicates the ID of the source node that generates
the message. Sequence number, 4 bytes, indicates the sequence of the messages generated
from the same source node. Destination, 4 bytes, indicates the ID of the destination node
that should receive the message. Timestamp, 8 bytes, records a message’s creation time,
and priority, 4 bytes, indicates the priority of a message determined by the tolerable delay
speciﬁed by the source node. In a DTN application, diﬀerent messages may have diﬀerent
tolerable delays. For example, voice messages should have lower tolerable delays than text
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Dest. Timestamp Priority Data
Sequence num Dest
Source Sequencenum
MessageID
Figure 5.5: The structure of the message head.

messages. SEDUM allows a source node to specify the tolerable delay of its message to
ensure timely message delivery. SEDUM includes speciﬁcation for priority levels and assigns
higher priority levels to messages with lower delay tolerance.
As shown in Figure 5.6, each node orders the messages in its buﬀer according to
the messages’ priorities (priority 1 has a higher priority than priority 2) and timestamps.
The messages are ordered in descending order of their priorities. In each priority level, the
messages are sorted in ascending order of their timestamps. A larger timestamp means
a shorter lifetime since a message was initiated. For example, in the group of priority 1
messages, M11 was created earlier than M73 , so M11 has higher priority than M73 . When
two nodes, say ni and nj , meet each other, the messages at ni whose destination corresponds
to nj are transmitted ﬁrst. For other messages, ni fetches a message from its buﬀer in
a top-down manner. ni compares its utility and nj ’s utility to the message’s destination.
Recall that we use Ui to denote node ni ’s utility to a message’s destination. For each fetched
message, if Ui < Uj , ni forwards the message to nj . Node nj conducts the same operations.
For example, in Figure 5.6, M73 , M28 , M91 and M32 satisfy U1 < U2 , then n1 sends these
messages to n2 in sequence. Therefore, the messages with higher priority are sent out ﬁrst.
Within each priority level, the messages with longer transmission delay are sent out ﬁrst.
The consideration of priority helps to deliver messages within their speciﬁed tolerant delay.
The consideration of timestamps ensures that the longer a message remains in the network,
the higher the chance that it is delivered out of the buﬀer ﬁrst, which avoids having a message
always stuck in a buﬀer and decreases the message delivery delay of the DTN.
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Figure 5.6: An example of message exchange.

Next, we discuss how a node addresses an incoming message. To avoid losing messages
due to buﬀer congestion, we adopt the congestion control method in [12]. That is, for a
number of message copies, a source node initially decides a core-replica, which is the replica
stored at the neighbor with the highest delivery utility to the destination node. A corereplica in a buﬀer cannot be replaced, but it can replace a non-core-replica in a buﬀer if
the buﬀer is congested. In SEDUM, a node can be selected by a number of nodes as a
relay node, requiring it to store a number of messages with diﬀerent delivery utilities. To
make wise use of the limited buﬀer resources, messages with higher utilities should have a
higher priority to use the buﬀer. Thus, more messages can be delivered to their destinations
during a certain time period. Core-replicas have a higher priority to stay in the buﬀer than
non-core-replicas. When a node with a full buﬀer receives a message, if the message is a
core-replica, it replaces the non-core-replica with the smallest utility in the buﬀer. If the
incoming message is a non-core-replica with utility Uj , the node ﬁnds non-core-replicas in
its buﬀer whose utility is lower than Uj , then replaces the non-core-replica with the lowest
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utility. If all non-core-replicas’s utilities are larger than Uj , the node drops the incoming
message. SEDUM’s buﬀer management method ensures that the core-replica of a message
must remain in the system, thus guaranteeing successful delivery of each message. Also, it
gives higher buﬀer priority to higher-utility messages, thus enhancing system throughput.
In SEDUM, when nodes ni and nj meet each other, they transmit messages according
to Algorithm 2. Speciﬁcally, they exchange their utility tables. According to nj ’s utility
table, ni ﬁnds in its buﬀer those messages that could have higher utilities if residing in
nj and forwards those messages to nj . If nj has free space in its buﬀer, it accepts the
incoming messages. If nj ’s buﬀer is full of core-replicas, it rejects ni ’s messages. If the
incoming message Mi is a non-core-replica and there is no message in the buﬀer that has
a lower utility than Mi ’s, nj also rejects Mi . Otherwise, the incoming message Mi replaces
the message with the lowest utility in the buﬀer. We have implemented the buﬀer as a
min-heap [26]. Therefore, for each message, we obtain the message with minimum utility in
constant time. As the heap structure is maintained with time complexity O(logn) for each
message, the complexity of the whole algorithm is O(logn) for each message.
Delivered Message Deletion. We deﬁne a message’s ID as the concatenation of its source
ID and sequence number. The replicas, especially the core-replicas, of the delivered messages must be deleted in a reasonable time to free buﬀer space for undelivered messages.
In SEDUM, every node keeps a delivered message list (deliveredMsgList) that records the
IDs of all delivered messages. When node ni meets node nj , they exchange their (deliveredMsgList). Each node then deletes the messages in its buﬀer indicated in the other’s
(deliveredMsgList) and merges this list with its own (deliveredMsgList). The node that does
not update its (deliveredMsgList) will continuously hold the delivered message copy until
it meets the destination node or the messages are replaced by other messages according to
buﬀer management algorithm. After a message is delivered, the last hop node puts the delivered message ID into the (deliveredMsgList), which will be exchanged among nodes in the
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Algorithm 2 Pseudocode for message transmission from ni to nj .
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

//Sending messages;
Send messages with Dest.=nj to nj
for each message M in the buﬀer do
if Uj > Ui then
Send message M to nj
end if
end for
//Receiving messages;
for each received message M with Uj do
if its buﬀer is not full then
Accept message M
else if all messages in buﬀer are core-replicas then
Reject message M
else if message M is a non-core-replica then
if no message has utility lower than Uj then
Reject message M
else
replace the messages with the lowest utility with message M
end if
else
replace the messages with the lowest utility with message M
end if
end for
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system. Even if a node misses an update to the (deliveredMsgList), it will ﬁnally delete the
messages in a later meeting with other nodes with high probability because of the ﬂooding
feature of the notiﬁcation message. Even if it is not deleted in time and is sent to the destination again, the destination will discard the message that it has already received. To restrict
the size of the (deliveredMsgList), each node periodically deletes outdated message IDs in
(deliveredMsgList). To guarantee that one of the replicas of a message is delivered in the
system before the message’s ID is discarded from all (deliveredMsgList), the ID discarding
period should be set as the upper bound of message transmission time in the system within
which a message should be delivered.

5.3

Performance Analysis

5.3.1

Analysis of the Routing Protocol
The single-copy routing protocols generate lower overhead but lead to a longer delivery

delay than the multi-copy routing protocols. Epidemic routing can produce short delay in a
lightly loaded transmission environment since a message is delivered to the destination along
the shortest path by ﬂooding. However, ﬂooding consumes signiﬁcant energy resources,
which are precious to mobile-devices. Small and Haas [86] indicated that restriction of
transmission traﬃc can save energy in the network. Multi-copy routing can reach a tradeoﬀ
between the single-copy routing and epidemic routing. Therefore, SEDUM creates Nc (Nc
N ) replicas for a message to increase the probability of a message being delivered to its
destination node (i.e., oﬄoading probability) while reducing resource consumption in the
network.
Theorem 5.3.1 If the number of replicas per message in multi-copy routing is large, adding
more replicas leads to a linear increase of energy consumption but a negligible delivery delay
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decrease.
Proof Replicating Nc − 1 copies of a message consumes (Nc − 1)E amount of energy, where
E is the average energy consumption for each transmission. Suppose the average message
oﬄoading probability of each node is p. If Nc is constant over the entire lifetime of the
message, the oﬄoading delay follows a geometric distribution with mean
more replica, the message oﬄoading delay is reduced by

1
1
− (Nc +1)p
Nc p

=

1
.
Nc p

If we create one

1
.
(Nc +1)Nc p

Therefore,

if Nc is large, as the number of replicas of the message increases, the rate of message oﬄoading
delay decreases non-linearly while the energy consumption increases linearly.
As mentioned earlier, SEDUM routing consists of three phases: replicating, forwarding, and clearing. Since each of the Nc relay nodes for a message looks for a routing path
independently in the forwarding phase, delay in the replicating phase adversely aﬀects the
delivery delay of the message in the forwarding phase and sequentially deteriorates the whole
system transmission eﬃciency.
Theorem 5.3.2 Suppose the average total replication delay of a message is Tr . Then the
average delivery delay is in the order of O(Tr ).
Proof The meeting time of two randomly selected nodes is exponentially distributed with
average Tm [13]. The expected duration of the forwarding phase is Tf =

Tm
,
nc

where nc is the

number of generated replicas when a replica meets the destination. The average number of
replicas at time t is

Nc
t
Tr

(t ∈ [1, Tr ]). Then, the average forwarding delay is:
Tr
Tf =

Tm
t=1 (Nc /Tr )·t

Tr

Tr

=
t=1

Tm
.
Nc · t

(5.11)

The average delivery delay of a message is therefore:
Tr

(
t=1

Tr + 1 Tm
t
Tm
)=
+
+
O(lnTr ) = O(Tr ).
T r Nc · t
2
Nc
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(5.12)

Therefore, to reduce the delivery delay, we must reduce the replication delay. Thus, in
the replicating phase of SEDUM, a source node should replicate a message to its neighbors
quickly regardless of their utilities, instead of only replicating the message to high-utility
nodes as in the forwarding phase. The initial low-utility nodes will meet high-utility nodes
later based on the routing algorithm. Thus, reducing the replication time can reduce the
delivery delay.
In Section 5.2.3, we explained the main three message replication algorithms: source
tree, binary tree, and optimal tree. We now compare the delay performance of the three
algorithms.
Theorem 5.3.3 The optimal tree replication algorithm can reduce the delay of the source
tree replication algorithm by:
Nc

N −1
)−
(
N −i
i=1

log2 Nc

(
i=1

N −1
),
N − 2i + 1

(5.13)

where N is the number of nodes in the system and Nc is the number of replicas in the system.
Proof In the source tree replication algorithm, message replication occurs only when a
source node meets a non-replica node. Assume it has generated l replicas. The probability
that it sends the (l + 1)th replica to a new node follows a geometric distribution with mean
N −l
.
N −1

Therefore, the average delay for replication is

N −1
.
N −l

Since the number of epochs to

replicate l replicas is l − 1, if Nc replicas are to be created in the system, the average delay of
 c N −1
th
the full creation is N
i=1 ( N −i ). During the i epoch in the optimal replication algorithm, the
N −2i +1
.
N −1

Since the number of epochs to replicate
 log2 Nc N −1
Nc replicas is log2 Nc , the average delay for creating Nc replicas is i=1
( N −2i +1 ).

probability of creating a replica node equals

Theorem 5.3.4 To replicate Nc replicas, the binary tree replication algorithm takes log2 Nc +
2 epochs and the optimal tree replication algorithm takes log2 Nc epochs.
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Proof In the optimal tree replication algorithm, since the nodes entitled to replicate messages continue replicates until Nc replicas are generated in the system, the algorithm requires
log2 Nc epochs to complete. In the binary tree replication algorithm, it takes log2 Nc epochs
to entitle nodes to replicate messages. After that, it takes two additional epochs for the last
entitled node to replicate messages. The total number of replication epochs equals log2 Nc +2.
Theorem 5.3.5 The average delivery delay T d for the SEDUM routing protocol follows
√
O( N ) > T d > O(log N ), where N is the number of nodes in the system.
Proof In the worst situation of the forwarding phase in SEDUM, where replica nodes cannot
ﬁnd a higher utility node for relaying, SEDUM becomes a two-hop multi-copy routing pro√
tocol, the delay of which is O( N ) [65]. Conversely, if replica nodes in SEDUM can always
ﬁnd a relay node with higher utility, SEDUM becomes an optimal redundancy multi-hop
routing protocol [65], the delay of which is O(log N ).

5.3.2

Analysis of the Message Replication Process
In multi-copy routing, too many replicas of a message generate high overhead while

too few replicas of a message may lead to a long delivery delay of the message. The number
of replicas of a message is an important issue that aﬀects routing performance. To ﬁnd the
smallest number of message replicas that can guarantee a speciﬁed routing delay, we build
a Markov chain to analyze the message replication process. Figure 5.7 shows a Markov
chain that models a message replication process. In the ﬁgure, π(l) (l ∈ [1, Nc ]) denotes the
network state where l replicas (including the original message) have been generated before
any of the replicas meet the destination. END denotes the state that a replica meets the
destination and the message transmission completes. The arrows between states in the ﬁgure


indicate the state changing direction. We use p π(l), π(l + 1) to denote the probability that
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Figure 5.7: A Markov chain that models a message replication process.
a non-replica node in network state π(l) receives a replica, which changes the network state
to π(l + 1).
We call the replica nodes that are entitled to replicate messages to other non-replica
nodes entitled nodes, and the replica nodes without replication responsibility non-entitled
nodes. In the optimal tree replication algorithm, when l <

Nc
,
2

every replica node is an

entitled node because every replica node is entitled to replicate at least one replica. When
l>

Nc
,
2

only a portion of the replica nodes are entitled nodes. In the case of l ∈ [1, N2c ], when

two nodes meet each other, because there exist l replica nodes, the probability that one node
is an entitled node equals
is

N −l−1
.
N −1

l
N

and the probability that the other node is a non-replica node

The “1” in (N − l − 1) indicates the destination, and the “1” in (N − 1) indicates

the ﬁrst meeting node. Also, the probability of node ni meeting node nj is the same as the


probability of nj meeting ni . Then, p π(l), π(l + 1) = 2 · Nl · NN−l−1
.
−1
We consider the case when l ∈ [ N2c + 1, Nc ] (i.e., in the last epoch Tl ) ﬁrst to calculate
the number of entitled nodes. Suppose there are x entitled nodes and l − x non-entitled
nodes in epoch Tl . The l − x non-entitled nodes in epoch Tl are separated from the (1 − x)/2
entitled nodes in epoch Tl−1 . Since the total number of replica nodes in epoch Tl−1 is Nc /2,
x + (l − x)/2 = Nc /2. Then, in epoch Tl , the number of entitled nodes is x = Nc − l and the
number of non-entitled nodes is l − x = 2l − Nc . Therefore, the probability that an entitled


c −l
c −l
node meets a non-replica node is 2 · NN
· NN−l−1
. That is, p π(l), π(l + 1) = 2 · NN
· NN−l−1
.
−1
−1
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If one of the replica nodes meets the destination node in the next epoch, the message
transmission ﬁnishes. Therefore, the probability that the message can be delivered in state
l in the next epoch is P (l, END) = 2 ·
is a replica node and

1
N −1

l
N

·

1
,
N −1

where

l
N

is the probability that one node

is the probability that the other node is the destination when

two nodes meet. In all other encountering cases, the network state stays the same. That is,






p π(l), π(l) = 1 − p π(l), π(l + 1) − p π(l), END . In conclusion, the transition probability
in the Markov chain between two states is:
⎧


l N −l−1
Nc
⎪
⎪
p
π(l),
π(l
+
1)
=2·
·
, l ∈ [1,
];
⎪
⎪
⎪
N
N −1
2
⎪
⎪
⎪ 

N −l N −l−1
Nc
⎪
⎪
⎨ p π(l), π(l + 1) = 2 · c
·
,l ∈ [
+ 1, Nc ];
N
N −1
2


⎪
l
1
⎪
⎪
p
π(l),
END
=2·
·
;
⎪
⎪
N N −1
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪






⎪
⎩ p π(l), π(l) = 1 − p π(l), π(l + 1) − p π(l), END .

(5.14)

Suppose the average meeting interval between two nodes is Tm . We use Td (l) to
denote the latency to reach network state π(l), i.e., to replicate l replicas:


 


 
Td (l) = p π(l − 1), π(l) · Td (l − 1) + Tm + p π(l), π(l) · Td (l) + Tm .

(5.15)

When the number of replicas that a message is allowed to generate equals Nc , the
average message delivery delay Td (EN D) is:
Nc

Td (END) =




(Td (i) + Tm ) · p(i, END) .

(5.16)

i=1

According to Formulas (5.14), (5.15), and (5.16), given an average node meeting interval
Tm , the number of nodes in the network N , and the number of replicas of a message Nc , the
average delivery delay Td (END) can be calculated. For example, when N =10, Nc =4 and
Tm =1s, we can construct a Markov chain as shown in Figure 5.8 based on Formula (5.14).
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Figure 5.8: An example of a constructed Markov chain.
Then, based on Formula (5.15), we obtain:
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪ Td (1) =
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ Td (2) =

4
(Td (1) + 1)
5
4
35
Td (1) +
9
18
16
52
⎪
⎪
⎪
Td (3) = Td (2) +
⎪
⎪
9
9
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
3
47
⎩ T (4) = T (3) + .
d
d
2
4

(5.17)

Then, based on Formula (5.16), we obtain:

Td (EN D) =

1
2
3
4
Td (1) + Td (2) + Td (3) + Td (4).
45
45
45
45

By solving Equation (5.18), we retrieve Td (EN D) =

34
s.
9

(5.18)

Thus, given a delay tolerance T ,

we can adaptively adjust the value Nc to guarantee Td (END) ≤ T .

5.4

Summary
In this chapter, we propose a duration utility that fully captures both stranger familiar

and collocation attributes. We theoretically prove that a duration utility can more accurately
reﬂect node communication capacities. We then propose the SEDUM routing protocol for
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DTNs that fully exploits node movement patterns in the social network to increase delivery
throughput and decrease delivery delay while generating low overhead. SEDUM replicates
a new message to a certain number of nodes, which then hold the replicas until meeting
other nodes with higher duration utilities to the destinations. A message is forwarded in this
way until one of its replicas reaches its destination. SEDUM includes a buﬀer management
mechanism to improve performance. We also introduce a method using a Markov chain to
calculate the minimum number of copies of a message to achieve a given delivery delay.
In the next Chapter, we will present the evaluation results of the integrated system
in Chapter 3, ARM in Chapter 4, and SEUMN in this Chapter.
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Chapter 6
Performance Evaluation
In this chapter, we validate the theoretical results that are presented in Chapter 3
and present the simulation results of the hierarchical account-aided reputation management
system proposed in Chapter 4. We also show the simulation results of the social network
and utility based distributed multi-copy routing protocol proposed in Chapter 5.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1, we evaluate the
trustworthiness of the proposed integrated system. In Section 6.2, we show the simulation
results of the hierarchical account-aided reputation management system. In Section 6.3,
we evaluate the performance of the social network and utility based distributed multi-copy
routing protocol. We ﬁnally summarize our results in Section 6.4.

6.1

Evaluation of the Integrated Reputation/Price
System
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6.1.1

Comparison of Incentives of Diﬀerent Systems
In this section, we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the incentives in the defenseless system,

reputation system, price system, and integrated system in a repeated game, where the nodes
can change their interaction strategies adaptively. We developed a simulator based on the
Monte Carlo method [20], in which two nodes are repeatedly and randomly paired up for
interaction until the reputation values of nodes are converged. At every game round, each
randomly formed pair of nodes have an interaction. That is, the nodes send a packet to each
other and drop or forward their received packet from the other. In the simulation, 100 nodes
are i.i.d. in the system. 50 nodes are cooperative and 50 nodes are non-cooperative at the
start. The number of players using a strategy in the next round was set to the product of the
relative success rate of this strategy in the previous game round and the node population.
In the simulation, the packet forwarding reward is mr = 2 units, the packet forwarding
price is mp = 1 units, the transmission beneﬁt is p = 4 units, and the transmission cost is
c = 2 units. The initial reputation value for each node is 1.0 and the reputation threshold
is TR = 0.3. The maximum reputation value is 1.0. Every time a node helps forward a
packet, its reputation value is increased by 0.1. Otherwise, its reputation value is reduced
by 0.1. We deﬁne the density of the (non-)cooperative nodes as the percent of the nodes
employing the (non-)cooperative strategy among all nodes. In each ﬁgure, the analytical
results calculated by Equation (3.30) are included based on the simulation parameters with
the individual payoﬀ matrix.
Figure 6.1 shows the density change of cooperative and non-cooperative nodes in a defenseless MANET. The ﬁgure shows that after several interactions, the selﬁsh nodes dominate
the population of the system, because in the defenseless system, the non-cooperative strategy is the NE, although not Pareto-optimal. Therefore, the nodes using a non-cooperative
strategy can receive much more payoﬀ than the nodes using a cooperative strategy. Since
the number of nodes using a strategy depends on the relative success rate of the nodes using
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Figure 6.4: The integrated system.

Figure 6.3: The price system.

this strategy in the last round, the number of players using a cooperative strategy decreases
sharply. Therefore, the defenseless MANET without any cooperation incentive or misbehavior detection mechanism will ﬁnally collapse. Also, from the ﬁgure we can see that the
simulation results are consistent with the analytical results in Proposition 3.5.2.
Figure 6.2 shows the density change of cooperative and non-cooperative nodes in a
MANET with a reputation system. The ﬁgure indicates that in the ﬁrst 8-9 interactions, the
density of non-cooperative nodes increases and the density of cooperative nodes decreases,
because during these game rounds, (Ii , Ij ) is the NE continually. The non-cooperative strategy can bring much more payoﬀ than the cooperative behavior, which results in a dramatic
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population decrease of cooperative nodes. However, when the reputation values of some
nodes fall below the reputation threshold, the payoﬀs of (Ii , Ij ), (Ci , Ij ), and (Ii , Cj ) turn
to (0, 0), according to Table 3.4. Therefore, the cooperative strategy is the NE and Paretooptimal. At this time, since the cooperative action can generate much higher payoﬀ than the
non-cooperative action, the population of cooperative nodes increases. However, after the
reputation values of the nodes increase above the threshold, they will again choose (Ii , Ij ).
Then, the density of selﬁsh nodes increases. The ﬁgure also shows that the percentages of
cooperative nodes and selﬁsh nodes ﬁnally approach a constant value, which is the reputation threshold value. This result closely matches Proposition 3.3.2, which indicates that the
strongest incentive provided by a reputation system will result in a situation where nodes
maintain their reputation close to and above the reputation threshold. The simulation results
agree with our analytical result for Proposition 3.5.2.
Figure 6.3 shows the density change for cooperative and non-cooperative nodes in a
MANET with a price system. The ﬁgure shows that cooperative nodes eventually dominate
the population in the system because nodes are rewarded for providing packet forwarding
services to others and charged for receiving packet forwarding service from others. The
system increases the payoﬀ of the cooperation strategy and decreases the payoﬀ of the noncooperation strategy. Therefore, (Ci , Cj ) is the NE, and the density for the cooperative
nodes increases sharply and that of the selﬁsh nodes decreases rapidly. These results agree
with Proposition 3.4.1, Proposition 3.4.2, and Proposition 3.5.2.
Figure 6.4 shows the density change of cooperative and non-cooperative nodes in a
MANET with an integrated system. The integrated system can distinguish the service quality of nodes based on their reputation values, which reﬂects their cooperation levels. In the
integrated system, a lower-reputed node receives a lower payoﬀ, while a higher-reputed node
receives a higher payoﬀ for providing service. Because the cooperation strategy becomes
both the NE and Pareto-optimal, a cooperative node earns a much higher payoﬀ than a
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non-cooperative node. Therefore, the number of cooperative nodes is more than the number
of selﬁsh nodes. Meanwhile, as the number of game rounds increases, the reputations of
the nodes similarly increase. Consequently, the payoﬀ for the (Ci , Cj ) also increases and the
number of selﬁsh nodes in the integrated system drops much faster than the price system.
Therefore, the integrated system can provide higher incentives than other systems to encourage the cooperation of the nodes. The simulation results are consistent with our analytical
result in Proposition 3.5.2.

6.1.2

Evaluation of the Reputation System
Since the Monte Carlo method cannot simulate a network scenario, we further inves-

tigate the eﬀectiveness of these systems for selﬁsh node detection in a MANET scenario with
NS-2 [4]. In the simulated MANET, 100 nodes are i.i.d. in a 500m × 500m square area,
with a transmission range of each node at 250m. Each node randomly selects a position in
the area and moves to the position at a speed randomly selected within [10 − 20]m/s. In
the test, we ﬁrst assign each node a reputation value randomly chosen from [0, 1]. We then
randomly select 10 source nodes in every second. Each of the 10 nodes sends a packet to a
randomly chosen neighbor. If the neighbor’s reputation value is lower than TR , it drops the
packet and its reputation value is decreased by 0.1. Otherwise, the neighbor forwards the
packet and subsequently its reputation value is increased by 0.1. The simulation time for
each test is 10,000s.
Figure 6.5 shows the initial reputation values of all nodes in the system. The reputation values are spread over the range [0, 1]. Since the nodes are punished only when their
reputation values fall below TR , they can randomly drop packets to save energy when their
reputation values are above the threshold. When their reputation values are below TR , they
cooperate in packet forwarding to increase their reputation values above TR to avoid being
punished. We test the reputation values of nodes in the system when TR equal to 0.3 and
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0.7, respectively. Figure 6.6 shows the ﬁnal reputation values of all nodes in the system
after 10,000s. We can see that the reputation values of all nodes converge to the reputation
threshold in each case, a result that is consistent with Figure 6.2 and Proposition 3.3.2. By
keeping its reputation value just above the threshold, a node can be uncooperative while
still avoiding punishment. Therefore, the reputation system cannot provide highly eﬀective
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of initial reputation values.

Figure 6.6: Converged reputation values.

We use the decrease/increase rate (DIR) to denote the ratio of the reputation decrease
rate to the reputation increase rate. The packet drop rate is the total number of dropped
packets divided by the total number of received packets. In this experiment, we vary DIR
from 1 to 8 with 1 increase in each step, and test the packet drop rate for each DIR in
a 10,000s simulation. Speciﬁcally, the reputation increase rate is 0.1, and the reputation
decrease rate ranges from 0.1 to 0.8 with a 0.1 increase in each step. Figure 6.7 shows the
experimental and theoretical results of the packet drop rate versus DIR. The theoretical
results are calculated according to Formula 3.10 in Proposition 3.3.3. The ﬁgure shows
as DIR increases, the packet drop rate decreases. Higher DIR means a node’s reputation
value decrease for its uncooperative behavior is more than the reputation increase for its
cooperative behavior. Thus, with a higher DIR, a node must be cooperative for DIR to
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decrease its reputation value due to one-time uncooperative behavior. Since a higher DIR
stimulates nodes to be cooperative, the packet drop rate decreases as DIR increases. The
measurement results are approximately in line with the theoretical results, with the error
bar within 0.05.
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Figure 6.7: Packet drop rate vs. DIR.

Figure 6.8 further shows the packet drop rate versus the DIR and reputation threshold,
which exhibits the same phenomenon as shown in Figure 6.7, detailing the relationship
between the packet drop rate and DIR. It is very intriguing to see that the reputation
threshold does not aﬀect packet drop rate and that the rate is only aﬀected by DIR. As
shown in Figure 6.6, node reputation values ﬁnally converge to the threshold regardless
of the threshold value. Some nodes maintain their reputations just above the threshold.
If a node drops a packet, its reputation value falls below the threshold and it must be
cooperative for DIR interactions to raise its reputation value above the reputation threshold.
This phenomenon is why the packet drop rate is only determined by DIR. Higher DIR
leads to lower drop rate and vice versa. This result is very intriguing and consistent with
Proposition 3.3.3.
In summary, reputation systems cannot eﬀectively encourage nodes to be cooperative
in the system, but only to keep their reputation values around the reputation threshold.
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To reduce the packet drop rate, the reputation decrease rate should be higher than the
reputation increase rate.

6.1.3

Evaluation of the Price System
In this section, we evaluate how a price system encourages the cooperation of the

nodes in the system. The simulation setup and scenario are identical to those at Section 6.1.2,
but instead of rating node reputation values, a node pays credits to the forwarding nodes for
their services. Since this is a generic price system, we do not consider the details of how nodes
pay for the price of packet forwarding service. We assign 1000 credits to each node initially.
A packet receiver drops the packet if its account value is above zero. The forwarding price
is 50 credits. We use RRP to denote the Ratio of packet forwarding Reward to forwarding
Price and test the packet drop rate with diﬀerent RRPs. Speciﬁcally, we initially set the
forwarding reward to 25 credits, and then increase it from 50 credits to 350 credits of 50
credit increment in each step. The entire simulation time for each RRP value is 10,000s.
Figure 6.9 shows the experimental and theoretical results of the packet drop rate versus RRP. The theoretical results are calculated based on Equation (3.14) in Proposition 3.4.3.
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The ﬁgure demonstrates that the packet drop rate grows as RRP increases, because when
the reward is larger than the price, a selﬁsh node can drop more packets and forward fewer
packets while still maintaining its account value above zero. Thus, a higher RRP leads to
more dropped packets by selﬁsh nodes. These measured results are closely consistent to the
theoretical results in Proposition 3.4.3. To restrict the packet drop rate of selﬁsh nodes, the
forwarding reward should be less than the forwarding price in a price system.
Packet generating and receiving rates are the number of bits per second a node generates to send out and receives to forward, respectively. We use RGR to denote the Ratio of
packet Generating rate and packet Receiving rate of a node. In this experiment, a randomly
chosen node i generates and sends packets to m (m ∈ [1, 5]) randomly chosen neighbors at
the speed of 2k/s for each packet stream. We also randomly choose node i’s neighbor j and
let it generate and send packets to node i at the speed of 2k/s. The size of one packet is 2k.
Node i’s RGR is varied from 1 to 5 at 1 increment in each step.
Figure 6.10 plots node i’s packet drop rate versus its RGR and RRP. The ﬁgure
shows that as RGR increases, the packet drop rate decreases sharply. Higher RGR means
that a node’s packet generating rate is faster than its packet receiving rate. That is, the
credits needed to pay for the forwarding services are more than can be earned. Insuﬃcient
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Figure 6.10: Packet drop rate vs. RRP
and RGR.

credits stimulate the node to be cooperative. The ﬁgure also shows that a larger RGR and
smaller RRP make packet drop rates decrease faster. Recall that small RRP and large RGR
respectively impose signiﬁcant eﬀort on reducing the packet drop rate. Under the impact of
both factors, the packet drop rate is reduced sharply. Therefore, a node with a high packet
generating rate is unlikely to be uncooperative in a MANET using a price system. However,
for nodes with a low packet generating rate, they are likely to drop packets since they do
not need to earn credits for packet forwarding requests.

6.1.4

Evaluation of the Integrated System
In this section, we demonstrate how an integrated system can improve the eﬀective-

ness of detecting selﬁsh nodes and encouraging cooperation in both reputation and price
systems. In this experiment, both the reputation increase rate and decrease rate were set
to 0.1. The initial reputation value of each node was set to 1 and the reputation threshold
was set to 0.2. Each node was initially assigned 1000 credits unless otherwise speciﬁed.
At every second, ten source nodes are randomly selected, each of which sends a packet to
a randomly chosen neighbor. The source node i pays the forwarder 50 credits in the price
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system and 50/Ri in the integrated system, where Ri is the source node’s current reputation.
The entire simulation time is 10,000s. In the integrated system, we assume nodes choose
the strategy that maximizes their beneﬁt (i.e., the cooperative strategy) with probability
p
min(0.8 + Δm
, 1), where Δmp = mp (t) − mp (t + 1). 0.8 and
mp

Δmp
mp

are the probabilities that a

Reputation value

node is cooperative because of the reputation system and price-based system, respectively.
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

T = 0.7
T = 0.3
0

20

40

60

80

100

Node ID

Figure 6.11: Converged reputation value
in the integrated system.

Figure 6.11 shows the converged reputation values of nodes in the integrated system
after 10000s. As the experiment of Figure 6.6 for a reputation system, we set the reputation
threshold of the nodes in the system to TR = 0.3 and TR = 0.7, respectively, and the
initial node reputation distribution is shown in Figure 6.5. Comparing Figure 6.11 with
Figure 6.6, we see that rather than converging to the reputation thresholds respectively as in
the reputation system, the node reputation values in the integrated system are converged to
1. Nodes always choose the action strategy that maximizes their utilities. In the integrated
system, the forwarding strategy can provide a node with the best utility. Therefore, nodes
always forward packets for others and their reputation values increase to the maximum. In
the reputation system, when a node’s reputation value is just above the threshold, it does not
have incentives to forward others’ packets because the forwarding cannot bring about more
utility. These results prove the higher eﬀectiveness of the integrated system in cooperation
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encouragement than the reputation system.
Figure 6.12 shows the packet drop rates in diﬀerent systems over the simulation
time when the reputation threshold equals 0.2. We see that as time goes on, the packet
drop rates of the price-based and integrate systems decrease and those of the reputation
and defenseless systems increase. Such diﬀerences is because the forwarding strategy can
always ensure that the nodes in both the price-based and integrated systems gain higher
utility, but cannot ensure this in the reputation and defenseless systems. We also ﬁnd
that the rate drops much faster in the integrated system than in the price-based system.
The faster drop rate of integrated system is because the low-reputed nodes in the integrate
system have higher incentives to be cooperative than in the price-based system because of
the diﬀerentiated reputation-based prices. As the defenseless system has no mechanism to
encourage cooperative behaviors or punish selﬁsh behaviors, all nodes in the system are
uncooperative. In the reputation system, since maintaining the reputation value only above
the reputation threshold can maximize a node’s utility, the packet drop rate increases and
then stays at around 0.8 because the reputation threshold was set to 0.2. These results are
in line with the density result in Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 and verify
that the integrated system provides the strongest cooperation incentives.
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To show the eﬀectiveness of the integrated system in selﬁsh node detection, we let a
packet receiver drops the packet if its account value is greater than zero or its reputation
value is above the threshold, and its reputation is then decreased by 0.1. Otherwise, the
receiver forwards the packet and its reputation is increased by 0.1, and We randomly choose
a node to function as a selﬁsh node, count the number of interactions between the selﬁsh
node and other nodes during the simulation time, and measure the account value of the
node corresponding to diﬀerent numbers of interactions. When the selﬁsh node’s reputation
falls below the threshold or its account value falls below zero, it is put onto a blacklist. All
other nodes refuse to interact with the node in the blacklist. We consider two kinds of selﬁsh
nodes: wealthy and silly selﬁsh nodes, and wealthy and clever selﬁsh nodes.
Figure 6.13 shows the account value of the selﬁsh node in the price system and integrated system. We initially assign 10, 000 and 1000 credits to the selﬁsh node to determine
the systems’ eﬀectiveness in detecting the selﬁsh node when it is wealthy and not wealthy.
In the ﬁgure, “Integrated-1000” represents the scenario of the integrated system and 1000
initial credits. The same notation applies to other credits. When the initial credits are 1000,
the selﬁsh node’s account value becomes 0 after 20 interactions in the price system and
after eight interactions in the integrated system respectively; thus, the integrated system
takes much less time to detect the selﬁsh node. The integrated system reacts faster because
the forwarding price in the integrated system is determined by the source node’s reputation
instead of staying constant as in the price system. As the reputation of the selﬁsh node
decreases, it must pay more for packet forwarding service. Therefore, the selﬁsh node will
run out of credits faster in the integrated system than in the price system.
The ﬁgure also shows that when the initial credits are 10, 000, i.e., when the selﬁsh
node is wealthy, its account value decreases very slightly in the ﬁrst 20 interactions. According to this decrease rate, it will take a signiﬁcantly longer time for the price system to detect
the selﬁsh and wealthy node based on its account value. The integrated system detects the
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Detection of silly selﬁsh

selﬁsh node after only nine interactions since the reputation value of the selﬁsh node falls
below the reputation threshold even though its account value is still high.
A clever, selﬁsh and wealthy node tries to maintain its reputation just above the
reputation threshold to avoid being detected. Figure 6.14 shows the account value of such
a node with 10, 000 credits in the integrated system, the reputation system, and the price
system. Its account value in the reputation system is maintained at 10, 000 since it does
not need to pay a price for packet forwarding. Because it can maintain its reputation value
at the reputation threshold, the selﬁsh node cannot be detected in the reputation system.
The account value of the node drops slowly in the price system, and much more sharply
in the integrated system. For the price system, since the selﬁsh node has a large amount
of initial credits, it takes a long time (i.e., more than 200 interactions) to be detected via
account starvation. In contrast, the integrated system can detect the selﬁsh node within
only 40 interactions according to account starvation. The integrated system is more eﬃcient
because when the selﬁsh node’s reputation is at the threshold 1/5, it must pay a price ﬁve
times higher than in the price system for each forwarding service. Therefore, its credits are
consumed more quickly even though it is initially quite wealthy. The experimental results
verify that the integrated system is more eﬀective in detecting selﬁsh nodes even when they
are wealthy and clever.
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We further investigate the impact of the reputation threshold, the number of interactions, and the forwarding price on the account value of the selﬁsh node with 1000 initial
credits. In Figure 6.15, “Integrated-50” represents the integrated system with a packet forwarding price equal to 50 credits, which is applicable to other notations. The ﬁgure shows
that at a certain reputation threshold and the same forwarding price, the account value
decreases faster in the integrated system than in the price system. This decrease is due to
the adaptive forwarding price based on reputation in the integrated system and constant forwarding price in the price system. The result conﬁrms that the integrated system can detect
selﬁsh nodes more quickly. Comparing the results of “Integrated-50” with “Integrated-100”,
we observe that “Integrated-100” decreases much more rapidly because a higher forwarding
price leads to a more rapid account value decrease.
The ﬁgure also shows that as the reputation threshold decreases, the account value
drops more rapidly for both “Integrated-50” and “Integrated-100”. Since a clever selﬁsh
node has a high incentive to maintain its reputation value around TR , a low TR will lead
to a low stable reputation value for the selﬁsh node. The selﬁsh node then consumes its
account value more quickly due to the reputation-adaptive forwarding price. In addition, we
observe that the reputation threshold does not aﬀect the account value in the price system
because the system does not consider reputation. We also observe that if a low-reputed node
118

Price − 50
Integrated = 50

Account value

1000
800

Integrated = 100

600
400
200
0
1

0.8

0.6

Reputation th0.4resh0.2
old

5

10

15

20

teractions
The number of in

0 0

Figure 6.15: Account value vs. reputation
threshold and number of interactions.
forwards a packet, its packet forwarding price decreases much faster than a high-reputed
node. Therefore, in the integrated system, low-reputed nodes are highly encouraged to be
cooperative.
Based on these results, we can conclude that compared to the reputation system and
price system, the integrated system can more eﬀectively defect selﬁsh nodes.

6.2

Evaluation of the ARM System
We conducted simulations with NS-2 [4] to demonstrate the performance of ARM.

We used the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 as the MAC layer
protocol. We chose the two-ray propagation model as the physical layer model, and the
constant bit rate as the traﬃc mode. We describe our default settings below unless otherwise
speciﬁed. The simulated network has 60 wireless nodes randomly deployed in a ﬁeld of 1200×
1200 square meters. We randomly selected 10 nodes as managers. The radio transmission
ranges of low-power and high-power interfaces were set to 250m and 1000m, respectively.
The raw physical link bandwidth was set to 2Mbits/s. The heights of antennas for data
transmitting and receiving were set to 1.5 meters. We used the random way-point mobility
model [2] to generate node movement. The nodes are i.i.d. deployed in the ﬁeld. They move
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at a speed chosen from [1,10]m/s, wait for a pause time randomly chosen from [0,10]s, and
then move to another random position. We randomly chose 10 pairs of source and destination
nodes every 40s. The range of the reputations was set to [0,1], and the reputation threshold
T = 0.4. The deviation thresholds are set as δl =δg =δa =0.2. Each simulation lasted 5000s.
We conduct 10 simulations and reported the average.
We set α = 0.7 in Formula (4.8), ϕ = 0.5 in Formula (4.9), pr = 2 in Formula (4.10),
and γ = 1 in Formula (4.11). The time period T for periodically reporting information
for mobile nodes and managers was set to 10s and 50s, respectively. Each node initially
was assigned 5000 credits and a reputation value of 1. We compared the performance of
the DSR [29] routing algorithm in the following systems: i) a defenseless MANET with
neither reputation system nor price system (Defenseless), ii) a MANET with ARM, iii) a
MANET with a representative reputation system (Reputation) [67], and iv) a MANET with
a representative price system [37] (Price). To make the results comparable, rather than using
the absolute number of forwarded packets, we use Rl =

Dr
Df

to evaluate a node’s reputation

value in Reputation. Selﬁsh nodes maintain their reputation just above T . In routing, a
node chooses a node not on its blacklist for data forwarding. By default, every node just has
one reputation manager.

6.2.1

Comparison of Performance of Diﬀerent Systems
This experiment measures the system throughput with a certain fraction of uncoop-

erative and reputed nodes, in which these selﬁsh nodes keep their reputation just above the
reputation threshold.
Figure 6.16 plots the average system throughput of diﬀerent systems versus the percent of selﬁsh nodes. The ﬁgure shows that ARM generates a higher throughput than
Reputation, which produces a higher throughput than Defenseless. In Defenseless, a selﬁsh
node drops all of its received packets. Reputation can force selﬁsh nodes to be cooperative to
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a certain extent. However, a selﬁsh node can still keep Rg just above T by dropping received
packets with probability T . In ARM, selﬁsh nodes ﬁnally do not have enough credits to
pay for their transmission services and are put onto blacklists. Therefore, ARM produces
higher throughput than Reputation. Also, the ﬁgure shows the throughput of the system
decreases as the number of selﬁsh nodes grows. Since Defenseless and Reputation cannot
detect all selﬁsh nodes, their throughput decreases as the fraction of selﬁsh nodes grows. It
is intriguing to see that ARM also exhibits performance degradation though it can detect
most selﬁsh nodes. Such degradation is due to the reason that selﬁsh nodes may be chosen as
forwarding nodes before their credits are consumed. Also, avoiding selﬁsh nodes in routing
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Figure 6.16: Average system throughput
To verify the eﬀectiveness of punishing selﬁsh nodes by refusing their transmission
requests, we tested the throughput of packets generated by selﬁsh nodes over a time interval.
We setup 10 selﬁsh nodes and used them as source nodes. Figure 6.17 plots the throughput
of the selﬁsh nodes. In Defenseless, selﬁsh nodes maintain a constant throughput of 15kbps.
In Reputation, the throughput decreases as time elapses and then remains constant at 6kbps
because the selﬁsh nodes keep Rg just above T , thus their transmission requests are accepted
by other nodes. The throughput in ARM declines sharply over time and ﬁnally reaches 0.
That is, with the aid of account management, ARM can eﬀectively detect and punish selﬁsh
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nodes, excluding them from the network.
To evaluate the eﬃciency of the systems, we tested the overhead measured in kbps
for all overhead messages in the systems. In addition to the “hello” messages, the overhead messages in ARM also include those for topology construction and maintenance, and
reputation querying; in Reputation, the overhead also includes the messages for reputation
exchange; in Price, the overhead also includes the messages for credit payments. Figure 6.18
illustrates the overhead in each system versus network size. The ﬁgure demonstrates that
ARM yields much less overhead than Price, which produces less overhead than Reputation.
In ARM, since nodes only communicate with managers, the overhead is proportional to the
network size. Though ARM must construct and maintain the DHT infrastructure in node
mobility, its total overhead is still lower than the other systems. In Reputation, the reputation information is exchanged among local nodes periodically, resulting in much higher
overhead. In Price, credit circulation in the network generates transmission overhead. The
results conﬁrm that ARM consumes less resource than reputation and price systems.

6.2.2

Evaluation of the DHT Infrastructure in ARM
We measured the average, maximum, and minimum connectivity degree per manager

when the managers move at the speed of 1m/s, 10m/s, and 20m/s. In addition to the default
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experiment scenario with 10 managers, we also measured the performance with additional
10 and 20 managers, respectively.
Figure 6.19 shows that the smallest connectivity degree of a manager is about

N
.
2

The

ﬁgure also shows that more managers incur higher connectivity degree because a manager
has more neighbors in a DHT with more nodes. We ﬁnd that the node mobility does not
aﬀect the connectivity degree per manager, thus the proposed DHT maintenance mechanism
can establish new links immediately upon link breakups.
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Figure 6.19: Connectivity degree per manager
Figure 6.20 presents the average connection duration of managers versus node mobility. We also include the theoretical results based on Proposition 4.2.2 in the case of
“10 managers”. The ﬁgure demonstrates that when the mobility is 0.5 m/s, the DHT in123

frastructure is much more stable than other situations. As node mobility increases, the
average connection duration drops sharply. We also ﬁnd that because the high power interface permits a manager to contact a manager within a long range, the connection duration
is nearly identical. Thus, the number of managers does not greatly aﬀect the stability of
DHT infrastructure. The simulation results closely match the theoretical results as shown in
Proposition 4.2.2. The small gap between the simulation and theoretical results is because
the theoretical analysis does not consider the node pause time during movement.
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Figure 6.20: Average connection duration
Figure 6.21 shows the maintenance overhead of the DHT infrastructure versus node
mobility. The overhead is represented by the number of messages exchanged for DHT maintenance and grows with the increase of node mobility. Higher mobility leads to higher probability of link breakups, incurring higher maintenance overhead. The overhead also grows
as the number of managers increases, because more managers generate more messages for
DHT maintenance. Therefore, fewer nodes with low mobility should be chosen as managers
to reduce DHT maintenance overhead.
Figure 6.22 shows the number of nodes that have been reassigned IDs in DHT maintenance over time, speciﬁcally indicating that most often, two nodes need ID reassignment
for DHT maintenance. Although the physical link between nodes ni and nj is broken, they
still share the same manager neighbors. Therefore, by re-ordering the IDs of ni and nj
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and the shared neighbors, the DHT structure with numerically continuous IDs can often be
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Figure 6.22: Reassigned IDs in DHT maintenance

6.2.3

Evaluation of Misreport Resilience
We also tested whether ARM can accurately calculate node reputation with misre-

ports due to an adverse environment with interfering background noise. We increased the
background noise in 10 randomly chosen regions. All nodes in the system are cooperative.
Figure 6.31a shows node local reputations in the defenseless system. The low reputations are
caused by misreports due to background noise. It is very interesting to ﬁnd that the nodes
with low reputation are clustered. The reason is that in the adverse environment, physically
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Figure 6.23: Node reputation in adverse environment

close nodes experience the interference noise at the same time. Figure 6.31b shows ARM
can accurately reﬂect nodes’ reputation in the adverse environment while Reputation cannot
accurately reﬂect some nodes’ reputations. ARM is able to collect all reports in the system
by relying on its DHT infrastructure, identify the cooperative nodes in the adverse environment by analyzing the clustering features of the nodes with low reputations, and then ﬁlter
their reports.

6.2.4

Evaluation of False Accusation Resilience
In this experiment, all nodes are cooperative. We select some nodes that will delib-

erately evaluate their neighbors with low reputations randomly chosen between [0.3, 0.4].
In the defenseless system, every node rates its neighbors based on their forwarding
behavior. Figures 6.24(a) and (b) show the plot of all evaluated local reputations of each
node in a defenseless system with ﬁve and ten false-reporting nodes, respectively. Because of
the false-reports, some of the cooperative nodes are rated with low reputations. Comparing
Figures 6.24(a) and (b), we see that as the number of the false-reporting nodes increases,
the number of low reputations each node received increases.

126

1.2

1

1

Local reputation

Local reputation

1.2

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

60

Node id

10

20

30

40

50

60

Node id

(a) Five false-reporting nodes

(b) Ten false-reporting nodes

Figure 6.24: Local reputations in a defenseless system.

To make the global values of a given node in diﬀerent nodes identical, we used broadcasting to ensure that each node receives the local reputations from others. Figure 6.25
shows the global reputation of each node in Reputation and ARM. Reputation exhibits a
large variance in reputations and cannot accurately reﬂect the reputations of these nodes.
The reason is that in Reputation, each node considers the false reports when calculating the
global reputations. In the ﬁgure, all reputations in ARM are close to 1, which means ARM
can more accurately reﬂect node reputations. Some reputations are not 1 because some
cooperative nodes may drop packets due to transmission interference.
Comparing Figure 6.25(a) with Figure 6.25(b), we ﬁnd that more false-reporting
nodes in the system generate greater variance in node reputations in Reputation, while they
exert no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on node reputations in ARM. More false reports incur a greater
inaccuracy of node reputations in the ﬁnal global reputation calculation in Reputation. In
contrast, by taking advantage of the DHT infrastructure, ARM can eﬃciently gather all
local reputations of each node in the system and ﬁlter the false reports.
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Figure 6.25: Node reputations in a defensive system.

6.2.5

Evaluation of Collusion Resilience
According to the movement of the colluders, collusion is classiﬁed as both non-group

collusion and group collusion. In the former, the colluders move individually, and they
report a high reputation for each other when meeting together. In the latter, all colluders
in a group move together as a group, and always rate high reputations for each other.
We conducted experiments for both non-group collusion and group collusion. We consider
collusion in which colluders drop received packets with probability 0.3, and falsely report
low reputation randomly chosen between [0.3,0.4] for their neighboring cooperative nodes,
and higher reputation randomly chosen in [0.9,1] for other colluders.
Figures 6.26(a) and (b) show node local reputations in a defenseless system with 5
and 10 colluders, respectively. The ﬁgures show that a certain portion of nodes receive low
Rl s that are from the false reports of the colluders on benign nodes and correct reports from
benign nodes on colluders. Comparing the two ﬁgures, we ﬁnd that the number of low Rl s
is proportional to the number of colluders in the system.
Figures 6.27 (a) and (b) show the global reputation of each node in Reputation and
ARM in non-group collusion. Reputation exhibits a larger variance than ARM in the repu128
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Figure 6.26: Reputations in a defenseless system with non-group collusion.

tations of cooperative nodes, especially when the number of colluders increases. The reason
is that Reputation includes the false reports for the cooperative nodes in calculating global
reputation. More colluders lead to more false reports. By collecting all reports in the system
through the DHT infrastructure, ARM can easily identify and ﬁlter the reports from colluders that are largely diﬀerent from others, since the majority of the nodes in the system are
benign. Also, though both systems can identify the colluders, Reputation cannot accurately
reﬂect the Rg s of colluders since some colluders have high Rg s. The reason is that the colluders report high Rl s for each other when meeting each other. Reputation considers these
false reports while ARM ﬁlters them when calculating Rg .
Figure 6.28 shows the local reputations for group collision in a defenseless system.
Compared to Figure 6.26, Figure 6.28 has fewer low node Rl s for two reasons. First, in
the group node collusion, the colluders can always report high reputations for each other to
increase their own reputations. Second, more colluders generate more low Rl s for cooperative
nodes. Figures 6.29(a) and (b) show the global reputation with group collision in Reputation
and ARM. When the number of colluders is ﬁve, even though they always collude with each
other, Reputation and ARM can identify the colluders since the majority of the neighbors
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Figure 6.27: Reputations in a defensive system with non-group collusion.

of a colluder are benign. By ﬁltering the false reports, ARM generates more accurate Rg s
than Reputation for both cooperative nodes and colluders. However, when the number of
the colluders increases to ten, it is very diﬃcult for Reputation to detect colluders. Also,
ARM cannot detect some colluders directly based on reputation, since the majority of the
neighbors of a colluder are colluders and the false reports from the colluders overwhelm the
reports from benign nodes. The account management in ARM can help detect the colluders
as shown in Figure 6.30.
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Figure 6.28: Reputations in a defenseless system with group collusion.
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Figure 6.29: Reputations in a defensive system with group collusion.

Figure 6.30 shows the account value of each colluder versus the number of generated
packets in ARM. We can observe that the colluders’ account credits decrease linearly as they
generate more packets. Although the colluders can maintain a high Rg by rating each other
high and receiving fraudulent beneﬁts of a low service price, they will ultimately consume
their credits as they generate more packets, and ﬁnally are detected as uncooperative nodes
by deﬁcit accounts.
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Figure 6.30: Credits of colluders.
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6.2.6

Evaluation of Reputation Manager Auditing
In this section, we test the performance of the reputation manager auditing mecha-

nism. We set a diﬀerent number of malicious reputation managers in the system as either
local reputation or global reputation collection. We then ran twenty simulations and report
the average.
Figure 6.31 shows the malicious reputation manager detection rate in a local reputation calculation with varying number of malicious reputation managers in the system.
We see that the reputation manager auditing algorithm can eﬀectively detect the malicious
reputation managers when the number of malicious reputation managers is small. In this
situation, the probability that a node meets a malicious reputation manager during a certain time period is low. However, as the number of malicious nodes in the system increases,
the probability that a node meets a malicious manager increases. More malicious managers
report false reputations for a node, leading to a decreased detection probability. When the
number of malicious reputation managers in the system is very large, however, a node has a
high probability of meeting many malicious reputation managers with a detection rate that
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Figure 6.31: Malicious reputation manager detection in local reputation collection.
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We can also see from the ﬁgure that as the average mobility of the nodes in the system
increases, the probability of detection increases. Higher mobility enables a node to meet more
reputation managers in a reputation update period, which helps detect malicious reputation
managers based on reputation reports from more total reputation managers. Comparing
Figure 6.31 (a) and Figure 6.31 (b), we ﬁnd that as the reputation update period increases
from 10s to 20s, the detection rate increases. A longer reputation update period enables
a node to meet more reputation managers during the period, which helps detect malicious
reputation managers based on reputation reports from more total reputation managers.
Figure 6.32 shows the malicious reputation manager detection rate in global reputation calculation versus node mobility with varying number of malicious nodes in the system.
We see from the ﬁgure that, as the number of malicious reputation managers increases,
the malicious reputation manager detection rate decreases. The increased number of the
malicious reputation managers increases the probability that a node has a malicious owner
manager. We also see that node mobility does not aﬀect the detection rate because malicious
reputation managers are detected by the deviation of reported information, which is not affected by node mobility. Comparing Figure 6.32 (a) and Figure 6.32 (b), we ﬁnd that as
the number of reputation managers of one node increases, the malicious reputation manager
detection rate increases. Such increase is because given a constant number of malicious reputation managers in the system, as more reputation managers manage the reputation value
of a node, the ratings from malicious reputation managers can be more easily identiﬁed.

6.3

Evaluation of the SEDUM Routing Protocol
This section demonstrates the distinguishing properties of SEDUM through simula-

tion on “The ONE” simulator [53] in comparison with Epidemic routing [94] (denoted by
Epidemic), and Spray and wait routing [90] (denoted by SW) based on the basic community
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Figure 6.32: Malicious reputation manager detection in global reputation collection.
model and the Manhattan community model. “The ONE” simulator is speciﬁcally designed
for evaluating DTN routing and application protocols written in Java. In Epidemic, when
two nodes ni and nj meet each other, ni copies to nj its messages that nj has never received
before. In SW, a source node replicates a certain number of replicas to its neighbor nodes
in the system. The replica nodes buﬀer the replicas until meeting the destination node. We
also compared the frequency utility based SEDUM and duration utility based SEDUM. The
experimental results conﬁrm that the duration utility produces higher throughput and lower
delay than the frequency utility.
We used two node movement models (Figure 5.2): the basic community model and
the Manhattan community model. In the experiments, 150 nodes are i.i.d. in a 2000m ×
2000m area. We assigned 15 interest points including 7 home communities and 8 gathering
places, and randomly chose 10 nodes to share an interest point to show the colocation node
movement pattern. The home communities and gathering places are randomly distributed
in the area. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the moving speeds of mobile nodes were randomly
chosen from (0-20]m/s. Each node has a 40m transmission range and a 40Mb buﬀer size.
At every second, two nodes are randomly chosen to generate a new message with a size of
1Mb for a randomly selected destination node with a transmission rate of 2Mb/s for 2000
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seconds. We assigned the same priority of tolerable delay to all messages. Initially, each
node randomly chooses three points as its interested points and is assigned a probability to
visit each of these three points. The probability reﬂects the likelihood that a node will move
to the point. To move from one interest point to another, a node chooses the shortest path
based on the Dijkstra shortest path algorithm. The Basic community model imposes no
node movement restrictions. The Manhattan community model conﬁnes the routing paths
of the mobile nodes to certain paths that reﬂect their real moving pattern in addition to the
colocation pattern. The Manhattan model consists of grids in a matrix, in which all nodes
can only move on the sides of a grid.
We set a 5-hop Time to Live (TTL) for messages in the three protocols. The number
of replicas of a message in SEDUM and SW was set to eight. When a node is in a home
community, it will go to a gathering place with a probability of 0.8, and will go to other
randomly chosen places with a probability of 0.2. When a node is in a gathering place, it will
then go home with a probability of 0.5, and go to other places with a probability of 0.5. After
reaching a point of interest, the node will stay there for a time period randomly selected
between [10-15]s. When a node is at other places, it will go back to its home community
directly.
All experimental results were averaged over ten runs. A warm up period of 500s is
used at the beginning of the simulations to initialize the utility of SEDUM. The simulation
time is 4000s. We use SEDUM-20 and SEDUM-40 to represent nodes in SEDUM with
transmission range of 20m and 40m, respectively. It is similar to SW-20, SW-40, Epidemic20, and Epidemic-40. We are mainly interested in four metrics in the simulation:
(1) Message delivery delay: the average time period that it takes a message to be
delivered to its destination;
(2) Message delivery capability: the total number of messages that are delivered to
the destinations;
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(3) Message delivery overhead: the total amount of traﬃc needed to deliver the
messages, including control traﬃc (e.g. delivered message list and exchanged matrix table)
and replica exchanging traﬃc;
(4) Success rate: the ratio of the number of successful delivered messages to the total
number of initiated messages.

6.3.1

Evaluation of Message Delivery Delay
Figures 6.33 (a) and (b) show the average message delivery delay versus the node

buﬀer size in the Basic community and Manhattan community models, respectively. From
Figure 6.33, we observe that the delivery delay for all systems decreases greatly as the node
transmission range increases from 20m to 40m because a larger transmission range enables
a node to contact more neighbor nodes, which increases the probability of meeting the
destination or nodes having a high utility for the destination. Both ﬁgures show that the
average delivery delay decreases as the node buﬀer size increases. Epidemic shows a sharp
drop, while SEDUM and SW show slight drops. A larger buﬀer size enables a node to buﬀer
more messages in transmission, thus reducing the probability that a message is discarded
due to buﬀer congestion. Because of the ﬂooding, Epidemic produces many more message
copies, which increases the frequency of congested buﬀers. Thus, many messages are dropped
in small buﬀers, while large buﬀers enable nodes to store more messages in routing, thus
greatly reducing the routing delay. When the buﬀer size of a node is large enough to store
all of the messages in a system, a source node routes a message through the shortest path to
the destination by ﬂooding messages in the network. In this situation, the delay of Epidemic
is the lower bound of the network’s delay.
We can also see from both ﬁgures that SEDUM is delayed the least, although SEDUM
replicates a message to several nodes just as SW does. SW uses direct routing with O( NNc )
delay, in which messages are routed to their destinations merely by chance. SEDUM uses
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Figure 6.33: Delivery delay vs. buﬀer size.

probabilistic routing, in which the messages are routed to nodes with a higher probability
of meeting their destinations. In addition, the buﬀer management mechanism in SEDUM
further reduces delivery delay. SEDUM gives higher priority to both longer-lifetime messages
for transmission in routing and to higher-utility messages to retain in a buﬀer when it is
congested. Further, the multi-copy based probabilistic routing can increase the probability
that a replica is forwarded to its destination through a relatively shorter path. Thus, SEDUM
has lower message transmission delays than SW. As Epidemic relies on ﬂooding, it suﬀers
from severe buﬀer congestion because of limited buﬀer sizes and a tremendous number of
messages. When the buﬀer size is small, buﬀer congestions cause many message drops, which
cause the high delay in Epidemic. We also see that the delay of SEDUM is nearly identical
to Epidemic with a large buﬀer size, which means that SEDUM can reach the lower bound
of the delay performance of the network with a large buﬀer size.
Comparing Figures 6.33 (a) and (b), we ﬁnd that the transmission delay of SEDUM
in the Manhattan community model is lower than that in the Basic community model when
the transmission range equals 40m. The nodes only move along the edges of the grids, thus
increasing the probability that two nodes sharing similar movement patterns will meet. By
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capturing the colocation and familiar stranger attributes of the node movement pattern,
SEDUM’s duration utility can accurately reﬂect the communication capacity of two nodes.
Therefore, the messages are forwarded to the destination nodes through a number of relay
nodes that share increasingly similar movement patterns with the destination.
In contrast, SW in the Manhattan community model incurs a higher delivery delay
than in the Basic community model when the transmission range equals 40m. In SW, a
source node replicates a message to a number of neighbor nodes. A message is delivered to
the destination only when one replica node meets the destination. However, since the nodes
move along certain movement paths in the Manhattan community model, it is very likely
that no replica node can meet the destination node if the replica nodes belong to diﬀerent
communities. Therefore, the transmission delay of SW in the Manhattan community model
increases. We notice that with a 20m transmission range, SEDUM generates similar delays
in both models, as does SW. Because the transmission range is already small, diﬀerent node
movement models do not signiﬁcantly change the number of nodes a node can contact. For
Epidemic, the messages are ﬂooded in the system with TTL, which is not aﬀected by node
movement patterns. Thus, its delay in both models remains approximately the same.

6.3.2

Evaluation of Message Delivery Capability
Figures 6.34 (a) and (b) show the total delivery throughput versus the buﬀer size for

the Basic community and Manhattan community models, respectively. From both ﬁgures, we
see that a larger transmission range increases the throughput of SEDUM, SW, and Epidemic.
A shorter node transmission range reduces the probability of node contacts, thus reducing the
number of successfully delivered messages. Figures 6.34 (a) and (b) also show that SEDUM
produces a higher throughput than SW, followed by Epidemic. SEDUM forwards messages to
nodes in longer contact with the destination, thus enabling greater message delivery capacity.
Also, SEDUM has a buﬀer management protocol that gives higher-utility messages a higher
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priority to remain in a congested buﬀer and to give longer-lifetime messages a higher priority
to be sent out from a buﬀer. Without the utility and buﬀer management strategies, SW
only relies on direct routing with a TTL in the forwarding phase. Each node holds message
replicas until it either meets the destination node or the number of the message’s forwarding
hops exceeds the TTL. Messages must stay longer in the buﬀer to meet their destinations
as the node transmission range decreases. Therefore, more messages are dropped as their
TTL expires. As a result, SW suﬀers more than other routing protocols from a decrease of
transmission range. Since Epidemic severely suﬀers from buﬀer congestion, especially under
a high load due to ﬂooding, the throughput follows SEDUM>SW>Epidemic.
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Figure 6.34: Delivery throughput vs. buﬀer size.

We also see from the ﬁgures that as the buﬀer size increases, so does the number
of messages successfully delivered to their destinations. A larger buﬀer size means more
messages can be buﬀered, and the probability that a message is thrown away from a buﬀer
decreases. Therefore, the number of messages received by the destination nodes is increased.
The ﬁgures also demonstrate that when the buﬀer is large enough for most messages, the
throughput of SEDUM is comparable to Epidemic in a low-load network, indicating the high
throughput performance for SEDUM.
Comparing Figures 6.34 (a) and (b), we observe that SEDUM can deliver more mes139

sages in the Manhattan community model than in the Basic community model because nodes
with similar movement patterns have a high probability of meeting each other in the Manhattan community model. Also, the duration utility that can capture the colocation and
familiar stranger attributes of node movement patterns enables a message to travel along
a path consisting of nodes sharing a similar pattern of movement with the destination. As
this pattern expedites message delivery and avoids message congestion in node buﬀers, more
messages can be successfully delivered to their destination nodes. In contrast, since the
conﬁned routing paths may reduce the meeting probability of a replica node with the destination node, the delivery rate of SW in the Manhattan community model decreases. In
Epidemic, since a source always ﬂoods a message to the destination node, the number of
received messages in the Basic community model and the Manhattan model remains nearly
identical.

6.3.3

Evaluation of Message Delivery Overhead
Figures 6.35 (a) and (b) show the total overhead involved in message delivery in

the systems versus the buﬀer size in Basic community and Manhattan community models,
respectively. We see from the ﬁgures that as the node’s transmission range increases from
20m to 40m, the system transmission overhead is reduced. Such reduction is because a large
transmission range increases the chance of a node meeting the destination node in a short
time, leading to a reduced number of replicas exchanged in the system.
Figure 6.35 also shows that SEDUM has smaller overhead than SW, followed by
Epidemic. This is because the optimal tree replication and buﬀer management protocols
enable SEDEM to deliver the messages to their destinations in a much a shorter time than
SW and Epidemic, as shown in Figure 6.35, reducing the number of replicas exchanged in the
system. We also see from the ﬁgures that as the buﬀer size increases, so does the overhead
in transmission. When the buﬀer size is small, some of the replicas are dropped because of
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Figure 6.35: Delivery overhead vs. buﬀer size.
the congestion in the buﬀer. Therefore, the number of replicas exchanged in the system is
reduced. However, such low overhead is achieved at the cost of the high message delivery
delay and low message delivery capability, as shown in Figure 6.33 and Figure 6.34.
Comparing Figures 6.35 (a) and (b), we observe that SEDUM has slightly less overhead in the Manhattan community model than in the Basic community model. The less
overhead is due to the reason that nodes with similar movement patterns have a high probability of meeting each other in the Manhattan community model. Therefore, it takes fewer
replica exchanges to deliver a message, which leads to less overhead. In Epidemic, since a
source always ﬂoods a message to the destination node, the amount of overhead in both
models is almost identical. We also see from the ﬁgure that the overhead in SW for the
Manhattan model increases slightly as no replica node can meet the destination node if the
replica nodes belong to diﬀerent communities. Therefore, the number of replica exchanges
in SW for the Manhattan community model increases.
Figure 6.36 shows a further investigation into the message delivery overhead for SEDUM. We see from the ﬁgure that compared to the replica overhead, the amount of the
control overhead in SEDUM is negligible. The reason is that although the nodes in the
system must exchange their utility table and delivered message list constantly, the size of
141

the metadata in these tables and lists are in Kbytes, which is so small that the amount
of control overhead imposes negligible eﬀects on system performance compared to the data
messages. We also see from the ﬁgure that both the control overhead and the replication
overhead in the Manhattan community model is smaller than that of the Basic community
model. As shown in Figure 6.33, the message delivery in the Manhattan model is faster than
the Basic community model, a reduced number of replicas is buﬀered in each node, reducing
the amount of traﬃc in exchanges of replicas, utility tables, and delivered message lists.
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Figure 6.36: Overhead in SEDUM

6.3.4

Evaluation of the Eﬀect of the Number of Replicas on Delay
In this experiment, we varied the number of replicas per message from 2 to 10 with

an increase of 2 in each step, and measured the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
message delivery delay in the Manhattan community model, as shown in Figure 6.37. In
the ﬁgure, “250+” means that the message delivery delay is larger than 250s. We can see
from the ﬁgure that as the number of replicas per message increases, more messages can
be delivered in a short time. However, the delay decrease rate is not proportional to the
number of replicas per message. As we can see, the message delivery delay with 8 replicas
per message is slightly less than that with 10 replicas per message. The result is in line with
Theorem 5.3.1.
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6.3.5

Comparison of Diﬀerent Replication Methods
In this section, we compare the performance of SEDUM for the Manhattan community

model using diﬀerent replication methods: optimal tree replication, source tree replication,
and binary tree replication. Table 6.1 shows the comparison results of the methods in terms
of the average overhead, the average delay, and the average throughput. We see from the
table that the source tree replication method leads to the largest amount of overhead, the
longest average delay, and the smallest average throughput. This is because the source tree
replication method is the slowest replica replication as only the source node is allowed for
the message replication. Such requirement reduces the chance for a replica to meet the
destination node. The longer the time for a message to be delivered, the longer the time the
message must stay in the buﬀer, which may result in congestion and reduce the throughput.
Meanwhile, the longer the time a message stays in the buﬀer, the higher the chance of the
message being exchanged among nodes, which can result in a high delivery overhead. Since
in binary tree replication, every node holding the replica is allowed to forward the replicas to
2 neighboring nodes, the performance of the binary tree replication is better than the source
tree replication. Since the optimal tree replication method is the fastest replication method
as explained in Section 5.2.3, the optimal tree replication has the highest performance.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of diﬀerent replication methods
Ave. overhead:
Ave. delay:
Ave. throughput:

6.3.6

Optimal tree Source tree
16112.4Mb 17514.4Mb
117s
213s
3970Mb
3714Mb

Binary tree
16943.8Mb
141s
3873Mb

Comparison of Frequency Utility and Duration Utility
In this section, we compare the frequency utility based routing and the duration utility

based routing to verify our analytical results in Section 5.1. We use the Manhattan community model to simulate the movement of nodes since this model is more realistic. Figures 6.38
(a) and (b) show the success rate of SEDUM using the duration utility and the frequency
utility with 0.4Mb and 4Mb message sizes, respectively. In the ﬁgures, SEDUM-D-20 denotes SEDUM using the duration utility and a 20m node transmission range. SEDUM-F-20
denotes SEDUM using the frequency utility and a 20m node transmission range. SEDUMD-40 and SEDUM-F-40 use a 40m node transmission range. The experimental results follow SEDUM-D-40>SEDUM-D-20≈SEDUM-F-40>SEDUM-F-20. Since a larger transmission range enables a node to contact more nodes, SEDUM-F and SEDUM-D in the 40m
node transmission range generate higher success rates than SEDUM-F and SEDUM-D with
20m transmission range. Since the duration utility can more accurately reﬂect the communication capacity between two nodes, the transmission success rate in SEDUM-D is much
greater than in SEDUM-F with the same transmission range. A comparison of Figures 6.38
(a) and (b) shows that as the message size increases, the success rate of SEDUM-F decreases,
while that of SEDUM-D remains almost identical. A larger message size increases the probability that messages are dropped during transmission due to broken links. This is consistent
with Theorem 5.1.1, which implies that larger messages reduce throughput between two
nodes. Nodes with a high frequency utility do not necessarily have a long communication
time for each contact. A relay node may fail to send a complete message because of the
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short communication period between two nodes despite their frequent meetings. The result
conﬁrms the higher accuracy of the duration utility than the frequency utility in reﬂecting
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Figure 6.38: Comparison of duration utility and frequency utility based routings versus buﬀer
size.
Figures 6.39 (a) and (b) show the relationship between the success rate and node
mobility with 0.4Mb and 4Mb message sizes, respectively. As the node mobility increases,
the message delivery throughput of both SEDUM-D and SEDUM-F decreases. As the node
mobility increases, the expected contact duration between the nodes decreases, resulting in
fewer messages transferred between nodes due to a limited contact time. We also observe
a slight decrease in SEDUM-D and a dramatic decrease in SEDUM-F. This discrepancy is
because the duration utility can more accurately reﬂect the communication capacity between
nodes based on the node movement patterns. Using the duration utility, messages are always
forwarded to nodes with higher communication capacities with the destination nodes, which
leads to a higher transmission success rate. SEDUM-F uses contact frequency as the routing
utility that helps route a message to a node that frequently meets the destination. As
node mobility increases, the contact duration between nodes decreases even if they have
high contact frequency, thereby increasing the probability of message drops. Consequently,
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Figure 6.39: Comparison of duration utility and frequency utility based routings versus
mobility.
Comparing Figures 6.39 (a) and (b), similar to Figures 6.38 (a) and (b), we notice
that the performance of SEDUM-F is aﬀected more by the message size than SEDUM-D
for the same reason. The frequency utility mainly captures the familiar stranger attribute
of the node movement patterns. A node with a high frequency utility to another node may
have small contact duration with the node in a contact, which makes large-size messages
more likely to be dropped. The duration utility can capture both colocation and familiar
stranger attributes of node movement patterns. That is, the duration utility considers not
only node contact duration but also contact frequency. Since nodes with long contact durations can transmit messages with large sizes, the transmission success rate of SEDUM-D
is only marginally aﬀected by the message size. These experimental results are in line with
Theorem 5.1.2.
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6.4

Summary
In this chapter, we evaluated the performance of the proposed mechanisms in terms

of trustworthiness, scalability and eﬃciency. The evaluation results for trustworthiness show
that compared to the reputation and price systems, the integrated system can provide the
highest cooperation incentives. The integrated system is also more eﬀective to detect the
selﬁsh nodes and sequentially reduce the system packet dropping rate of the reputation and
price systems. The evaluation results for scalability show that ARM can provide eﬃcient reputation management in MANETs with the lowest overhead compared to the reputation and
price systems. Also, ARM can eﬀectively identify falsiﬁed, conspiratorial and misreported
information so as to provide accurate node reputations that truly reﬂect node behaviors.
The evaluation results for routing eﬃciency show that the duration utility in SEDUM can
achieve a higher packet transmission success rate compared to the frequency utility. SEDUM
can also achieve the highest message delivery throughput and lowest message delivery delay
compared to the spay and wait and epidemic routing algorithms.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work

7.1

Summary and Findings
As distributed wireless systems require all nodes in the network to cooperatively

conduct a task, encouraging the cooperation of the nodes is crucial for the proper function
of these systems. Reputation and price systems are two main approaches to deal with
the cooperation problem in distributed wireless networks. However, the current reputation
and price systems cannot eﬀectively encourage the cooperation of the nodes in the system.
Moreover, these two systems result in high overhead for reputation or price management
as well as a low eﬃciency in selﬁsh and colluding node detection. In this dissertation, we
proposed mechanisms for distributed wireless systems to enhance trustworthiness, scalability,
and eﬃciency.
To increase the trustworthiness of the distributed wireless systems, we initially analyzed the underlying cooperation incentives of the reputation and price systems and the
defenseless system using cooperative and non-cooperative game models in Chapter 3. In
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the cooperative game we found that each node earns the maximum beneﬁt only when they
form a grand coalition, in which all nodes in the system are cooperative. To form such a
coalition, however, the cooperative strategy should be enforced by a third party. Based on
the non-cooperative game model, we identiﬁed several problems that limit the cooperation
incentives provided by both reputation and price systems. The strategies of using a threshold
to determine the trustworthiness of a node in the reputation system and the strategies of
rewarding cooperative nodes in the price system may be manipulated by clever but selﬁsh
nodes. These limitations will result in a high packet dropping rate of the whole system.
Based on the investigation results, we have proposed an integrated system to leverage the
advantages of both the reputation and price system, by integrating the misbehavior detection mechanism from the reputation system and the cooperation incentive mechanism from
the price system. The integrated system can also overcome their individual disadvantages.
The theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the integrated system can provide
higher cooperation incentives than the reputation and price system alone in terms of higher
payoﬀs for the cooperation strategy and make the cooperative strategy to be the NE and
Pareto-optimal. The system is also more eﬀective in selﬁsh node detection, which can greatly
reduce the packet dropping rate of the whole system.
To achieve high scalability, in Chapter 4, we further proposed a hierarchical Accountaided Reputation Management system (ARM) based on the theoretical results in Chapter 3,
which can eﬃciently and eﬀectively deter node selﬁsh behaviors and provide cooperation incentives with small overhead. ARM builds an underlying locality-aware DHT infrastructure
to eﬃciently collect global reputation information in the entire system for node reputation
evaluation, which avoids periodical message exchange, reduces information redundancy, and
more accurately reﬂects a node’s trustworthiness. ARM has functions of reputation management and account management, the integration of which fosters the cooperation incentives
and non-cooperation deterrence. ARM can detect the uncooperative nodes that gain fraud149

ulent beneﬁts while still being considered as trustworthy in previous reputation and price
systems. Also, it can eﬀectively identify falsiﬁed, conspiratorial, and misreported information to provide accurate node reputations that truly reﬂect node behaviors. The simulation
results show that ARM can greatly reduce the system overhead compared to the reputation
and price systems alone as well as accurately calculate the global reputation of the nodes
and eﬀectively detect selﬁsh and colluding nodes.
Based on the trustworthy and scalable mechanisms, we proposed a Social nEtwork
and Duration Utility based distributed Multi-copy routing protocol (SEDUM) for DTNs
in Chapter 5. In many DTN applications, the movements of mobile devices have certain
patterns as the devices in these scenarios are the extensions of the hosts (i.e., human or
animals), which normally exhibit colocation and familiar stranger features. We design a
new metric, “duration utility”, captures both colocation and familiar stranger attributes
for message routing. Taking advantage of the duration utility, SEDUM fully exploits node
movement patterns in the social network to increase delivery throughput and decrease delivery delay while generating low overhead. SEDUM replicates a new message to a certain
number of nodes, which hold the replicas until meeting other nodes with higher duration
utilities to the destinations. A message is forwarded in this way until one of its replicas
reaches its destination. SEDUM includes a buﬀer management mechanism to improve performance. We also used a Markov chain to calculate the minimum number of copies of a
message for a given delivery delay. The simulation results show that the proposed routing
protocol outperforms the epidemic routing and spray and wait routing in terms of higher
message delivery throughput, lower message delivery delay, lower message delivery overhead,
and higher packet delivery success rate.
Chapter 6 presents the evaluation results for trustworthy, scalable and eﬃcient distributed wireless system. The evaluation results for trustworthiness show that compared
to the reputation and price systems, integrated system can provide highest cooperation
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incentives. The Integrated system is also more eﬀective to detect the selﬁsh nodes and sequentially reduce the packet dropping rate of the whole system compared to the reputation
and price systems. The evaluation results for scalability show that ARM can provide eﬃcient reputation management in MANETs with lowest overhead compared to reputation and
price systems. Also, ARM can eﬀectively identify falsiﬁed, conspiratorial and misreported
information so as to provide accurate node reputations that truly reﬂect node behaviors.
The evaluation results for routing eﬃciency shows that duration utility can achieve a higher
packet transmission success rate compared to the frequency utility. SEDUM can also achieve
the highest message delivery throughput and lowest message delivery delay compared to spay
and wait and epidemic routing algorithm.

7.2

Future Work
In the future, the following issues can be addressed.

Security in Communication. In the ARM system, the reputation managers are encouraged to manage the reputation and account values of all nodes in the system. However,
such reputation managers are vulnerable to distributed deny of service (DDOS) attacks by
malicious nodes. The malicious nodes can send many junk messages to reputation managers
to prevent these managers from receiving reputation reporting from normal nodes. How
to prevent the distributed system from DDOS attack is an interesting subject for future
research.
Hybrid Networks. In this dissertation, we focused on the trustworthiness, scalability,
and eﬃciency of distributed wireless systems such as MANETs and DTNs. The use of
hybrid wireless networks is also a promising communication network in the future. A hybrid
wireless network is a combination of a MANET and an infrastructure network. In a hybrid
network, base stations in the infrastructure act as relays for mobile nodes in MANET for
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long distance communications and Internet access, while MANET extends the coverage of the
infrastructure network. Given such a new network model, how to ensure the trustworthiness,
scalability, and eﬃciency of the communication between mobile nodes is also an interesting
topic.
Altruism Analysis in Game Theory. In this dissertation, we used game theory models
to evaluate the incentives provided by reputation systems, price systems, and the proposed
integrate system. Game theory assumes that all the nodes in the game are self-interested.
However, in reality, such an assumption does not always hold. Altruism is also common in
our society. Therefore, how does altruism of the node aﬀect the cooperation modeling for
reputation and price systems will be an interesting topic for future research.
Real System Implementation. In this dissertation, theoretical modeling and simulation
are used as major approaches to evaluate our proposed mechanisms. In the future, we would
like to implement the mechanisms proposed in this dissertation in real systems such as mobile
phone applications. By tracing interactions between real users through real applications, we
can evaluate the eﬀectiveness of our proposed mechanisms in the real-world scenario, which
can provide more realistic indication to improve the proposed mechanisms in the dissertation.
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